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BOEEEHP. BOWIIE'S DOCTEINE 01
TEE SPECULATIVE SIONIFICAITCE OF PHEEDOM
Introduction, p. 1.
The problem of freedoa, p. 1.
1. The prohlem stated, p. 1.
2, Possible attitudes toward the problem of freedom, p. 9.
a. Treedom is a significant speculative postiilate of
thou^t, p. 9.
1. The teaching of Epicurus about freedom, p. 12.
2. The uncritical point of view of absolute freedom, p.
3. The point of view of limited freedom, p. 15.
a. Freedom confining choice to an alternative
between two organized necessities, p. 15.
b. The point of view of freedom as self-
determination, p. 16.
c. The point of view of freedom as freedom of
action, p. 17,
d. The doctrine of rational freedom, p. 18.
e. Itychlsm, or irrational freedom, p. 22.
1. Bergsonlan freedom, p. 22.
2. James' doctrine of freedom, p. 23.
b. Freedom Is an Incoherent hypothesis, p. 25.
1. The hypothesis of necessitarianism, p. 25.
2. The hypothesis of de termini an as a modification of
necessitarianism, p. 28.
c. The two doctrines of Sidgwlct stated and estimated, p. 30.
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1, The insoluble character of the prohlem of freedom, p. 30.
2. The uniiaportance of the prohlem of freedom, p. 33.
d. Jreedom as an uhenmndener Standpvuakt . p. 34.
3. Bowne's criticism of the historical approach t6 the problem, p. 35.
B. The method of investigation, p. 40.
1. A study of Bowne's sources relative to the problem of freedom, p. 40.
2. A critical and systonatic exposition of Bowne's teaching about
freedom, p. 40.
3. Reconstruction of the problem in the li^t of present insist, p. 41.
0, Ttie object of the dissertation is to examine critically Bowne's teach-
ing that the postulate of freedom is of deep speculative significance,
p. 41.
Body, p. 42.
The relation of Bowne to modem philosophical thought, p. 42.
1. Leibnitz, p. 42.
2. Berkeley, p. 49.
3. Kant, p. 53.
4. Hegel, p. 62.
5. Herbart, p. 68.
6. Lotze, p. 71.
7. Ulrici, p. 81.
8. Eenouvier, p. 87.
9. James, p. 92.
Id. H. Bergson, p. 94.
B. A critical and systematic ejgjosition of Bowne's doctrine of the
speculative significance of freedom, p. 101.
1. The nature of freedom, p. 101.
a. The definition of freedom, p. 101.
1. Controversial aspects of the definition, p. 103.
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a. Misunderstanding due to the use of language, p. 103,
1). The definition too inclusive, p. 105.
c. The relation of freedan to the self not adequately-
expressed, p. 106.
2. The fundamentsd characteristics of Bowne's definition of
freedom, p. 107.
a. The definition is inductive in character, p. 107.
h. Freedom is limited to a rational agent, p. 107.
c. Freedom implies purpose, p. 108.
d. Freedcaa implies creativity, p. 108,
e. Freedom is limited in scope within consciousness, p. 109.
f. Freedom is related to causal uniformity rather than
to tychism, p. 109.
g. Freedom the power of contrary choice, p. 109.
3. The definition of freedom is independent of the question
of the reality of freedom, p. 109.
h, Bowne's method of investigating the problem of freedom, p. 110.
1. The inductive character of the study, p. 110.
2. The purpose is not to demonstrate a theorem but to solve
a problem, p. 111.
3. Freedom ase-umed as a postulate the origin of which lies
beyond the scope of inquiry, p. 112.
2. What Bowne included under the speculative significance of
freedom, p. 112.
a. Freedom and reason, p. 112.
b. The advantages of the study of the problem of freedcxa in
connection with reason, p. 113.
1. It avoids the tangle of discussion concerning motives
in the determination of the will, p. 113.
2. It calls attention to freedom and its significance for
the inner thought life rather than to executive activities
in the outer world, p. 113.
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3. yreedom in thou^t is practically admitted by every-
one, p. 113.
4. It is implied in the nature of delsate and argumentation
idiere its significance can "be made apparent, p. 113,
c. The scope of application of the doctrine in which it has
permanent significance, p. 114.
1. Microcosmic aspect, p. 114.
a. Bowne's doctrine of the self, p. 114,
h. The epistemological argument for freedom, p. 114.
1. Freedom and reason, p. 114.
2. freedom and any rational science, that is, the
theoretical or scientific interest, p. 114.
c. Freedom and life, the ethical or practical interest,
p. 115.
2. Uacrocosmic aspect, p. 115.
a. Freedom and eill philosophy, or the speculative de-
mand, p. 115.
h. Freedom and theology, or the religious interest, p.
116.
3. Freedom and rational ideals, p. 117.
3. The analysis of the doctrine, p. 117.
a. Bowne's doctrine of the self, p. 117.
b. F2*eedom and reason, p. 125.
1, The definition of reason, p. 125.
2, The negative argument for freedom, p. 126.
a. The problem created "by the dilemma of determinism,
p. 126,
1. Rationality requires the postulate of the
trustworthiness of reason, p, 126.
2. Notwithstanding this postulate, a large part of
human thinking finds itself involved in error,
p. 126.

"b. The iacompetence of the hypothesis of necessity to
deal with this antincMny of thou^t, p. 126.
1. Both true and false ideas are equally effects,
p. 126.
2. The necessity and possihility of a criterion
for thou^t, p. 127.
3. The possibility of the application of a criterion
for truth, p. 128.
c. Bowne's refutation of Spencer's nescience, p. 129.
1. Die denial of knowledge, p. 129.
2. ISrror is therefore cosmic in character on every
necessitsirian scheme, p. 129.
3. The positive eurgoment for freedom, p. 132.
a. !Ihe essential trustworthiness of our mental faculties
must be assumed, p. 132.
1. The constitution of reason only partially auto-
matically conditioned, p. 132.
2. Careless use of these faculties accounts for the
rise of error, p. 133.
b. The freedom of reason necessary to ratify and control
the operation of thou^t according to an ideal of
truth, p. 133.
1. The finite mind as the source of error from this
point of view, p. 135.
2. This vindication of reason is not the power to
make things true or fadse at will, p. 135.
c. Bowne's alleged discovery of the unity of freedom and
uniformity in rationality, p. 135.
1. Freedom the source of truth in knowledge, p. 136.
2. rreedom the soTiirce of error in knowledge, p. 136.
d. The argument for freedcsn as revealed in the logical
character of de'bate, p. 136.
1. The self-abnegating character o£ determinism in
argumentation, p. 136.
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2. Bowne's discovery that the purest illustration of
freedom to be found is in the operation of pure
thou^t implied "but not sufficiently developed,
p. 137.
3. The significance of this teaching for education,
p. 138.
4. The limited sphere of human freedcan, p. 139.
a. The various mechanisms within consciousness independt-
ent of volitional control, p. 139.
1. The laws of thou^t, p. 139.
2. The forms of eaperience, p. 139.
3. The categories of thou^t p. 139.
4. The laws of association of ideas, p. 139.
5. Little or no direct control over the feelings,
p. 139.
6. The judgaents of conscience forever secure from
volitional modification, p. 140.
"b. Uniformity edways allied with freedom even in the
absolute being so that freedom is never a aynonym for
lawlessness, p. 140.
5. The validity of Bowne's teaching concerning freedom and
reason, p. 142.
a. Points of correction and extension in the argument,
p. 142.
1. An examination of the argument that mechanigoi can
produce no criterion for truth, p. 142.
2. An examination of the contention that freedom is
the source of both truth and error in knowledge,
p. 143.
a. How account for the insight into truth re-
sulting from such involuntary mechanisms
as the subconscious? p. 143.
1. The relation between truth so attained and
previous volitional activity, p. 143.
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2. ThiB e35)lanation an insufficient answer to
the problem raised, p. 143.
"b. The problem of origin and validity applied to
freedcwi as the source of truth and error,
p. 144.
c. Freedom is rather the only dependable or trust-
worthy condition possible to the discovery of
truth and error, or the sole dependable or
trustworthy discovery of truth and error is
possible only to freedom, p. 144.
b. The essential correctness of Bowne's argument and its
significance, p. 144.
1. The insist that freedom and uniformity must be
united in rationality and that neither can dis-
pense with the other, p. 144.
a. Provides against tychism, p. 145.
b. Provides against necessitarianism, p. 145.
2. Proper rationality is possible only to freedom,
p. 145.
3. Freedom, which implies reason, also implies the
hi^est category, that of purpose, p. 145.
4. The hypothesis of rational freedom offers the only
e3q)lanation for the ability of groups of persons
widely separated and with different heredity and
environment Independently t.o arrive at the
same truths, such as the principles of morality and
of mathematics, p. 146.
c. Freedom and any rational science, p. 147.
1. The independent character of truths of reason and those
of physical science, p. 147.
a. The superficial character of spontaneous thou^t,
p. 148.
b. But science aims at knowledge which is profound and
exact, p. 148.
1. Such knowledge is impossible as a mechanical pro-
duct, p. 149.
2. The scientific ideal intplicit in a free mind de-
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Toted to truth, the only explaziation of science and
all'hi^er knowledge, p. 149.
2. The converse argoment that freedon annuls any and all
rational science, p. 149.
a. The postvilates of science, p. 149.
1. The uniformity of law renders the possi^bility of
ccanprehending free action unthinkable, p. 1^,
2. The mechanical conception of causality, p. 150.
a. Zvery event has its necessary cause which con-
tains it, hence freedom is impossible, p. 150.
t. If every event is not determined and freedom is
true, science is impossible, p. 151.
b. The postulates of science restated, p. 151.
1. Treedom and causality not incompatible, p. 154.
a. Finite volition continually plays into an order
of law, p. 154.
b. There is no reason for denying cosmic freedom
this capacity, p. 154.
2. FreedCMa is no barrier to the uniformity of law,
and vice versa , p. 154.
a. The contingency of the laws of nature, p. 154.
b. Freedom and uniformity not antithetical but
correlative terms which unite in rationality,
p. 164.
3. Two kinds of causation, p. 155.
a. Mechanical causation, p. 155.
b. Volitional causation, p. 155.
1. The law of causation requires us only to
seek an agent for every act, p. 157.
2. The nature of such an agent is left un-
determined so far as the law goes, p. 157.
3. Free causality as possible as any other and
experience has contact with no other cause,
p. 157.
(
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4, yreedan and xmiformity must unite in rationality
in order to provide the ground for scientific
knowledge, p. 158.
c. Minor criticians of freedom, p. 158,
1. Preedom of the will equivalent to tychism, p. 158.
2. The objection that the wei^tiest motives determine
volitional action in the light of which freedom is
an illusion, p. 158.
3. What a self can do, that it must do as an ohjection
to freedom, p. 159.
3, The irrelevancy of the argament that freedom invalidates
science, p. 159.
a. The field of science defined and its problem stated,
p. 160.
t. The field of philosophy defined and its problem stated,
p. 160.
c. The Irrelevancy is now seen to consist in confusing
the two problems, p. 161.
d. Treedom and life, the ethical or practical interest, p. 163.
1. Treedom is not a postulate given 1;^ the speculative
reason, p. 163.
a. The impossibility of any apriori demonstration of
freedom, p. 163.
b. No form of apodeictic certainty possible, p. 163.
c. Speculative reflection may assist in educing the idea
into clear consciousness and rendering it consistent,
p. 164.
2. The postulate of freedom is something rooted in life itself
as the precondition of any and all morality whatsoever,
p. 165.
a. The practical basis of belief requires us to postulate
the great catholic beliefs of the race as facts,
p. 165.
b. To deny the postulate of freedcan the mind would fall
into discord with itself and life would lose itself in
inner contradiction, p. 167,
(
X1. The method of rigor and vigor irrelevant, p. 167.
a. Logic is regulative, not constitutive, p. 167.
"b. Life is deeper than logic, p. 167,
2. What life demands, in the ahsence of absolute
proof to the contrary, must "be allonved, p. 167,
a. We find freedom supported "by a somewhat posi-
tive consciousness, p. 167.
"b. We find it also implied in the principles "by
which men and societies live, p. 167.
c. The e^erience of freedom in the human con-
sciousness could not "be any clearer if proven
true than it actually is, p. 167.
3. Mechanism the sophisticated product of an ideal of
reflection which falls of sheer ahgurdity when in-
voked to explain personal life, p. 167.
4. In inquiry into the validity of the argument that freedom
is true because of practical necessity
^ p. 168.
a. Negative criticism, p. 168.
1, The unclear character of life as a criterion
for truth and the difficulty involved in apply-
ing it, p. 168.
a. Freedom as a catholic belief of the race
admits of no proof, p. 169.
b. Freedom as a catholic belief of the race
is a fallacy of abstraction, p. 170.
c. Freedom &8 a catholic belief of the race or
consensup gentium is a faulty criterion for
truth, p. 170.
d. Clearness of freedom in consciousness not a
criterion for its validity, p. 171.
e. Feeling is no proof of freedom, p. 172.
f. The criticism that life is deeper than logic
is meaningless apart from reason which can-
not be denied without at the same time being
affirmedj p. 172.

g. Bowne's argument that the debate between
necessity and freedom is at best a drawn battle
surrenders rationality to intuition, p. 173,
1. But, since nothing is foreign to the law
of contradiction, life's intuitions must
also be subjected to it, p. 174.
2. Zven though reason could not be surrendered
and even thou^ it were shown to be inade-
quate, there is no cause for reasoning less
efficiently than is absolutely necessary
in the attempt to make experience coherent^
p. 174.
h. The logical absurdity of mechanism is no proof
of freedom and no disproof of mechanism, p. 175.
2. Bowne's criticism of the possibility of a criterion
for truth, p. 176.
a. The eclectic character of his thou^t about
truth, p. 176.
1. The stress on rational consistency, p. 176.
2. The pragnatic emphasis, p. 177.
3. The appeal to intuitioniem, p. 178.
b. The net result of the criterion for truth is
left in unstable equilibrium, p. 178.
b. Positive criticism, p. 178.
1. The precedence of concrete life over formal logic
is essential, p. 178.
2. The fact that freedom has evolved as one of the
hi^er forms of mental evolution as an act of
faith is certainly significant, p. 178.
3. The utility of freedom or its necessary assumption
by life and society is apparent, i.e. the recogni-
tion and assumption of duty and responsibility,
p. 178.
Treed(»n and all philosophy or the speculative demand, p. 178.
1. It is necessary to postulate a free intelligent cause as the
source of the outer world, and, in fact, of all existence
in order to satisfy the rational mind or the nature of
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Intelligence and to bring any line of thought to an end^
p. 179.
a. The mind's desire for explanation and the insight that
freedom is the condition of any real eagplanation,
p. 179.
1. Ejqplanation defined, p. 180.
2. Kinds of explanation, p. 180.
a. Szplanation by classification, p. 180.
b. Scientific explanation and its limitations,
p. 181.
c. Two metaphysical types of explanation, p. 182.
1. The explanation of mechanism and its in-
herent defects J p. 183.
a. It l^ses into a groundless becoming^
p. 185.
b. It Inyolves Infinite regress^ p. 185.
c. Progress is rendered sxiperficial if not
denied outri^t, p. 185.
d. The contingency of the laws of nature,
p. 185.
2. Explanation by free intelligence is the only
tiltimate and satisfactory e:q)lanation,
p. 186.
a. Dae imperfect and unsatisfactory char-
acter of much that passes for ejqplana-
tion, p. 186.
b. The advantages of explanation by free
intelligence, p. 186.
b. Free intelligence the only possible solution of the
problem involved in the categories of change and
Identity, p. 186.
1. The definition of change, p. 186.
a. The apparent contradiction involved in the idea
of change as applied to concrete things, p. 187.
b. The Heraclitean conception of change, p. 187.
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c. The contradictory character of the notion of a
changeless thing with changing states, p. 187.
d. The difficulty of distinguishing a changing
thing frcxa a series of different things on
the impersonal plane, p. 187.
2. The definition of identity, p. 188.
a. Logical identity, p. 188,
"b. Phenomenal identity, p. 188,
c. Metaphysical identity, p. 188.
3. The meaning of identity on the impersonal plane^
p. 188,
a. The untenahil ity of the Heatic notion of
changelessness, p. 188.
"b. Identity in Impersonal reality equivalent to
continuity and constancy of law, p. 188.
4. The solution of the apparent inherent ultimate
antinomy "between the two principles of reason,
change and identity, is possihle only on the
personal plane, p, 188,
a. The antinomy of change and identity stated on
the impersonal plane, p. 188.
"b. The removal of this abstract antinomy on the
personal plane in self-conscious intelligence,
p. 189.
1. In experience we have a union of identity
and change, p. 189.
a. The self or so\il persists as a con-
crete changing "being, p. 189,
1, The self not a rigid substance^
p. 189,
2, The self a changing reality Tdiere-
in memory constitutes continxiity
and identity, p. 189.
h. The inexplicable character of the
union of change and identity in self-
conscious experience, p. 189,
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2, Transcendental «npiricism reveals personal-
ity and intelligence as ultimate facts,
p. 189.
a. The mind is deeper than its categories
and explains them, p. 189.
"b. Change and identity are therefore
explained in free intelligence, p. 189.
FreedCHQ and the speculative danand for unity, p. 190.
1. The irapossitility of achieving more than a merely
formal, conceptual or verhal unity on the neces-
sitarian plane, p. 190.
a. The legitimacy of the ideal of unity or syste-
matic totality as a demand of reason, p. 190.
b. Mechanical explanation as an ideal of specula-
tive unity cannot escape a groundless plurality,
p. 190.
c. It is also doomed to failure because of its
inability to bring any line of thought to an
end, p. 191.
2. Concrete and real \inity possible only to free in-
telligence, p. 191.
a. A free mind back of the cosmos in the only way
in which a plurality can be integrated into a
true unity, p. 191.
b. It is likewise the sole ground for different-
iating a unitary necessity into a plurality,
p. 191.
3. Free volitional causality the only condition of
reconciling the categories of unity and plurality,
p. 192.
a. Free intelligence the only thing that can be
manifold without being many, p. 192.
b. Free intelligence the only thing that can posit
plurality over against itself and maintain its
own unity, p. 192.
Freedom the condition of the unification of a system of
things with a common so\irce into a plan of purposeful
activity, p. 192.
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1, Treedom eind. purpose, p. 192.
a. Definition of purpose, p. 193.
"b. Purpose includes free dan, p. 193.
1. Difficulties in the enrpirical teleological
argument, p. 193.
a. Teleology cannot be based on esperlence
much of which reveals no purpose, p. l93,
t. To argue that absence of piirpose is
merely our inability to understand an
unseen plan is at best our conviction,
not our eagperience of that plan, p. 193.
c. Ihere purpose is discernible in the op-
eration of natural agents, the end
rarely appears of sufficient value to
sacrifice for its attainment, p. 193.
d. Since we cannot prove that nature's
agencies are designed to produce ends,
we must conclude that whatever ends are
realized in natxire are but the necessary
results and outcome of natural agencies,
p, 193.
2. Counter arguments whidi off-set these objec-
tions to teleology, p. 193.
a. Teleology not demonstrable from ej^jer-
ience but a necessary assumption to
every theory of knowledge, p. 193.
b. Since all natural science is based on
the assumption of a rational universe,
the denial of this postulate is as
suicidal to science as to teleology,
p. 193.
3. Assumptions which underlie the anti-teleo-
logical argument, p. 194.
a. Two basic assumptions, p. 194.
1. The lex continui . p. 194.
2. The assumption that the physical
agents include all being, p. 194.
b, A third assumption of the anti-teleolo-
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gist is that mind raust "be observed in nat-
ure in order to "be proved and that this is
the most perfect world and order of atoms
is merely an assumption, p. 194.
c. A fourth aJBSumption of the anti-design
argument is that the physical agents
which are causes are endowed with what-
ever is necessary to explain their acti-
vity; anti-teleolo^, therefore, e:qplains
nothing but assumes everything, p^ 194.
d. Therefore natural laws are univer-
sally uniform and everything has its
physical antecedents, p. 194.
e. Also the present is the necessary
and only possihle result of the past,
p. 194.
4. The fallacies of the deterministic argument,
p. 194.
a. The continuity and uniformity of law do
not preclude the fact that such law may
he the fulfilment of purpose, p. 194.
h. The assumption of mechanism that disorder
preceded order in cosmic procedure fails
of proof for denying that order is the
more reasonable beginning of things,
p. 195.
c. The teleologist does not rest his case on
the empirical observation of mind in
nature and freely admits the problem
created by evil both physical and moral
and purposelessness revealed in the ord-
ers of lower life, p. 195.
5. The complexity and prolificness of adaptations
render chance a far less reasonable hypothes-
is than is desi^, p. 195.
6. Therefore the universe is better eagplained on
the reality of a desigaer described as Self-
determining Force, or Tree Idind, p. 196.
7. This is Bowne's argument for the fact that
pujpose, which is the hi^est of the logical
categories and which we must apply in our
attempts to reach the highest order of know-
ledge, includes freedcsa, p. 196.
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8. Bowne's argument that purpose includes
freedom examined,: p. 197,
a. Defects of the argument, p. 199.
1. The counter argument that science
as well as teleology vanishes with
the denial of a mind in nature
leaves the argument Just where it
was, p. 199,
2. in inquiry into the statement that
mechanism e:q)lains nothing, p. 200
3. It is conceivahle and possible that
mechanism and chance do e^^lain a
few adaptations "but there axe many
which they fail to e:qplain, p. 200.
4. Purpose and freedom as coincident
terms, p, 201,
a. ISnds may he attained without
foreknowledge, p. 201,
h. Ends may he foreseen but not
chosen, p. 201.
c. Ends may be both foreseen and
chosen, p. 201.
b. The valid element in Bowne's argument,
p. 202,
1, Mechanism is an incoherent hypo-
thesis, p. 202,
2, Within limits shown, purpose does
include freedom, p. 202.
c. Freedom includes purpose, p. 202.
1. The nature of freedom demands the power of
contrary choice in the light of puroose,
p. 202.
2. Freedom is always, therefore, teleological
in character, p. 202.
3. The impertinence of the contention that the
solution of freedom requires either absolute
mechanism or absolute freedom, p. 203.
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a. The solution of this problm consists
in the notion of an all-em"bracing ration-
al purpose, p. 203.
Id. Metaphysical necessity must yield to
uniformity administered by freedom for
the attainment of rationsd ends, p. 203.
4. Sumary result of the discussion of free-
dom and purpose, p. 203.
a. The world might conceivahly reveal
purpose without freedom, p. 203.
h. The highest type of purpose only
revaals freedom, p. 203.
c. Freedan must include purpose, p. 203,
f. Freedom and theology, or the religious problem, p. 205.
1. Freedom is necessary to explain the religious cosmos as
we have shown it to be implicated in the metaphysical
cosmos in general, p. 206.
a. Tree creation the only solution of the problem of
religion, p. 206.
1. The persistent problems of error and evil as
undeniable facts of h-uman experience, p. 206.
a. The pantheistic hypothesis examined and
revealed to be a form of absolutism, p, 207,
1. Pantheism defined, p. 207.
2. The types of pantheism, p. 307.
b. Pantheism revealed to be a necessitarian doc-
trine, p. 208.
2. The status of the problem of error and evil in
this necessitarian scheme of things, p. 208.
a. The problem and its bearing on the impersonal
world, p. 209.
b. The problem and its bearing on the personal
world, or the consecjaeaces of the pantheistic
doctrine of man, p, 209.
b. The theistic hypothesis examined, p. 210.
1, Definition of theism, p. 210.
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2. Types of theism, p. 210.
c. The theistic doctrine of creation, p. 211,
1. The importance of the distinction "between God and
creation, p. 211.
a. The solution of the prohlem of knowledge
possible only where "both finite and infinite
freedom are maintained, p. 212.
1. The necessary dualism involved in finite
knowing, p. 212.
a. The prohlem created "by this necessary
dualism, p. 212.
b. Attempts at the solution of this prob-
lem, p. 213.
1. Ui^)reductive attempts, p. 213.
a. Materialism and its difficult-
ies, p. 213.
h. Idealism and its difficulties,
p. 214.
c. Absolute idealism and its dif-
ficulties, p. 214.
2. The productive solution of the prob-
lem removes the difficulties in-
volved in epistemological dualism
by positing a theistic monism, p.
215.
a. Tree creation is the only solu-
tion which haraonizes thought
and things, p. 215.
1. Knowledge is impossible where
cosmic object and absolute
subject are separated by a
distinction of independent
being, p. 215.
2. If -united to render know-
ledge possible, they can
not be separated again, p.
215.
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3. Free creation cuts the Gordian
knot, since
_ a. The absolute subject pro-
duces the cosmic object,
p. 215.
b. The cosmic object is so
related to the human
subject that each in a
senee exists for the
other, p. 215.
b. Free creation not only transcends
the dualism in finite knowing
but preserves finite freedom,
p. 216.
1. This is necessary in order to
prevent the collapse of reason
because it solves the problem
of error, p. 216.
2. It is also necessary in order
to prevent ethical or moral
collapse because it affords
the most reasonable solution of
the problem of evil, p. 216.
2. Freedom and creativity, p. 217.
a. Human freedom and the possibility of
creativity, p. 217.
1. The purest illustration of freedom
is revealed in the operation of pure
thought as a seld-directing activity
which proceeds according to laws
inherent in itself and to ideals
generated by itself, p. 217.
2, We can understand creative activity
only from the analogy of our own
experience according to which we
first form conceptions and then
realize them, p. 217,
b. Creativity does not, however, always
imply freedom, p. 217.
1. The creative activity of thought
requires that knowledge of things
result from the operation of the
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BOBDEN P. BOWNE'S DOCTRINE OF
THE SPECULATIVE SI&NIFICMCE OF FREEIXJM
Introduction
freedom is the philosophical problem par excellence .
Fundamental to every human problem and interest is the persist-
ent question: "Are we free agents or are we hound, not only
hand and foot hut nerve and muscle, feeling and thinking,
fated by our make-up to folly or wisdom, vice or virtue, mood
and outlook, type and temperament and career?"^ The interest
we have in seeking an answer to this question is both theoret-
ical or scientific and practical or moral. In the last anal-
ysis these two interests cannot be divorced. The truth and
the utility of freedom enter intimately into both what
personality is and what personality is able to do. If it be
objected, after the fashion of many minds, that "the emphasis
which has been put upon the formation of choice in connection
with freedom will appear an evasion, a trifling with meta-
physical futilities" in comparison with that form of freedan
which holds that "The ideal of freedom is the holy grail of
1, Jastrow, Joseph, "Freedom and Psychology,"
Freedom in ^he Modem World , edited by H.M.Kallen, p. 210.
2. Dewey, John, "Philosophies of Freedom," Freedom
in the Modem Worl^L . edited by H.M.Kallen, p. 244.

-2-
social progress, it may well "be pointed out that "The debt
of the special sciences to metaphysical discussion could not
easily he overestimated.**^ And "the foundations of almost
•very department of knowledge and action can he traced to
metaphysical analysis."*^ Coherent thinking with respect to
the nature of freedom will prove to be no exception to this
truth.
The exiualnaticn of experience reveals the problem
properly described as that of freedan. It must be shown
how this problem emerges. Preliminary to this, it is neces-
sary to examine the assertion that freedom is a datum of
immediate e:qperience or immediate consciousness. Should it
turn out that freedom is a universal fact of immediate experi-
ence, it is hard to see how any problem concerning its reality
could arise. In the strict and literal scientific sense of
the word, our knowledge of freedom, whatever its true status
may be, is not that of immediate perception. "The necessity of
freedom and ptirpose, however, is not given in direct intxiition,
or in simple inspection of our consciousness: it is a deduced
necessity."^ The validity of this position must be examined.
1. Hamilton, W.H. , "Freedom and Economic Necessity,
Freedom ia thg Modem World, edited by H.M.KEdlen, p. 25.
2. Mackenzie, J. S. , "Metaphysics. " -Bncyclopaedla
of Hellgion and Ethics , vol. 8, p. 598.
3. ibid., p. 598.
4. Bowne, B.P., Metaphvsict ; A Study is First
Pringip;?^, p. 171.

-3-
The origin or emergence in spontaneous thought of the idea
that volitional activity niust always he regarded as free is
two-fold. On this point Bov.-ne is in substantial agreement
with the general consensus of scholarship.^
"This arises partly from tho peculiar consciousness we
liave in such activity of "being the cause and source of
the activity. In conducting, for example, a train of
tho-ught, we have a very clear conviction that it depends
upon our volition whether it shall go on or not, and that
the volition depends on us. So with other activity
which falls within volitional limits; we are clearly con-
• scious that we can he^^in, continue, or end it, and that
without compulsion of any sort, internal or external.
The conviction of freedom arises also, and especially,
from the ethical sense of responsihility. Under noraal
circ"umstances , and when undehauched hy speculation, no
one can help regarding himself and his neighbors as
responsible for vol-untary action; and, under the same
circumstances, no one can regard any one as responsible
who, by natural or external necessity, is shut up to a
single course of action. The great form of excuse for
wrong-doing is, I could not help it. Tliese two facts
lead us to refer our acts to ourselves as their respon-
sible, that is, as their free cause. "2
The point at issue is whether or not the testimony of naive or
spontaneous thouglit is scientific in affiraing imr.ie^.iate con-
sciousness of freedom as a fact. It is true enough that when
we are conscious of directing conscious purposes we experience
the self as a creative subject. And again, it is likewise true
that one v/uo i-z capable of experiencing the feeling of duty,
ought, rather, regret
,
responsibility and the like feels
that he Imows himself to be beyond the bounds of necessity.
1. James, William, Tlie ',Till to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philoso^^hy
. pp. 159-160. Palmer, 0. H.,
Tiie Problem of Freedom
, pp. 55-57.
2. Bov.-ne, B. P., Introduction to Psycholo;^ical
Theory, pp. 222-225.
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For these two facts of experience are of such a character
that personality readily and intuitively discriminates between
passive objects and active subjects. But is it being directly
conscious of freedom that we Icnow when we describe these ex-
periences? In any case it must be admitted that we Iznow or
are conscious of only the facts and, when I choose between
alternatives, the truth is that, until the choice has been
made, the fact does not appear so that I am immediately aware
of only that which I chose and not of tlmt which I did not
choose. That I might have chosen differently and possess the
power to have selected another alternative is, therefore, not
a direct perception but turns out to be grounded in my native
conviction or belief that such is the case. We formulate this
situation more exactly by calling attention to the fact that
the thou^t of freedom in uncriticized reflection carried
with it the thought of alternatives or dual possibilities and
not the fact but the assumption that in choosing the will is
not determined by anything other than itself. It seems, how-
ever, to be permissible to say that this situation in ex-
perience gives rise to a well-nigh universal belief in freedom
against which evidence is lacking. Yet this work-a-day language
must be distinguished from that precise and scientific account
of experience v=hich differentiates our loiowledge of fact from
our strong feelings, beliefs and convictions about what facts
are. It is the determination of experience on this point that
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precisely constitutes the pro"blem of freedom and marks the
point of its emergence for philosophy. We are not, then,
immediately conscious of freedom as a fact, "but of facts which
we interpret as being free. The question as to whether or
not freedom is the "best assumption or hypothesis to make for
the explanation of the facts involved characterizes the prob-
lem of freedom.
The fact that no amount of experience reveals the
fact of freedom as such forces us to a change of venue and to
carry the problem from the common sense level into the realms
of science and philosophy where rational and coherent criticism
undertakes to attack the problem with accredited methods of
investigation far removed from the criteria of feeling and
opinion. Here the problem becomes that of discovering how to
harmonize the practical assumptions of life, among which freedom
is certainly one of the most conspicuous, with the theoretical
demands of reason. The paradox consists- in trying to harmonize
the freedom of the will with our scientific view of the nature
of man and his world. Certain ass-umptions made by the special
sciences constitute an ideal of explanation which has been so
surprisingly successful in both the mental and physical realms
of nature that misgiving tends to arise concerning what appears
to be one of the most patent facts of experience. The raeclian-
ical conception of nat-ure as a theoretical source of this felt
conflict betv/een lile and logic is only equalled by another
theoretical difficulty to be found in a certain conception of
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God. Just as nature has laid bare the stnicture of large
areas of her gigantic system of causes and effects until
the machine has become the model of scientific explanation,
80 from an entirely different angle the will of God has "been
conceived from such an absolute point of view that finite
wills find it impossible to function significantly as other
than modal determinations of the one all-inciusive purpose
which finds its minutest details determined by the Cosmic
Mind. In order to show just where the problem lies, we msy
state without amticipating the argument that both freedom and
determinism are in the last analysis postulates of rationality,
ideals of explanation whose validity must be tested by an
adequate criterion for truth so far as philosophy has been
able to assist us in arriving at truthful propositions. In
writing of the importance of the free-will controversy, James
says,
"I know of no robject less worn out, or in which inventive
genius has a better chance of breaking open new ground,
—
not, perhaps, of forcing a conclusion or of coercing assent,
but of deepening our sense of what the issue between the
two parties really is, of what the ideas of fate and of
free-will imply."
The problem of freedom, then, emerges as a result of the follow-
ing antinomies which it presents to thought as its logical
implications are thought out in terms of categories applicable
to the -universe as a whole. First, freedom or the power to
1. James, William, The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philosophy , p. 145. Also Lotze, H.,
Microcosmus
. p. 226.
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select "between alternatives free from "both internal and
external determinations appears to violate certain fundamental
scientific assiamptions about nature. It seems to violate the
concept of lex continui . It would further appear to endanger
the doctrine of the conservation of force. Not only does the
notion of freedom appear to contradict these laws of nature
but, secondly, it seems to violate the most fiindamental laws
of thought, namely the laws of causality and of sufficient
reason which condition the unity of thought. And, finally, the
idea of freedom appears to conflict with certain of the divine
attributes such as foreknowledge in such a way that it must be
surrendered. In spite of these theoretical demands of reason,
freedom is the postulate underlying the entire practical life
of the human race as the precondition of any meaning in such
problems as those pertaining to political liberty, industrial
freedom, intellectual freedom, religious freedom, moral and
rational freedom and their related notions of justice, equal-
ity, veracity, reward eoid punishment, and rights and duties.
Notwithstanding the point of vier; of many great
philosophers who have disclaimed operJ.y all pretensions to
prove that the freedom of the will is true, freedom remains no
less real and no less significant a problem. Professor
Macintosh well says, "no philosopher will ever succeed in driving
mystery out of the processes of life and consciousness, or from
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any other phase of real existence; the "best we can hope to
do is to get the mystery properly cornered, correctly located.
This, after all, is a very great achievement with the nat\Tre
of things revealed as they are and some of life's greatest
problems require no further solution than this. If by a solu-
tion of the prohlem of freedom is meant insight into how freedom
is made and is possible, we are foredoomed to failure for we
have neither the method nor condition under which a mastery of
this problem is possible. If, on the other hand, we encounter
freedom as a paradox or an antinomy of thought and seek the
removal of the antinomy by more coherent interpretation of the
facts pertaining to it, this is not an unreasonable hope how-
ever incomplete the solution may prove to be. Then, too,
however unyielding a problem may have proven to be from the
point of view of science and philosophy, there is always the
possibility of the discovery of a more fruitful hypothesis.
Freedom is, therefore, a formidable problem having withstood
all historical attempts at a solution. Nor does it yet appear
that a solution of the order of a mathematical problem is
possible. It may even appear that the nature of the problem
1. Macintosh, D. C, The Problem of Knowledge , p. 314.
2. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
7reedon", Llethodist Review 77 (1895), 694-695. Metaphysics ,
r ev. ed .
, p. 415.

-9-
presented forever precludes a solution In which case it would
be a substantial contribution to human knowledge to establish
the fact.^ At any rate, the classic historical efforts to
apprehend freedom in its fullest meaning have led to more precise
statement and understanding of its implications.
From the historical point of view, we may classify the
attitudes which have "been taken toward the problem of freedom
as follows: first, those theories which have regarded freedom
as a significant specxilative postulate of thought; second, those
theories which have regarded freedom as an unfruitful principle
of philosophical procedtire; and, third, those theories which
have regarded the problem of freedom and its solution as a
matter of indifference. The metamorphosis of the problem of
freedom in western thought has passed thro-ugh four phases. The
ancient world, while it was perhaps groping as concerns the
discovery of the real difficulties of the problem, nevertheless,
as with most of the major philosophical problems, succeeded in
stating it. The problem then passed from the soil of Hellenic-
Roman speculation under the influence of Christianity into the
form of a theological controversy which constitutes the second
stage of its development. Here it took the form of reconciling
freedom with the attribute of the divine omnipotence. During
1. Wright, I. K., A Students PhilosoTohy of Religion ,
p. 397, "Psychologists admit that it is unlikely that it ;vill
ever be possible to devise experiments that will absolutely
settle this question."
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this period the Humanist thinkers espoused the cause of
freedom while the authoritative expression of religion in-
clined toward determinism. G-enerally speaking, the philosoph-
ically educated Greek Fathers defended freedom as opposed to
the semi-cultured Africans and Westerns who inclined toward
predestination. This status of the prohlem continued until
the opening of the modern period when the venue of the prohlem
again shifted from the court of theology to that of metaphysics.
The character of the problem took the form of the attempt to
reconcile moral freedom v.ith the categories of causality and
universality of law. From Hobhes to Kant the skeptical intellect
inclined for the most part to determinism while the defenders
of morality and religion, as opposed to the preceding period,
were the defenders of free 'om. Contemporary thought, "both
proximate and present, has seen the rise of still another form
of the discussion of freedom under the tremendous incentive
of modern empirical science as opposed to the method of apriori
metaphysics despite the fact that this method and the problems
raised by it still continue. The application of experimental
method to the study of personality on the assumption of the
truth of the theory of evolution has revealed a series of mech-
ajiisms in consciousness an intimate acquaintance with which has
disclosed the influence of heredity and environment to be so
great that the ideal in certain quarters has become that of

ass-uming the deterministic ideal of explanation as the only
fruitf-ul principle of interpretation.^
While it was Anajcagoras who, among the ancient
Greek philosophers, first introduced rational causality as
a principle of causal explanation into his cosmology, it was
not until the time of Aristotle that vie have formulated the
doctrine that events are caused in three ways, as the result
of the action of efficient causes (external compulsion), as
the result of final causes (internal nature), and without
cause (absolute chance) . This last point is now generally
recognised as "of the inmost essence of Aristotelianism
The freedom of the will, too, was admitted "by both Aristotle
2
and by Epicurus." Aristotle had no Greek word for free-will
and never expressed this idea. It was only in later Greek
philosophy and theology that the word (^'^''"e v o"*^ °'_k-^ was
invented for this purpose, Aristotle rejected the thesis of
4
Socrates and Plato that virtue determines the will by the
knowledge of the good and, in its place, affirmed that freedom
is constituted in an intelligent and sensitive being whose
actions are neither necessarily determined by his idea.s nor
1. Eashdall, Hastings, The Theory of Good and
Evil, 2nd ed. , vol. 2, pp. 310-311.
2. Peirce, Charles S., Chance, Love and Logic
.
p. 180. Cites Aristotle's "Physics", Book II, chapters iv. v, vi
3. Rashdall, Hastings, The Theory of Good and Evil
.
2nd ed. , vol. 2, p. 311, footnote.
4. Aristotle, ITicomachean Ethics
. VII, 2.
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his desires. The free man has the power to attain happiness
by directing his own deliberations and by exercising the
power of choice in his actions. This proof of freedom he bases
upon psychological analysis. "Our particular acts are contin-
gent and depend on our choices."^ In addition to this indirect
proof, responsibility implies freedom in Aristotle's teaching*
"And so the saying, 'none would be wicked, none v/ould be
blessed,' seems partly false and partly true; no one
indeed is blessed against his will, but vice is vol-
untary. If we deny this we must dispute the statements
made just now, and must contend that man is not the
originator and the parent of his actions, as of his
children."^
There is, therefore, a fortuitous element in Aristotle's world.
Freedom is real and man constitutes the possibility of intro-
Jecting spontaneous acts into the sequence of phenomena.
Illogical as it may seem, Epicurus taught a doctrine
of freedom in substantial agreement with the free-will doctrine
of Aristotle. This he did by revising the atomic theory of
Deraocritus in adding the Clinamen or the notion of the power
of the atoms to change their coTorses from the straight lines
in which fate or necessity has coerced them. This element of
spontaneous chance he applied also to the problem of freedom
in man and, hence, like Aristotle, confers upon the theory of
atomism life and entelechy. The unique character of Epicurus*
teaching lies in the fact that he seems to have been the first
1. Janet, Paul, and Seailles, Gabriel, A History
of the Problems of Pliilosophy
. Vol. 1, p. 319.
~
2. Aristotle, Nlcoraachean Ethics
. Ill, 5.
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to expo-und freedom to mean uncaused event "by blind mechanism
which divorced freedom and purpose. Human freedom must find
its place within the laws of nature as a form of -universal
contingency and spontaneous power constitutional to atoms."^
Both the doctrines of logical and physical determinism are
denied since, like Aristotle, he recognizes that the theory of
contradictory propositions respecting fut\ire events carries no
necessity respecting their truth when taken individually* Moral
determinism is denied in the interest of responsihility which
p
must not be sacrificed.''
It is apparent that Epicurus' teaching about freedom
is inconsistent with his fundamental philosophical theory and
that the identification of freedom with blind mechanism is a
statement of the problem revealing the fact that he was uncon-
scious of the real difficulties involved in it, a condition
characteristic of Greek speculation down througli the entire Stoic
and Epicurean periods. It is necessary here to distinguish the
uncritical point of view which has soiaetimes argued as though
the freedom which libertarians contend for must be absolute and
unlimited from the more critical and discriminating point of
1. "That the mind itself does not feel an internal
necessity in all its actions, and is not as it were overmastered
and impelled to bear and put up with this, is caused by a minute
swerving of first beginnings, at no fixed part of space and no
fixed time" (Lucr., II, 292-3). "We change the direction of our
motions neither at a fixed time or fixed T)lace, but v/hen and where
the mind itself has prompted" (Ibid. 256). Janet and Seailles,
A History of the Problems of Philosophy , vol. 1, p. 323.
2. "Necessity is an irresponsible power, and fortune
is unstable, v/hile our will is free; and this freedom constitutes,
in our case, a responsibilit:'- 'vhich makes us encounter blame and
praise." (D. L., x, 133). i"bid., p. 323.
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view which advocates only a limited freedom. It may "be true
that, during the history of the discussion of freedom, its
advocates took little pains to correct the assmption either
deliberate or na'iVe on the part of determinists tliat absolute
freedom was the point at issue. The position which argues that
every act is equally free and undetermined is one which is today
and perhaps was in the past never seriously advocated by any
person competent to pass jud^ent upon human experience. The
freedom of indifference or extreme libertarianism would impinge
upon caprice as its central principle. It demands that the future
be absolutely ambiguous in the sense that an arbitrary will
determines whatever choices are made. It should be pointed out
that the position of absolute freedom when carried to its logical
conclusion is not fTindamentally different in consequence from
that of the opposite extreme of determinism, a hypothesis which
presents us with a will that wills nothing, while in the case of
extreme freedom we are presented with a will that wills nothing .
In either case, the will is nullified. The most which the
libertarian finds it necessary to prove is that there are acts
of choice which are undeteruiined by anything other than the will
acting as its own cause.
"Ninety-nine hundredths (so to spealc) of a man's life might
be due to heredity, edvication, environment, and original
constitution; but provided there were a hundredth part
referable only to undetermined acts of choice, that vmuld
be enough to satisfy the post\alate of Freedom This
point of view was paradoxically expressed by an able advocate
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of Indeterrainism—the late Professor Chandler of Oxford—
when he said that it was eno-u^ that one act of a man's life
should be free. But in truth it is not necessary that even
an isolated act should be referable Y.'holly to the free will.
It would be enou^ that it should enter as a factor into
the determination of a man's acts or some of them, that a
man's acts and matured character should be referable not to
two factors but to three—birth-character
,
environment,
undetemined choice."^
Libertarians do not insist that everything we do is free but
merely call attention to the fact that not everything we do is
determined.
The great majority of indeterminists have sought to
defend some sort of limited freedom. It is sufficient to show
that,
"could it be proved that once since the universe began a
single being had on some occasion brought another influence
to bear upon his conduct besides sequential causation, he
would have established libertarianism. • . • • One
instance to the contrary will destroy the doctrine as
effectually as ten thousand."^
Among the nxmerous varieties of freedom may be mentioned that
which confines choice to an alternative between two organized
causal necessities. One of these necessities may be described
as sequential causation or the causation of forces. The other
type of necessity is that of antesequential causation or the
causation of reason* We are presented with two types of determined
orders which completely exclude any and all possibility of
1. Rashdall, Hastings, The Theory of Good and Evil.
2nd ed. , vol. 2, pp. 307-308.
2. Palmer, G. H., The Problem of Freedom , p. 151,
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ab solute freedom for either rational causation or physical
causation must necessarily be invoked to explain phenomena
since human actions are no more independent of causes than are
physical forces. On this view it is possible for one to cease
to be a person, that is to say, one is not determined to act
antesequentially and, insofar as he chooses to surrender his
rationality, he is invaded by the order of sequential causation
which is to that extent the surrender of freedom,^
Another interpretation of freedom is that which may be
described as the freedom of self-determination. Persons are
described as autonomous or self-directing while things on the
other hand are viev^'ed as heteronomous. Persons have the power to
form ideals and purposes toward which they have the capacity to
work unimpeded from any external influence. Freedom implies
that.
"that is free which is not coerced or impelled from without;
or that is free which unfolds without hindrance its own
nat-ure. At the same time this freedom may be absolutely
determined by some internal necessity. But when this inner
necessity is extended to the entire activity, we have
nothing of freedom left but the name; and it would tend to
clearness if this were dropped."^
This confers upon persons a type of individuality which is indeed
unique in that it is the permanent guarantee of creative activity.
1. Palmer, G. H. , The Problem of Freedom , is a defense
of this point of view of freedom.
2. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychol o,g;ical Theory.
.
p. 223.
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Duns Scotus, teacher of the Franciscan Order, hecame the worthy
protagonist of freedom as opposed to Aquinas. This mediaeval
doctor ta^ught a modified Augustianism which formulated itself
into Voluntas est su;oerior intellectu . Freedom of the will,
human and divine, "became its central principle. Freedom is not
alone centered in G-od as Augustine had urged "but the human
will can freely cooperate with the grace and will of G-od. In
man the freedom of the will is "both formal and practical in that
he can choose to will or not to v/ill as well as what to v;ill
within limits. When finite wills will what God wills this is
accounted to them as meritorious. The world as a whole is con-
tingent and ah solute predestination as taught "by Augustine
must helie the facts. The notion of free causes which may or
may not act is a fundamental principle of Duns Scotus' systeia.
Heal, self-determination is accorded persons on this hypothesis.^
Another notion of freedom introduced into English
thought "by John Loclre is known as the freedom of action. It is
the ability to do or not to do that which is willed. From this
point of view freedom has nothing to do with the creation of
purpose but refers entirely to the execution of purpose in conduct.
While the theory stresses conduct rather than the nature of voli-
tion, Locke viewed both the nature of volition and the execution
1. Janet and S^aill es, A History of the Problems of
Philosophy , vol. 1, p. 328.

-18-
of what is willed as sequentially determined. Lookers position
is freedom in name only and he rejects freedom on psychological
gro-unds. The will is determined by desire*
"The motive for continuing in the same state or action is
only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change
is always some uneasiness.^ ... A constant succession
of uneasinesses, out of tliat stock which natural wants or
acquired hahits have heaped up, take the will in their
turns;" and no sooner is one action despatched, which "by
such a determination of the will we are set upon, hut
another uneasiness is ready to set us on work,"2
Locke's contrihution, in spite of his indifference to free will,
was made at the point where he distinguished "between will and
desire. There are exceptions to the law that the greatest un-
easiness always determines the will because "we are endowed with
a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from deter-
3
mining the will and engaging us in action." Man is free to the
extent that his desires may be considered and their consequences
weighed in which case the judgment of good or evil determines
the will. Knowledge regulates our choices and we are free in
the degree that we regulate our choices by reason. Freedom implies
reflection in preference to impulse in assisting us to achieve
true happiness.
A doctrine which has had a long, useful and dignified
career in the history of philosophy from the ancient Greeks to
1» Locke, John, Essay Concerning!: Human Understandias: .
Book II, Ch. 21, par. 29.
2. ibid.. Book II, Ch. 21, par. 45.
S. Locke, John, Essay Conceriiin^s; Human Understanding .
Book II, Ch. 21, par. 50.

-19-
the present is that of rational freedom, rational causation,
or it is sometimes called idealistic determinism. Anaxagoras
may he accredited V7ith having first developed the hypothesis
of a universal Mind as an efficient cause, therehy opening the
way for a teleological explanation of nature, following this
principle of rational causation, "For Plato, as for Socrates,
virtue is therefore the determination of the will "by the know-
ledge of the good; it is true freedom, true happiness; the
wicked man is ignorant, unhappy, and a slave. Plato, in the
Republic , makes this appeal,
"Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge
and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he
may be able to learr, . and may find some one who v/ill
malce him able to learn and to discern between good and
evil, so as to choose always and every^.vhere the better
life as he has opportunity."
The Stoic's denial of freedom grew out of his pantheism and his
conception of rational causation educed physical, logical and
3
ethical proofs for determinism. The logical proof consisted
in showing that, of two contradictory propositions, one is
necessarily true and therefore, when it is affirmed, the possibil-
ity of its contradictory is at that moment excluded. The physical
!• Janet and S^ailles, A History of the Problems of
Philosophy
, vol. I, p. 318.
2. ibid.
, p. 318, \ /
3. The Stoic doctrine of the Ao^OQ was a return
to that of Heraclitus before freedom had even become a problem
of thought*

argxment for determinism was 'basecL on the laws of nature as
the principle of causality. The fortuitous element, that of
some chance power like free will, gave way to a seamless universe
whose unity is expressed in a universal providential design
according to law. In this respect the Stoic restored the principle
of Democritus which had been attacked "by "both Aristotle and
Epicurus.. To the Stoic, rational causation denies "both revela-
tion and foreknowledge since it is "because nothing is left to
chance that the divine mind can foreknow everything and fore-
knowledge implies determinism. To accept free will on this
theory severs man's relations with the Determiner of Destiny
in which case divine sticcor is cut off. Finally, ethical con-
siderations will show tliat determinism does not produce inertia.
Character determines the way we move. This is only a sort of
determinism "by character, however, rather than hy things. The
teaching of St. Augustine concerning freedom is not unamhig-
uous. He breaks with Platonism in stressing the priority of the
will over the intellect as the innermost characteristic of per-
sonality. "All our mental states are formed under the direction
of the purposes of the will."^ Will and intellect are not separate
faculties but rather a unity of soul- s-ub stance. From the point
of view of theory, freedom of the will is vigorously defended
1. Cushman, H. E. , A Beginner's History of Philos-phy .
Vol. 1, p. 344.
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in the interests of justice and responsibility. The will is
free to resist inclination and sensuous nature hut practically
and actually freedom of choice is irapossihle. Since only the
good-will is free, it is in reality the Good which determines
it.^ This conclusion is genuinely if not act-ually Platonic.
In Thomas of Aquino we find St, Augustine* s absolute
predestination challenged. The intellect is superior to the
will as a mental faculty.
"God knows all things, not only those which actually exist,
but also those which either He Himself or any creature
can bring forth. Thus all future contingent things as
they are in themselves and according to their actual con-
dition are Icnown to Him all at once and infallibly. . . •
Eternity exists as a whole, and embraces all time; whence
it is clear that contingent things are infallibly known
to God in so far as they are present before the divine
vision, and that at the same time contingent things are
future when compared with their immediate causes.
Aquinas felt the force of both freedom and necessity in our acts.
This dilemna is met with his theory of physical premotion.
On this view God has foreknowledge and can both foresee and pre-
determine our acts. This is tantamount to affirming that God
wills finite actions to be both free and determined. For God
has not only predetermined me but he has also predetermined me
to act freely. That this does not affirm the identity of contra-
dictions is not easily made apparent. The explanation is clearly
1. Harnack, Adolf von., History of Dogna
,
vol. v,
p. 112, n. 4.
2. Janet & S^pUles, A History of the Problems of
Philosophy . Vol. 1, p. 227#
I» • I
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one which feels the prolilem involved in G-od's foreknowledge and
the solution is f-undamentally grounded in Aristotle at the point
of making intellect prior to will. This conception of rational
freedom will be continued under Bowne's relation to modern
philosophy.
A final attitude toward the problem of freedom as a
speculative postulate of great significance is that of tychism
appearing in the contemporary philosophy of Bergson and James.
Professor Henri Bergson makes the concept of freedom fundamental
in his doctrine of evolution. It is however a very different
meaning that attaches to freedom in his thinking from that which
the notion ordinarily signifies in critical thought.
"Free-will, in the usual meaning of the term, implies the
equal possibility of tv;o contraries, and on my theory we
cannot form\ilate, or even conceive in this case the thesis
of the equal possibility of the U;o contraries, without
falling into grave error about the nature of time."^
For Professor Bergson the process of evolution is creative.
While the past is in a very real sense conserved and transmitted
there is also the fact of creation. Freedom is therefore the
power to produce the new, the novel, the emergence of that which
cannot be read back into the cause because it contains what is
not in the cause. The category of teleology is denied the e^lan
vital as a causal agent whether it be the finite or the infinite
1. LeRoy, Edouard, The ITew Fnilosophv of Henri Bergson .
pp. 192-193.
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aspect which is -under consideration. Freedom understood to
mean the power of contrary choice or a selective or deliberative
choice "between two or more alternatives he regards as incoherent
in his scheme of 1 ' evolution creatrice . The life and entelecliy
with which evolution is endowed is equivalent to an indeterminisra
of chance or at least a large fortuitous element. It is the
notion that even a capricious universe is preferable to a
determined one if only it he dynamic and creative.^
Prohably one of the most compelling exponents of tychism
was William James. Taken together with his doctrines of pluralism
and meliorism it constitutes one of his most fundamental conten-
tions. James preferred the tern chance to convey his notion since
both libertarians and deteminists have each declared at times to
be the tr\ie freedomlsts. Chance "is a purely negative and relative
term, giving us no information about that of which it is predicated,
except that it happens to be disconnected with something else,—
not controlled, secured, or necessitated by other things in advance
of its own actual presence."^ This view is nowhere in the writings
of James given any clearer expression than in the following quotas
tion: "Our sense of 'freedom* supposes that some things at least
are decided here and now, that the passing moment may contain some
1. Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution , p. 248»
2. James, William, The Will to B elieve and other
Essays in Popular Philosophy
, pp. 153-154.
II
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novelty, "be an original starting point of events, and not merely
transmit a push from sometMng else."^ This notion of freedom
was applied equally to personality human and divine. While the
doctrine of tychism was never fully worked out hy James, he was
careful to point out that, "'Free-will' does not say that every-
thing that is physically conceivahle is also morally possihle.
It merely says that of alternatives that really tempt our will
more than one is really possible." Here lies the ohvious
difference between Bergson and James. Chance is equally affirmed
by both, but for Bergson it is not remotely unlike what Epicurus'
doctrine was revealed to be, while James' view is consonant with
that of freedom as it pertains to the will. It is in the interest
of freedom that he refused to accept monism and so tenaciously
clung to pluralism. The indeterminism and free-will which James
urged "gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no
single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to a
mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt,
remain forever inacceptable."'' It is unmistakably clear that
such a philosophy as this takes itself seriously both on logical
and aesthetic grounds with the result that freedom is made a
metaphysical first principle of the first magnitude.
1. James, William, Some Problems of Philosophy , p. 139.
2. James, William, The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philosophy , p. 157n.
3. ibid., p. 177.
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Opposed to this result is that of mechanistic
reasoning forever holding freedom to "be in the very nat-ure of
the case an incoherent hypothesis. Historically the doctrine
has taken two forms, tloat of necessity and that of determinism*
In general it is that type of explanation which views every
event both physical and psychical as the only possible outcome
of other preceding events which require one and only one result
and this result is mechanically produced.
"The proposition in question is that the state of things
existing at any time, together with certain immutable
laws, completely determine the state of things at every
other time (for a ILmitation to future time is indefen-
sible). Thus given the state of the universe in the
original nebula, and given the laws of meclianics, a
sufficiently powerful mind could produce from these data
the precise form of every curlicue of every letter I am
now writing."
This is of co-arse thorough-going and absolute necessity.
"Whoever holds that every act of the will as well as every
idea of the mind is under the rigid governance of a
necessity co-ordinated with that of the physical world,
will logically be carried to the prc-oosition that minds
are part of the physical world in such a sense tliat the
laws of mechanics determine everything tliat happens accord-
ing to immutable attractions and repulsions.''^
The constitution of things is rigid and fixed so that nothing
which transpires falls outside immutable and inexorable mechanical
law. Its influence on religion is called predestination while
1. Peirce, Charles S., Chance
.
Love , and Lo^ic . p. 181»
2. jo id., p. 181.
(
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in philosophy it is called fate. Fixity and uniformity of
mechanical causal sequence are indisputable.
Deraocritus seems to have been the first among the
Greeks to view the world as \mder the universal reign of mechanical
law. Mechanical cause is behind every event both physical and
spiritual. Animistic, hylozoistic and primitive adumbrations of
teleological explanation of every sort are frankly eliminated by
Democritus. But freedom is excluded not only by atomism as
Democritus taught it but it is equally impossible for Sleatic
pantheism. Parmenides no less than Democritus urged necessity
as a universal principle. While Heraclitus and Diogenes Apollonius
taught intelligence to be a first principle, they did not provide
for freedom in its operation. The Pythagoreans taught a doctrine
of responsibility based on merit and demerit, yet even here freedom
is at best only implied and has to be read into the doctrine of
transmigration of souls. Early Greek thought did not therefore
deal with free-will as a problem because it liad not emerged in the
philosophic mind."*" The teleological explanation of Plato and
Aristotle did much to limit the hard determinism of Democritus
since their day. Nevertheless materialists throughout the history
of philosophy have championed it with enthusiasm and vigor.
Attention has been called to the inconsequential way in
which Epicurus, having accepted Democritean materialism, still tried
1. Janet & Seailles, A History of the Problems of
Philosophy
. Vol. 1, pp. 315-316.
Ii
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to retain freedon in his world-view. The Stoics likewise, revert-
ing to type, interpreted rational causality in terras of the
Heraclitean logos or fire, itself in the last analysis a material
first principle. Freedom among the Stoics was in the last analysis
nominal rather than a logical consequence based on the demands of
their system. The New Academy under the leadership of Carneades
Imd a strong opposition to the determinism of the Stoics. Carneades
was equally relentless in opposing the Epicurean doctrine. He
anticipated if he did not actxxally state the psychological argument
of Held, Victor Cousin, and Jouffroy. The principle of causality
is not violated by the freedom of the will since freedom is itself
a cause whose nature is to be free. Carneades argued,
"For in saying 'without cause*, we mean without
antecedent external cause, not without any cause whatever.
• ... So when we say that our soul is moved without
cause, we mean without antecedent extrinsic cause, not
independent of all cause w:iatever Therefore,
not to expose ourselves to the ridicule of the material
philosophies by asserting that anything happens without a
cause, we must distinctly propound that the nature of an
atom is such that it may be moved by its own specific
gravity, and that its intrinsic nature is the very cause
of its motion. And in the same manner we need not seek
for an external cause for the voluntary motions of the mind.
For such is the natxire of voluntary motion, that it must
needs be in o-ur own power and depend on otirselves, other-
wise it is not voluntary. And yet we cannot say that the
motion of our free-will is an effect without a cause, for
its proper nature is the cause of this effect" (Cic. De Fato).
TThile the Neo-Platonists incorporated the freedon of the
will into their thinking, they failed to make it consistent with
1. Janet & Seailles, A History of the Problems of
Philosophy
. Vol. 1, p. 324.
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thelr speculative, psycliological and religious teachings.
Plotinus -urged that without freedom punishment and reward are
meaningless and lamhlichus affirced both free will and determinism.
In saying that a thing is uncertain and at the same time that
it can "be foreseen with certainty there is presented an antinomy
that was never solved. The adjudication of the claims of free
and mechanical causality had not been made at the time of the
opening of modern philosophy. While Descartes defended free will,
the empiricists, sensationalists, materialists, Locke and Hobbes
sought to explain both the mental and physical in terns of the
laws governing external phenomena and their relations. Modern
determinism finds a most rugged protagonist in Thomas Hobbes.
According to him, everything including the human will is finally
explicable as the movement of material atoms determined by the
laws of necessity. Desire and will are identical in the last
analysis and so-called deliberation is merely desire, appetite
or fear in a succession of these experiences.^
Thus we have seen that the doctrine of necessity implying
fatalism and predestination which renders the individual and his
conduct but the impotent product of a purposeless whole has been
held by materialistic thinkers from ancient philosophy even down
to within modern thought. It remained for John Stuart Mill,
1. Hobbes, Thomas, On Human Nature
.
Chs. VII, XII.
i
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prompted by Hme and Jonathan Edwards, to substitute the doctrine
of determinism often described as soft determinism for the
rigorous hard determinism of historic necessitarianism.^ Accord-
ing to Mill, conduct is a product of circumstance and character
so that, if the facts concerning one's heredity, history, habits,
powers, defects and peculiarities were completely kno^m and his
environment were laaown eqvially well, conduct could be predicted
with absolute certainty. In general Mill's view of determinism
required that the grounds of conduct be conditioned by the past
character and the circumstances of the agent. The question still
rises regarding soft determinism as to whether or not necessi-
tarianism still remains in principle though slightly modified in
form. The locus of the problem hinges on whether or not new
events ever occur in a world like ours. If personality al an
expression of will is not its own cause but is determined by
something other than itself whether it be according to circum-
stances implicit in the star-dust or whether it be determined by
the past character and circumstances of the individual, real am-
biguity is equally eliminated as respects the future of the will.
In both cases freedom is denied in preference for a world of
sequential causality. Man is not free where his future is wholly
and precisely predetermined by his past cliaracter, habits and
environment. If character is rigid, immutable and determined in
1. Palmer, H. S., The Problem of Freedom , pp. 46-4.7.
1
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stnict-ure, then there can be no freedom of the will. "Every act
of genuine freedoni means a novel and unique event in the history
of the world. It is just this possibility for which determinism
of the liillean type can find no more satisfactory explanation
than can its older form called necessitarianism.
In the work of Henry Sidgwick, we encounter a still dif-
ferent attitude toward the problem of freedom. The results of his
investigation are two-fold. In his opinion, attention must be
centered upon the insoluble character of the problem of freedom
and the relative practical unimportance of the problem. The first
of these contentions he posits on the ground that demonstrable
evidence is forthcoming for the truth of both determinism and
libertarianisra. The weakness of each point of view is to be found
in the truth of its opposite. In his opinion the review of the
evidence to be educed on each side of the free-will controversy
affords no ground for a solution or conclusion regarding the
relative correctness of these theories. Sidgwick concludes that
when voluntary action is thoroughly understood in connection with
the free-will controversy, the cumulative argvunent for determinism
is overwhelming while at the same time he insists that in action
it is impossible not to regard oneself as free to do \7hat he
judges to be reasonable. "YoluntaxT" action is distinguished as
1. Leighton, J. A., if!an and the Cosmos
, p. 457.
I
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'conscious* from actions or movenents of the hmian organism
which are '-unconscious' or 'mechanical
"The belief that events are determinately related to
the state of things immediately preceding them is
now held by all ccsnpetent thinkers in respect of all
kinds of occurrences except h\3man volition
Step by step in successive departments of fact con?-
fllcting modes of tho-ught have receded and faded, until
at length they have vanished everywhere, except from
the mysterious citadel of Will, Everywhere else the
belief is so firmly established that some declare its
opposite to be inconceivable: others even maintain
that it always was so. Every scientific procedure
assumes it: each success of science confirms it*
• . • • but sdso that the different niodes of determi-
nation of different kinds of events are lundamentally
identical and mutually dependent; and naturally, with
the increasing conviction of the essential unity of the
cognisable universe, increases the indisposition to
allow the exceptional character claimed by Libertarians
for the department of human action.''^
Further, when we direct attention to human action
itself, we discover that a large part of it is likewise
determined by physical causes involving great difficulty at
points to show the difference between such detemiined acts
and those which are conscious and voluntary. In fact, a large
part of human action believed to be free is illusory.
"Though Libertarians contend that it is possible
for us at any moment to act in a manner opposed to
o\ir acquired tendencies and previous customs ,— still
,
they and Determinists alike teach that it is much less
easy than men commonly imagine to break the subtle
\anielt trammels of habit. *^
1. Sid^ick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics . 7th ed.,
p. 59.
2. ibid., pp. 62-63.
3. ibid., p. 65.
I
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Sidgwick now proceeds to show tliat it is possilsle
to set over against the cmuLative evidence offered for
Determinism the immediate testimony of consciousness that it
is free in the moment of deliberative action. If I possess a
"distinct consciousness of choosing "between alterna-
tives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right
or reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that
I can now choose to do what I so conceive,— supposing
that there is no obstacle to my doing it other than
the conditions of my desires and voluntary habits,—
however strong may be my inclination to act unreason-
ably, and however oniforraly I may have yielded to such
inclinations in the past. " J-
It is possible that the conviction of free choice may be
illusory and that further l-naowledge of personality might
reveal a constitution requiring determinism as its most coherent
interpretation. Nevertheless the fact is that the mechanistic
assumption, in view of what facts are now known, requires a
fundamental alteration of experienced self-action which violates
the notion of the self or the active mind to which they are
referred. Due to the present incomplete state of human know-
ledge respecting the nature of personality there obtains con-
flict of argument resulting in widely different views on the
part of many competent thinlcers respecting the freedom of the
will. This fact obviously served as the basis for Sidgwick's
saying "I do not myself wish at present to pronounce aiay
2decision on it."
1. Sidgwiclc, Henry, The !t;ethods of Bthics . 7th ed,,
p. 65.
2. ibid . . p. 66.
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Not only is freedom of the will at present insoliable
but Sidgwick held it was practically inconsequential. He
regarded "it possible and useful to show that the ethical im-
portance of deciding it one way or another is liable to be
exaggerated; and that any one who will consider the matter
soberly and carefully will find this importance to be of a
strictly limited kind."^ The metaphysical question of free
will is not regarded as important, theology excepted, for
systematic ethics generally. On this view determinism is not
held, except in certain exceptional circumstances or on certain
theological assumptions to appreciably modify one's view of
what he ought to do or the reasons wliy he ought to do It. It
is argued that happiness, excellence, remorse, oughtness, merit,
demerit sind responsibility will be met by the determinists
practically the same as by the libertarians and that the pro-
motion of virtue and social well-being are equally well promoted
on either view. The power of the will extends to the control
of certain muscular contractions, the control to some extent
of our thoughts sind feelings, and, finally, the alteration of
future action and conduct, all of which have practical importance
in showing the extent of the power of the will, but which are
BO limited that any lingering doubt which the argment may have
1. Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics , 7th ed.
,
p. 66.
I
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left in the reader •s mind concerning the practical importance
of the free-will controversy is dispelled. These views of
Sidgwick have "by no means been universally accepted and com-
petent scholarship generally a^ees that momentous consequences
attach to each theory. While it is true that at best much
inconsistency infests our thinking, this does not warrant the
conclusion that o\ar belief about freedom does not change
practical endeavor in addition to much else. The view here
expressed is an interesting alternative in the history of
speculative thought but it fails to do Justice to either fact
or theory.
Lastly, the view of freedom as an tLberwundener
Stanp^punk^ teaches that freedom is a notion which the mind
has outgrown. It ie undoubtedly due to the success of the
natviral sciences that this point of view has been advanced.
This implies that experience as a whole can be explained
\inder the category of sequential causality. Inasmuch as both
mechanism and freedom are ideals of explanation rather than
demonstrable facts, freedom is certainly not an obsolete point
of view. The present status of hximan knowledge does not warrant
the dogma of universe! mechanism. 'Whatever science may reveal
about the mechanisms of consciousness, there certainly exists a
body of data xinable to be forced into any such Procrustecm bed.
"In origin Mechanism is an abstreict quality correspond-
ing to the concrete thing machine; that is to say, it is a
quality, not of any object existing in HatTire, but of
certain artificial constructions made by man. Hence to
4
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apply the conception to Nat-ore in anything like Its
original sense Is to he guilty of anthropomorphism
in a double degree,"!
Freedom is therefore not disproven hut, on the contrary, still
maintains in human thought a position identical with the place
accorded it hy Immanuel Kant who regarded freedom as the key-
stone in the arch of his two Critiques, The evidences supporting
the postulate of freedom will constitute a si^lficant part of
this study. Here we merely set forward the claim that freedom
is not em ttberwundener Standpunkt ,
Bowne's attitude toward the historical approach to
the problem of freedom is instructive for our purpose. In his
criticism of Chauncey Wri^t as a philosopher, Bowne expresses
his own view toward the vadue of the history of philosophy as
follows. "It is too late in the development of thought for
any one to attempt independence. A large study of the history
of philosophy is absolutely necessary to prevent one from wasting
his strength on exploded errors."^ With this discriminative
appreciation of the history of philosophic thought Bowne never-
theless felt that "the traditional arguments for both freedom
and necessity have generally been short-sighted and superficial,"'
1. Streeter, B,H, , Reality , p. 2,
2. Bowne, B.P,
,
"Chauncey Wrl^t as a Philosopher,"
New Englander . 37 (1878), 603. For a less friendly appreciation
of the history of philosophy in Bowne's later thou^t, see
Personal ism, pp. 15-17.
3. Bowne, B.P. , "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Heview. 77 (1895), p. 688.
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Too often in the past spec-ulators have confined themselves
to the proolen of our executive activities in the outer
world at the expense of the significance of freedom in the
thou^t life which has been commonly overlooked.^ This error
was primarily due to the creating of a psychological distinction
"between will and intelligence as a real distinction instead of
recognizing them as aspects of one thing. On this false dis-
tinction the will and its activity were identified with unin-
telligent and unmotivated willing over against which stood the
Intellect as couplete in itself. It was not seen that will
and intellect were "both abstractions and the one concrete reality
is the willing and knowing self. Thus willing may "be intelligent
volition on the one hand while knowing, on the other hand, is
attained only thro-ugh the will to .mow which is "basic to all
knowledge. It is at this point that Bowne gave expression to
his classic conviction which characterized the distinctive
contri"bution which he made to the pro"blem of freedom. "I am
pers-uaded, therefore, tloat one wishing to find his way into
this problem of freedom will do well to consider, first of all,
the question of freedom in intelligence itself £.nd the collapse
of rationality involved in the system of necessity."
1. Bowne, B. P., Princir>les of Ethics , 165. "It
is one of the traditional imbecilities of this discussior, , that
freedom of thought, ^lihich involves all the difficulties oi lae
general problem, is practically admitted by everyone, and the
discussion is limited to our executive activity."
2. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedoni" Methodist Review
.
77 (1895), p. 639. Personalism .
pp. 201-202.
i
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Not only did Bowne object to the old faculty psychology
as has just been pointed out "but he clearly showed that historical
discussions of freedom have usually centered about the field of
ethics and that we here encounter a tangle of arguments con?-
cerning motives in the deterniination of the ^vill,^ traditionally
the question of the weightier motive and the stronger impulse
in determining conduct has led to the conclusion tliat volition
springs from desire and the accompanying impulse to action and
that volition is therefore to be identified with desire a con-
fusion T.hlch we have already pointed out in the thought of
Thomas Hobbes. Desire is the basis of all activity and when
single automatically passes into action. In case the mental
state is coinplex, a conflict of desires and motor impulses
ensues in consciousness which is called reflection and delibera-
tion. The strongest competitor among the desires finally decides
action and we call this act volitional whereas it is purely
mechanical. The fact is we are rarely aware of all the impulses
operating in us and we therefore imagine that we control our
wills or that we decide between conflicting motives, a situation
which gives rise to the illusion of freedom in willing. Thus
what we call freedom has been thought of as desires and Impulses
1. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics : a Study in First
Principles
, p. 169. "It is one of the misfortunes of the
doctrine of freedom that it has commonly been considered v/ith
reference to moral action only. In this field, interests, passions,
and the various selfish sentiments are very prominent, and
obscure the real nature of the question."
II
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conflicting in the form of motives as constitutional elements
the strongest of which prevails -under the form of volition.
The fact is that a special act of volition appears to "be necessary
in order to realize the strongest motive. Bowne, therefore,
recoiled against this historical notion of volitional activity
as reducible to a coniplex mechanical activity and viewed it as
"an incongruous mixture of freedom and necessity" vrhich reduced
"action to a series of occurrences within us, according to the
laws of causation,"^ In the field of ethics, therefore, "there
is always room for speaking of the weight of motives, of the
stronger impulse, etc.; and thus we fail to get the clear
illustration of freedom involved in the passionless operations
2
of tho\aght itself." Such confusion in the history of tho-ught
can only be traced to the failure to differentiate volition
from its psychological attendants.
^'urther, there is a necessary distinction between
volition and judgnent upon which we must insist. The two are
different both in their psychological nat-uTe and in their
direction. While volition may be, and often is, based on Judg-
ment it does not follow that insight into one co-urse of action
as preferable to another carries with it the v/illing of the
wiser co-urse of action. In life we often j-udge intelligently
where the will is never enlisted to legislate thought into action
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psycholop:ical Theory
,
pp. 221, 224-225.
2. Bowne, B.P., "Tlie Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 586,
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and converselv volition often enough flies in the face of
reason.
Moreover, a general conviction has prevailed in
certain quarters of speculative thought that "the belief in
freedom is an offense to reason';"^ We hold it out of deference
to morality "but with no inconsiderable compromise to the
intellect. Contrary to this opinion, Bowne urges his contention
that this view is an oversight of the facts involved in the
problem of freedom, that it rests upon a most superficial under-
standing of the categories employed in constructing the specu-
lative difficulties in the conception of freedom.
Finally, much theological debate lias urged for
dogmatic reasons a distinction between freedom of choice and
freedom of willing. Our choices were regarded as determined
by our natures or by our characters yet we were free in the
execution of -ur choices. The fact is th^t in life we find
the notion of freedom of choice far less trotiblesome than the
realization of our choices. Traditional theology has failed
to see that our problem lies in the weakness of executive
ability rather than in any lack of power to choose. Hence, the
notion of moral inability and natural ability is a matter of
1. Bovme, B. P., MetaTihysics . rev. ed., p. 405.
Three years earlier, Bovme wrote in the present tense as
follows:- "There is a very general conviction in speculative
circles that the notion of freedom is an offense to reason .-"
"The Speculative Significance of Freedoii, " Methodist Review
.
77 (1895), p. 683.
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specuLation rather than of erperience. From these observations
we readily conclude that Bowne f o\uid the critico-historical
approach to the problem of freedom "both instructive and productive
althou^ a large part of speculation in this field has been
negative in its import. It has been necessary to re-examine the
psychological, logical, ethical, religious and speculative grounds
of the problem of freedom.
The method of investigation which will be followed
throughout this study may be outlined as follows. It will first
be necessary to examine Bowne 'e sources relative to his doctrine
of freedom. This will reveal the extent of his historical in-
debtedness to modern philosophical thought. Within this circle
of influence we must examine the philosophical investigations
of G. W. Leibnitz, George Berkeley, Iramanuel Kant, G. F. W.
Hegel, Hermann Lotze, J. F. Herbart, Charles Renouvier, Hermann
Ulrici, Henri Bergson and William James insofar as their inves-
tigations directly or indirectly contribute to the exact appre-
ciation of Bowne' s doctrine of freedom. In addition to Bowne*
s
estimate of the history of philosophy in general, there is
evidence tliat he was influenced either at times or throughout
the construction of his philosophy of personalism by many of the
eminent thinkers to whom we have just referred.
The question of the philosophical orientation of
Bowne' s thought respecting freedom once determined, the way for
a critical and systematic exposition of his particular teaching
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is made clear. In addition to the question of Bowne's historical
indebtedness, careful attention will "be directed to the meta-
morphosis of his own thinking. It will also he our purpose to
reveal the structural and functional positions of freedom in
Bowne's system of thought.
Finally, an examination and reconstruction of the
problem of freedom in the light of present insight are required
for the purpose of determining the relative value of Bowne's
teaching in the light of contemporary types of philosophical
thinking. This critical analysis includes a wide range of
brilliant contemporary influence among which names are those
of Henri Bergson, William James, Josiah Hoyce, William McDougall,
E.G. Spaul ding, Esuis Driesch, Louis Arnaud Held, W.E.Johnson,
Charles Peirce and W.E. Hocking. In this way, it will be possible
to examine the validity of Bowne's thou^t as well as to fix
the degree of novelty and standard contribution made by him
looking forward to the solution of the problem of freedom.
The object of the dissertation is to examine critically
Bowne's teaching that the postulate of freedom is of deep
speculative si^ificance. The deep speculative sigaificance
of freedom easily constitutes one of the major motifs in the
writings of Bowne. It will be our purpose to discover whether
or not he overestimated the value of this contention.
i
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Bowne's Relation to Modern Philosophical Thotight
In the Preface to his Metaphysics : a Study in First
Principles .^ Bowne says of G. W. Leihnitz (1645-1715) that
"Leitnitz f\arnishes the starting point" for his metaphysical
investigation. The sense in which Lelhnitz serves as the point
of departure for Bovoie's metaphysics becomes clear when we under
stand the Leibnitzian Monadology with respect to its teachings
about the categories of substance and causality. As respects
substance, Leibnitz posits simple substances without parts or
extension or figure or divisibility which constitute the element
2
of things and which are imperishable. These he calls monads.
It is the principle of individuality so constructively extended
for which Leibnitz's teaching is noteworthy for our purpose. Hi
monads may properly be described as selves though the most inte-
grated ones are properly described as persons. His sir.-.ple sub-
stances are dynamic and active rather than passive and extended.
Descartes* notion of substance is therefore rejected and the
essential nature of matter is force but force and motion are not
derived from extension. He arrived at the conception of matter
in terms of force by an analysis of the mind on the ground that
1. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics ; a Study in First
Principles . 1882, Preface, p. vii.
2. Leibnitz, Gr. W. von, La Monadologie . translated
from the French by F. H. Hedge, Ilodern Classical Fnilosophers
.
rev. and enlarged ed., B. Hand, p. 198.
II
I
1
-43-
it is "a living mirror of the universe" and reflects as well
as determines the nature of things.
Logically thought is expressed through the Judgment
in which a predicate is asserted of the sijLject, While a
subject in one context may "become the predicate of another,
there is a unique kind of subject of which many predicates may
be asserted, but it, itself, can never become the predicate of
another subject, Tliis svjbject is substance defined by Leibnitz
as the subject of all its various predicates but itself the
predicate of no sxJbject.^ This conception of substance is
perfectly identified with the notion of the self underlying all
mental states. I am always the subject and cannot become the
predicate to any s-ubject, I have immediate self-knowledge not
gained through external reference to any other object. The
notion of substance is analogous to that of the soul or self-
substance which is a force center. Such monads are self
energizing and there are many such independent substances as
opposed to the dualism of Descartes and the monism of Spinoza.
In character, the monad is a unit of substance each being unique
or a world in itself, each is active preserving unity through
change and identity in difference. But "The i'onads have no
windows through which anything can enter or go fortla."^ Since
1. Leibnitz, G. W., Schriften
.
IV, p. 432. Cited by
Hibben, J. G., Philosoiphy of the Enlightenment
, p. 168.
2. Leibnitz, G-. 'J., La I.^!onadolo.£:ie
.
translated from
the French by F. H. Hedge, Modern Classical Philoso-phers . rev.
and enlarged ed., B. Rand, p. 200,
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the monads suffer no external connections or interactions which,
affect one another, there is required an internal principle of
activity efficiently motivated described "by Leihnitz as pre-
established iiarmony.^ That is, God has so adjusted his creation
that all entelechies or created monads have their interaction
explained through this principle.
"Thus God alone is the primitive unity, or the original
simple substance of which all the created or derived
Monads are the products; and they are generated so to
speak, by continual fulgurations of the Divinity, from
moment to moment, bounded by the receptivity of the
creatxire, of whose existence limitation is an essential
condition."^
Elsewhere Leibnitz says:
"Ood at first so created the soul or any other real
unity, that everything njust arise in it from its own
inner nature, with a perfect spontaneity as regards
itself, and yet with a perfect conformity to things
outside of it And accordingly, since
each of these substances accurately represents the
whole universe in its own way and from a certain view,
and the perception or expression of external things
come into the sotil at their appropriate time, in
virtue of its own laws, as in a world by itself, and
as if there existed nothing but God and the soul. •
there will be a perfect agreement between all these
substances, which will have the same result as if
they had communication with one another by a trans-
mission of species or qualities, such as the mass
of ordinary philosophers suppose."*^
If we substitute Bowne's theory of interaction for Leibnitz's
theory of pre-established harmony as has just been described.
1. Leibnitz, G. W., Schriften
. IV, p. 484, Cited
by Hibben, J. G. , Philosopiiy oi the Enlightenment . p. 168.
2. Leibnitz, G. W., La Monadologie
.
translated from
the French by P. H. Hedge, Modern Classical Philosophers . rev.
and enlarged ed. , B. Rand, p. 205.
3. Leibnitz, G. W., Schriften, IV, p. 432. Cited
by Hibben, J. G., Philosophy of the Enlightenment
, p. 168.
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the res-ult Is personallstic thelsci all but the name, Leibnitz
taught a spiritual pluralism of individual selves having a
certain completeness, perfection, and s-ufficiency "which makes
them the eources of their own internal actions, and, as it were,
incorporeal automata •*
With this insight into Leibnitz's category of s\3b-
stance, we now examine his category of ca\isality. It will instruct
us here to indicate the historical background of his thought*
Leibnitz rejected the teachings of Descartes and Duns Scotus,
both of whom taught that there is in God absolute indifference or
the liberty of indifference and that man's will is free. On the
other hand, he rejected the logical fatalism of Spinoza who
identified the possible, the real and the necessary which viewed
all phenomena as the necessary consequences of the one eternal
principle or Substance, Ood himself. Siib stance is the vortex
which perpetually swallows finite personality and Spinoza's
psychology philosophically denied true metaphysical freedom to
finite persons. Leibnitz undertakes to steer a middle course
probably best described as tbat of moral necessity, inclinat non
1. Bowne, B. P., St-udies in Theism , p. 252. Bowne
rejected Leibnitz's theory of pre-estabiished iiarmony because
"It comes into hopeless collision with the fact of freedom and
is essentially fatalistic." Cf. pp. 255-256,
2. Leibnitz, G. W., La Monadologie . translated from
the French by P. H. Eedge, Modern Classical Philosophers . rev.
and enlarged ed., B. Hsoid, p. 202#
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necessltat . He finds absolute freedom contradictory to the
divine foreknowledge, the laws of nattire and also those of
reason for the vdll requires "by the principle of siafficient
reason in order to act not only force but a goal or the good
which is the only necessity. As opposed to Spinoza's logical
fatalism which identifies the real as the necessary, Leibnitz
urged that what does not imply contradiction is possible which
permits that the contrary of aill phenomena in the world Is
possible and contingency is true of reality. In spite of this
we do live in the best possible of worlds wnich God deliberately
chose for this very reason but in which all phenomena are
predetermined, foreseen and causally arranged by him. "All things
are certain and predetermined in man as in everything else, and
the human so\il is a kind of spiritual automaton."^ Or again
"the mind is a force which endeavors to act in many direc-
tions, but does so only where it finds most facility and
least resistance Thus it is that the in-
clinations of the mind aove towards all the goods that
present themselves; these are the antecedent volitions;
but the consequent volition, which is the result of them,
is determined towards that by which it is i.iOst strongly
affected. "S
Freedom in man implies intelligence,^ spontaneity^ and contin-
1. Leibnitz, &. W., New Essays Concerning Human Under-
standing;, p. 206. . . . the prevalence of perceived good
inclines without necessitating, althou^ considered as a whole, this
Inclination is determinate and never fails to produce its effect."
2. Janet , J. , & Seailles , G. , A History of the Problems
of Philosophy
.
Vol. 1, p. 341,
3. ibid .
. pp, 341-342.
4. Leibnitz, G. W., New Essays Concerning Hunan Under-
standing
, p. 182,
5. ibid . . p. 180,
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gency. Intelligence is the power to choose and deliberate on
the "best alternative of action but, being finite, man cannot
exercise a perfect use of reason. "Agents wnich have absolutely
neither tho-ught nor volition are in all respects necessary
,
agents ." Spontaneity is a monad's power of acting and of being
at the same time the principle of its own action. "But Aristotle
has already well remarked that to call acts free, we demand not
only that they be spontaneous , but further that they be deliberate ."
But since these spiritual monads have no direct or reciprocal
action among themselves, their independent acts are made to agree
with one another through a hannony pre-established by God. As
respects contingency, "volitions are contingent," that is everything
which is not contradictory or absolutely impossible is contingent
including all phenomena together with human actions. However,
"Freedom, which is only a power, belongs only to agents and cannot
be an attribute or modification of the will, which is itself nothing
o
else than a power. "*" In urging the determination of the will by
reason, Leibnitz has Philalethes argue as follows:
"To be determined by the reason to the best, is to
be the freest. Fno would wish to oe foolish for the
reason that a fool is less deter.nined by wise reflections
than a man of good sense? If freedom consists in throwing
off the yoke of reason, fools and madmen will be the only
free-men; but I do not believe that for love of such
freedom any one would wish to be a fool save he who is
one already."*^
1. Leibnitz , G. W. , New Essays Concernin)S; Human Under-
standing
, p. 183.
2. ibid ., p. 134.
3. ibid ., p. 206.
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Hor did Leibnitz hesitate to urge that Ood himself is determined
to choose the best and that his freedom does not hinder him from
being determined by the good any more than o\ir freedom hinders us.^
While Leibnitz concludes with a moral necessity, his determinism,
even though its psychological consequezu:es were equivalent to the
logical fatalism of Spinoza, is inspired by a decidedly different
motive and aim. In Leibnitz's conception of the universe as a sub-
stance of spiritual monads, in his notion of concrete individuality
and in his conception of rational determinism and a dynamic universe,
it becomes clear in what sense "Leibnitz furnishes the starting
point" for Bowne's metaphysics, Bowne rejected the power of action
as synonymous with freedom as applied to both persons and atoms.
"This power of action, however, must not be confounded with freedom
. . . . Whenever it does act, it is the source of the action;
yet the atom is not free."*^ This type of philosophical deter-
minism recognizes the so\il as a true subject but affirms that its
activity is determined from within by its ovm nature. The
soul may be the source of action but vinder a given circumstance
it can act in only one way so that only the alleged conscious-
ness that we might have acted otherwise is denied. Bowne held
that "Leibnitz, who, with Spinoza, is the fo\inder of determinism.
1. Leibnitz, G.W., New Essays Concerning Human Under-
standing , pp. 205-206.
2. Bowne, B.P., Studies in Theism , pp. 242-249.
3. ibid . p. 396.
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also asserted in the strongest manner the spontaneity and
reality of the so\d. Both writers rep-udiated the notion of
an external compulsion of any kind."^ Sut the manner in which
Leibnitz viewed the inner life was a violation of Bo^vne's
notion that reasoning implies freedom. In Leibnitz's system
we have a succession of mental states which we cannot interrupt.
One belief determines us as much as another. His view makes
truth and error alike necessary. Such inner determinism over^
throws knowledge completely. On this ground Bowne rejected the
theory of pre-established harmony as incompatible with science
and philosophy because it denies freedom and ends in fatalism.*^
In other respects Bowne accepted certain features of Leibnitz's
doctrine of pre-established harmony in the interest of his
theory of interaction.
Bowne at one time described his system as a Kantianized
3
Berkeleianism. By this he acl-niowledged his metaphysics to be
in its main outline essentially that of Berkeley (1635-1753).
Much of both the form and content of Bowne' s philosophy is
Berkeleian and there is evidence pointing toward the primacy of
Berkeleian influence above that of either Kant or Lotze. The
1. Bowne, B. P., Studies i;q Theisrq
. p. 397.
2. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics ; a Study
_
in Urst
Principles
, p. 124.
"
3. Bowne, B. P.. Meta-olr,rsic8 . rev. ed.
, p. 423.
4. Knudson, A. c The Philosophy of Personalism.
p. 431, footnote 51.
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relation of Berkeley to Malebranche (1638-1715) and LeilDnitz
clearly indicates the direction of his tho-u^t. The absolute
idealism of Male"branche destroys finite freedom in the interest
of doing justice to God. "TThatever effort of the mind I may
make, I can find no strength, or efficiency, or power outside
the will of the infinitely perfect Being. Volition is
described as a natural impulse toward the good in general which
is indeterminate for it is God who irresistibly Impels us
toward the good in general. But while God is the real cause of
all volitions of finite minds, he is not the author of sin.^ At
this point, Llalebranche destroys human freedom and the divine
activity for his definition of sin as nothing and the sinner as
doing nothing requires the cessation of God's original imp-ulse
and logically calls for a human volition. Tnile he affirms that
"Man is a free agent," his theory of freedom is in reality
subsidiary to his more general theory of occasional causes.
While Berkeley felt a mental kinship to L^alebranche, he employs
freedom as a metaphysical first principle which provides finite
spirits with real metaphysical freedom.
Berkeley' s thou^t Ib similar to Leibnitz's.. He taught
a complete immateriality of substance which he regarded as
1. Janet, P., & Seailles, G., A History of the
Problems of Philosophy
.
Vol. 1, p. 336.
2. Malebranche
,
Nicolas, A Treatise of Morality ^
Hand, B., The Classical Moralist
s
_, p. 288.
3. lialebranche
,
Nicolas, A Treatise of Morality
.
Hand, B., The Classical Moralists, p. 289.
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spirit-ual. Heaiity is a society of spirits hianan and divine.
He says "A spirit is one simple, -undivided, active being—as it
perceives ideas it is called the understanding , and as it
produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the EjJLL*"^
The mind of a spiritual being is active in making and unmaking
ideas and in this is constituted its willing and volitional
power. Ity freedom of willing ideas in my mind at pleasure is
limited for the power of control over my thoughts does not extend
to the ideas actually perceived by sense for these are independent
of my will. But, since I am not the volitional cause of these
sensuous ideas as creatures of my will, there must therefore be
some other will or spirit which produces and impresses them upon
my mind.
"The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and
distinct than tnose of the imagination; they have like-
wise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not
excited at random as those ^ich are the effects of
h\aman wills often are, but in regular train or series
—
the adiiiirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies
the wisdom and benevolence of its Author."^
Further the rules by which the mind presents ideas of sense con-
stitute the laws of nature thereby giving to nature uniformity
and dependability. These laws of nature express the goodness of
the supreme will. Finite spiritual beings are therefore both
active and passive. With respect to their limited activity
1. Berkeley, George, A Treatise Concerning the
Principles of Human Knowledge
.
2d ed., Rand, B., Modern Classical
Philosophers
.
rev. and enlarged edition, p. 274.
2. ibid. . p. 275.
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they are in possession of limited freedom while with respect
to their ideas of sense they are passive and insofar determined.
Insofar as the mind is active, it has the power to choose, while
ideas which are caused in me "by the action of the cosmic spirit
are not products of my volition. The former are called ideas
or Images of things and, being excited in our imagination are less
regular, vivid and constant, while the latter are called real
things and. are more vivid, strong, orderly and coherent since
they depend upon the cosmic spirit rather than upon our own.
This distinction in personality between freedom and necessity
lies at the heart of Bowne's doctrine of limited freedom which
will appear in our analysis of his teaching on this point.
^
Berkeley, in fact, makes freedom a metaphysical first principle
in his interpretation of reality whether in finite spiritual or
the infinite spiritual being.
"That impious and profane persons should readily
fall in with those systems which favor their inclina-
tions, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing
the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as
the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and
design from the formation of things, and instead thereof
make a self-existent stupid, unthinking substance the
root and origin of all beings; that they shoxild hearken
to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a
Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing
the whole series of events either to blind chance or
fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body on
another - all this is very natural. And, on the other
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychol og;ical
Theory , pp. 232-234.
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hand, when men of "better principles otserve the enemies
of religion lay so great a stress on unthinkinis; Matter ,
and all of them use so much industry and artifice to
reduce everything to it; nethinks they should rejoice to
see them deprived of their grand support, and driven
from that only fortress, \7ithout which your Epicureans,
Hothists and the like, have not even the shadow of a
pretence, and "become the most cheap and easy trivnnph
in the world."
We encounter, in the spiritual pluralism of Berkeley, personal
idealism which is in its own respect a unique contrTcution to
2
the history of philosophical tnought.
The indebtedness of Bowne to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
is very great. In Bovme's reference to liis own thought as a
Kantianized-Berkelelanism to which reference has already "been
made, he meant to describe his epistemology as essentially
Kantian apriorism. Bowne' s eystem so far as his logic, epistem-
ology and etliics are concerned is in many respects Kantian
although BoYrae greatly extended those ideas of Kant which he
found congenial to his own thought while he critically rejected
aspects of the Kantian epistemology which were of a debatable
and. less permanent character. ?or our purpose, we shall
therefore limit our survey of Kant's Critical Philosophy to
those aspects of ::nowledge and personality which contributed
1. Berkeley, George, A Treatise Concerning the Princi-ples
of Hman Knov/ledge . 2d ed« , Hand , B
.
, Liodern Classical Piiilosoohers .
rev. and enlarged ed., p. 293.
2. The intimacy of the philosophical points of view
of Berkeley and Bowne is revealed by the fact that, at the time
of his death, Bovme was planning to write a vol-ume on Berkeley.
I am indebted for this information to Dean Albert C. Knudson of
Boston University Scliool of Tlieology.
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directly to Bovme's doctrine of freedom. What Kant had to
say about the reason, the will and morality v;ith respect to
their individual natures and interdependencies rrill constitute
our inquiry insofar as they involve his postulate of freedcen.
Kant postulated freedom as the key-stone in the arch of his
critiques, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, 2d rev. ed., 1787)
and Kritik der r>raktisclien Vernunf t (1788). In the Kritik der
reinen Vernunf
t
.-^ Kant discusses the idea of freedom from the
point of view of a yossihility in a v.orld where the universal
law of necessity has "been affirmed and he attempts to- show how
the idea of freedom as a cosmic concept correlates with the
general necessity of nature. Kant admits two kinds of causality
as conceivable to explain events, th^t of nature and that of
freedom. Kant defines freedom as follows:
"Dagegen verstehe ich unter Freiheit, l.-n kosmologlschen
Verstande, das Verciogen, einen Zustand von selhst ansu-
fangen, deren KausalitS.t also nicht nach dem Naturgesetze
wiederum unter einer anderen Ursache steht, welche sle
der Zelt nach hestinrate."^
Freedom, therefore, Is a type of causality independent of any
other cause by vrhich it is determined in time. It is an idea
of reason and there is in man a self-deterr.ination Independent
of the necessity of sensuous Impulses. If it were ;:ot so, the
will would in turn be determined as all natural events which
1. Herausgegeben von Dr. Raymund Schmidt, S. 603-623.
2. Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der reinen Vernunf t, S.603.
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woTold destroy transcendental freedom as well as practical
freedom. But,
"obgleich etwas nicht geschehen ist, es doch habe
geschehen sollen und seine Ursache in der Erscheinvmg
also n^icht so "bestiniingnd war, dass n^cht in -unserer
Willkur eine Kausalitat liege, unabhangig von jenen
NaturoTsachen und selbst wider ihre G-ewalt und Einfluss
etwas hervorzubringen, web in der Zeitordnung nach
empirischen Gesetzen bestimrat ist, mi thin eine Reihe
von Begebenheiten ganz von selbst anzugangen."^
On this hypothesis, Kant proposes the idea that every effect
in the v.'orld must arise not either from nature or from freedom
but that nature and freedom co-exist in the same event in
different relations. This is possible since phenomena are not
things in themselves for in that case freedom would be impossible,
but, because they are representations only, united according to
firmly established natural laws, they are in need of non-
phenomenal causes such as rational, spontaneous causes which lie
outside the phenomenal series but whose effects are discoverable
in the series of empirical phenomena. On this view an effect
may have its intelligible cause considered as free while, with
reference to phenomena, the effect is at the same time a necessity
of nature. Otherwise the antinomy of nature and freedom is
insol-uble.
"Sj| wSrde denn Freiheit und Natur, Jedes in seiner voll-
stajidigen Bedeut-ung, bei ebendenselben Handlungen, nachdem
1. Kant, Immanael, Kritik der reinen Vernunft
.
S. 604-605.
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man sie mit ihrer intelligi^blen oder sensiblen Ursache
dergleicht, zugleich und ohne alien Widerstreit
angetroffen werden."^
Kant, therefore, holds that the antinomy of nature and freedom
rests on mere illusion. Man belongs to the noumenal and
phenomenal orders. As a member of the former, homo nomenon,
reason is the condition of all free actions "by v/hich man takes
his place in the phenomenal -.vorld.^ As a member of the latter,
homo phenomenon , his will has an empirical character which
causes all his actions. Freedom is not contradictory to natural
necessity in one and the same action for the law of each con-
stitutes different relations to the same effect so that each
may exist independent of and \aniisturbed by the other. Having
distinguished the category of causality as a concept of natural
necessity from the category of causality as a concept of freedom,
he concludes "Hieraus v/ird der leser ersehen, dass , da ich
Freiheit als das Vermogen, eine Begebenheit von selbst anzufangen
erklarte, ich genau den Begriff traf , der das Problem der
Metaphysik ist."*^
In addition to his epistemological and metaphysical
doctrine of freedom where he showed its possibility, but did
not prove it, Kant taught explicitly the necessity of freedom
1 • Kant , Immanuel , Kritik der reinen Vernunf
t
.
S. 610.
2. ibid.
.
S. 519.
3. Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena zu einer .jeden
kunf tigen Lletaphysik
,
die als VTissenschaf t wird auf treten konnen
,
1783, S. 113.
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in his moral philosophy* The central idea of his moral
philosophy is freedom which he identifies with rational
spontaneity. Not only does morality depend upon freedom hut
his conception of society as a kingdom of ends and his repub-
lican theory of government rest upon the same doctrine. In
religion, the true church is constituted of free "beings who
worship God freely while, in education, the same principle of
freedom constitutes the "basic principle of growth. In fact,
"Ethics is a system of the pure rational laws of freedoo." ^
However, freedom is a postulate the "basis of which is the un-
conditioned moral law not revealed "by the theoretical reason.
An unconditioned will is free and, when the will is "based
upon reason, it becomes self-conditioning and, hence, is free.
The moral law within us demands freedom for its exercise for
the ouglit ijiiplies the power to do. We have no knowledge of
freedom since the scientific use of the reason reveals only
causal necessity. Nevertheless, we feel the mandate of the
moral reason which implies freedom even though this postulate
which we are required to malce can never "become an object of
knowledge and therefore prove it to the understanding. On
this account, the practical reason takes priority over the
pure reason due to the fact that it reveals to us what the
understanding can never demonstrate.
1 . Kant , Immanuel , Kritik der Toralctischen Vernunf t.
.
1783. Also, (xrundle,g:ung zur aieta-'ohysik der Sitten . 1785.
2. Cushnan, H. E. , A.3ef;inner ' s History of F;iilosoT)h.y .
Vol. 2, p. 278,
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Contrary to Hime,-'- Kant fo-und the category of
causality to "be a transcendental idea "because reason creates
it independently of erperience. Causality, therefore, like
space and time is an antinomy arising out of the atteiapt of
reason to think the vyorld as a true ding-an- s ich « Both thesis
and antithesis of the antinomy are conceivahle but, of co-urse,
cannot both be true. Kant*s solution consists in allov7ing the
antithesis to hold for the phenomenal world -while the thesis is
true for the noumenal world. The phenomenal world implies
sequential causality and, as such, is a mechanism ad inf initvcn .
The no-umenal \7orld embodies ante sequential causality. Tranr-
scendental freedom is a creation of reason which conditions
the possibility of "ought" in addition to the "is" which the
scientific reason reveals. Freedom is a function of reason
and conditions all voluntary action, jill real causes are,
therefore, due to reason.
In addition to Zant's discussion of Freedom in
connection with the category of causality, there is one further
significant aspect of Kant's doctrine of experience which has
an important bearing on Bowne's doctrine of freedom, namely
his classic doctrine of the constitutive activity of the mind*
Concerning it, Bowne says "This is the abiding and imperishable
element in Kant's system and constitutes his immortal merit.
II
1 • Kant , Immanuel
,
Proleg;omena zu einer j eden
kunf tiffjen Metaoliysik . die als TTissenscliaf t vvird auftreten konnen,
1783, S. 7.
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No critical weapon formed against the view has prospered, and
it stands invincihle."^ Bowne's phrasing of Kant*s doctrine
took the fomi "that experience is possible only throiigh the
constructive action of the mind according to principles immanent
in it; and thus we see that knowledge in general is possihle only
in the same way,"" While Bowne accepted the rational mind as
active, constructive and constitutive, he rejected Kant's psy-
chology and his agnosticism. It is on this ass\amption of the
mind as a rational activity that Bowne passed easily as did
Kant to the identification of its nature as also spontaneous and
free,
Kant regarded freedoii; as the third antinomy of pure
3
reason encountered when the reason deals with rational cosmology.
Here the reason falls into contradiction with itself which creates
a serious difficulty. In dealing with the metaphysical idea of
causality, Bovme regarded Kant's argument against freedom to "be
arbitrary and fictitious. The proof of the antithesis of freedom
and tiiat everything in the world takes place entirely according
to the laws of nature involves great confusion, for Bowne held
that the notion "that freedom is 'opposed to the law of causality
and represents such a connection of successive states of effective
1. Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer , a Critical Exposition ,
p, 17. The or:/ of Thou^t and KnOwledg:e
. pp. 114-115.
2. Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer, a Critical Exposition .
p. 16.
3. Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der relnen Vernunft
. S. 530-539.
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catLses that no -unity of experience is possilDle with it,* is
sheer extravagance."^ Such a view is an abstract and fictitious
conception of the meaning of freedom. Further, where Kant regards
freedom as the abnegation of procedure according to rules and
likens nature to lawful procedure and freedom to that of lawless-
ness, we have a gratuitous conception. Bowne's criticism of
Kant at this point so instructively reveals his own position
concerning freedom that we are required to state it here.
"Now, all that is necessary for experience and
science is simply a certain uniformity within experience
itself. This uniformity as such is altogether independent
of the metaphysics of its possibility. If we suppose it
to rest on necessity or to rest -upon freedom, science and
experience are equally possible. We find as a matter of
fact that tnere are certain uniformities of experience,
and science states these as far as it can, and by means
of the knowledge thus gained seeks to control life. But,
as said, the question of freedom or necessity is entirely
independent of this uniformity. Freedom violates no law
of nature and no law of mind. The believer in freedom
would be as good a psychologist or physicist as the
believer in necessity. It is only as we pass from this
practical science to some kind of basal doctrine which
regards the universe as something absolutely determined
from everlasting to everlasting, and seeks to bind all
events together in one scheme of necessity, that any
difficulty arises; but this notion is a sheer fiction of
the dogmatic intelligence. We do not .aiow the world to
be any such scheme, and Kant aimself held that the world
was no such scheme. We simply icnow that there are certain
uniformities on which we can practically rely for the
1. Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer , a Critical
Exposition
, p. 192.
2. Kant, Imraanuel , Kritik der reinen Vern-unft
. S. 539.
"Denn es iRsst sich stehen einem solchen gesetzlosen VermSgen
der Freiheit, kaum mehr Natur denken; well di« Gesetze der
letzteren durch die einfl^Lsse der ersteren, unaufhiirlich
abgeandert, \and das gpiel der Erscheinungen, welshes nach der
blossen Natur regelmassig und gleichformig sein wurde, dadurch
verwlrrt und unzusammenhangend gemacht wird."
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guidance of life within the range of experience. Anything
beyond this is dogmatic assertion or some species of fate."^
Further, Zant misunderstood the nature of causality
in Bowne's opinion. Instead of viewing causality hack of the
cosmos as a temporally first dynamic impulse which "began the
series of events in time, causality must "be regarded re.ther
as the "continuous productivity, "by which the things that were
and the things that are alike have been produced; which worked
and works and -.vill work forevermore,"" This is an idea of
volitional causality which Bowne stressed in his first published
work*^ and v.hich runs as a thread throughout the entire course
of his thought. Kant's argment that the denial of freedom
would relieve the antinomy of pure reason is shov/n by Bowne to
be fatal as t.:is would be the one condition rendering nature
capricious, groundless, arbitrary and kaleidoscopic. It is
not necessity tliat secures regularity in nature for nature
changes, a fact in the midst of which we have no explar^.tion
unless we reconcile change and identity by trust in the uni-
formity of nature as administered by "free intelligence".
"Such intelligence can choose ends to be reached and the
means for reaching them, and can direct itself to their
realization. It is, therefore, in the highest degree
mistalcen to declare that there could be no orderly
1
. Bowne , B . P. , Kant and Spencer
, a Critical
Exposition
, pp. 192-193.
2. Jila., p. 195,
3. Bowne, 3. P., Fniloso-phy of Herbert Spencer
.
p. 112.
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systen and nj imity of experience if we grant the notion
of freedom."
uloreover, Kant's solution of the antinomy of freedom
is, in Bowne's opinion, a conclusion to "be reached in a far
simpler and Liore satisfpxtory way. In the first place, to
account man as a meciber of tr.-o worlds, he violates his doctrine
of the subjectivity of the categories teaching a transcendental
causality of freedom for man considered as nourisnon vvhich
frankly applies the categories not only to think ahout noumena
but actually to Icnow noumenal objects. In their conclusions,
Kant and Bowne eventually tend to coincide respecting the place
of freedom in any satisfactory conception of reality. Bov/ne's
view of the solution of the Kantian antinomy of reason is as
follows:
"Tlie only thing that really meets the demand for causality
ij- thf' conception of a living, active intelligence which
is iniralnent in all its deeds, and which is equally present
to all of them, to the last as well as the first. With
this understanding we see the Kantian antinomy disai^pear-
ing."-
What Bowne learned from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel *
(1770-1831) concerning the doctrine of freedom wa6 both positive
and negative, but, if we may judge Bowne's appreciation from
1. Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer
, a Critical
Ex"position , p. 196.
2. ibid .
, p. 198. In this quotation, imminent is
probably a typographical error and should be read innaa.nent .
3. McConnell, Bishop F. J., Borden Parker Bowne . His
Life and His Philosophy, p. 114. "Bowne always extolled Hegel as
having immortal merit."
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his writings, we find the negative influence given priority
over the positive influence. What Bovme could receive from
Hegel's teaching on this point was held in common with Kant.
The close association of pantheism and even of atheism
appearing in such a system as that of Spinoza and a similar
fallacy ^7hich in Bovme 's opinion vitiated a large part of
Hegel's works laid the latter' s philosophy under the interdict
of Bowne's pen. Yet, in Hegel is to he found a doctrine of
freedom revealing much with which Bowne could and did agree.
"The territory of right is in general the spiritual,
and its more definite place and origin is the will,
which is free. This freedom constitutes the sub-
stance and essential character of the will and the
system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom.
It is the world of spirit, which is produced out of
itself, and is a second nature."^
In Hegel's opinion, freedom is a structural phase of will as
weight is essential to bodies. In fact, that v;hich is free is
the will for, apart from freedan, the will is meaningless and,
without the will as subject, freedom is no reality. The
psychological distinction of mind into a dioality of facxilties
which separates reason and will is a vain discrimination.^
Continuing the discussion, Hegel argues that
"The will contains the element of pure indeterminate-
ness, i. e., the pure doijjbling of the I hack in thought
1. Hegel, G. W. F., Philosoiphy of Right
.
Rand, B.,
The Classical Moralists
, p. 587.
2. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," llethodist Review . 77 (1695), p. 689. Here Bowne
substantially accepts Hegel's psychology.
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upon itself. In this process every limit or content,
present tlio-ugh it "he directly "by way of nature, as in
want, appetite, or impulse, or given in any specific
way, is dissolved. Thus we liave the limitless infini-
tude of absolute abstraction, or universality, the
pure thought of it sell."
This is Hegel's description of the negative side of freedom
which he describes as freedom of the void which has risen to
be an actual shape and passion. The notion conceived as
absolute and also as self-determination is implicated in the
idea of stA stance which presupposes that the notion has a
nature v/hich creates the difficulty that, after all, Hegel's
conception of freedom is equivalent merely to that of
spiritual mechanism and determinism except that it is of a
more refined sort. Tliis logical problem in Hegel's conception
of the notion as absolute renders the principle of free thought
precarious. Hegel's thotight falls under the fallacy of the
universal, a pantheistic tendency rrherein "the individual is
merged in the class term, and this soon passes for the universal
and all-embracing being. Thus a harmless logical subordination
becomes a fatal ontological implication."
In this same connection, Bowne describes Hegelianism
as a form of impersonalism which arises through the fallacy of
the abstrsct, that is, all concrete reality including intelligence
1. Hegel, Or, W. F., Philosophy of Right , Rand, B.,
The Classical Lforalists
.
p. 589.
2. Bovme, B. P., Tlieory of Thought and Xnov/ledge ,
p. 247.

-65-
is derived from ultimate reality which is impersonal in
character by some logical process or implication. Such an
idealistic iir:personalism, while in origin antipodal to
naturalism, is in outcome often identical with it. Strauss
held that the difference "between Hegelian idealism and
materialism is only one of words and Bovme affirms that this
is true of the left wing Hegelians urging that such impersonal-
istic metaphysics is the perennial source of atheistic reason-
1
mg.
In the preface to the PhilosoT)hy of Hi^it,, Hegel
affirms "What is rational is real, and what is real is
2
rational." It is from this point of viev; that Hegel derives
his spiritual universe as the natural. This conception of
absolute spirit would apparently infringe upon freedom and
spontaneity ancl, therefore, leaves no room to explain the
facts of sin and error. But it is Just this infinity of the
mind which constitutes its freedom because freedom not only
implies absence of restraint but active self-determination as
well. The self is, therefore, free because it deals with
what is ideal and is an independence which comes to reality
through self-control. The natural is to be regarded as
1. Bowne, B. P., Personal ism , pp. 218-219, 253-263.
Theory of Thou£3it and Knowledge , p. 247,
2. Reyburn, H. A., The Ethical Theory of Kegel, a
Study of the Fnilosophy of Right , p. 54. Bowne, B. P.,
Studies in Theism
, p. 118. Here Bowne accepts Hegel's thesis.
"The second part of our thesis claims that the laws of reality
and of rationality must be identical, in order to make science
possible."
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essential to freedom. In all this, Hegel makes the claim to
absolute autonomy for the "bonds of mind are nothing other
than spiritual forces. But there is no way to prevent ovx
asking whether the impelling force which we call spiritual
rather than corporeal substance may not be quite as thorough-
going a determinism. In spite of this, Hegel's free mind
claims to possess the springs of its own action within it
and that it is striving for an end postulated by its own
rational being. To sunmarize briefly, Hegel *s view is that
the "Mind is inherently universal, self-contained, all-
inclusive, ir^finite, self-revealing, and free."^ The difficulty
with Hegel's view is the way in v,'hich the principle of individ-
uality from the point of view of the freedom of finite persons
is conceived. If finite persons are not metaphysically dis-
crete units with a higher degree of impenetrability than Hegel's
absolute idealism will allow, they become eventually enveloped
by the category of necessity which makes all reality one self-
contained and complete experience "herein finite persons are
but uodal expressions of the one self-realizing absolute mind
in its onward march through history. Against this Hegelian
conception of freedoci, Bowne would urge two primary objections.
First, the notion of the self is pauperized and emptied of its
1. Reyburn, H. A., The Ethical Theory of Hegel . a
Study of the Fnilosophv of Hi^vt, p. 89,
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•uniqueness in such a way as to "be relatively worthless.
Secondly, the prohlems of sin and error become opaque.
The denial of personality and freedom as set forth hy Hegelian-
ism does injustice according to Bowne to both the cognitive
and volitional aspects of human erperience.^ The fundamental
objection of Bowne to Hegel's doctrine of freedom lies in its
sacrifice of finite freedom to cosmic freedom. The result is
that the notions of finite freedom, responsibility, sin and
error find no solution on the plane of impersonal pantheism.
At this point, Bowne would accept the point of view
of Renouvier who regarded freedom to be the necessary pre-
supposition of both the rational and noral life apart from which
knowledge, duty, responsibility and guilt are meaningless.
Indeed it is hard to see just how any absolute idealism can
save finite persons from becoming at best i^iore than spiritual
automata which point of view eventuates in determinism and
pantheism. Bowne' s defense of the freedom and individuality
of the finite person in contrast with Hegelian absolutism is
well formulated by Robert Browning, Qiristmas-Sve and Easter-Day
,
where the personal God
"whose pleasure brought
Man into being, stan'^s away
As it were a handbrcadth off, to give
Room for the newly laade to xivt.
And look at him from a place apart,
And use his gifts of brain and heart
Given, indeed, but to keep forever. "2
1, Bowne, B. P., Personalism
. p. 263.
2. Cited by Dean A. C. Knudson, The Philosor)hy of
Personaliaa
. p. 34.
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Anong the acknowledgements which Bowne made respect-
ing the historical connections of his thought is a reference
to Johann Friedrich Herbeirt (1776-1841). He attributes to
Herbart the credit for having supplied the method which he
employed in writing his metaphysics.^ Herbart defined philos-
ophy as the elaboration of conceptions: logic aims at clearness
in conceptions while metaphysics undertakes the correction of
conceptions.^ Anong the formal conceptions furnished by e3q)or-
ience idilch contain contradictions are the following: the con-
ception of inherence which is the notion of a thing with several
attributes implying that one is many; the conception of causality;
the conception of change; and the conception of an Ego regarded
as the primary source of our manifold ideas. The task of meta-
physics is to bring experience under the law of contradiction
and thus to render it consistent and comprehensible. This meta-
physics seeks to do through what Herbart called the method of
relations.*^ Notwithstanding the fact that it has been competently
doubted that the contradictions affirmed by Herbart are really
contained in the formal conceptions forced upon us by experience,'^
this need not necessarily invalidate the Herbartian method.
1. Bowne, B.P.
,
Metaphysics , a Study in First
Principles . 1882, Preface, vii.
2. Ueberweg, Friedrich, History 9f Philosophy ,
vol. 2, p. 268.
3. ibid., p. 273, McConnell, Bishop F. J., Borden
Parker Bowne
. Eis Life and His Philosophy , pp. 242-243.
4. ibid., p. 279.
1J
The reconstruction of the comcepts of experience consists in
seeking out the necessary complementary conceptions, or points
of relation through i^ich the contradictions contained in the
concepts of experience are resolved. It is this method which
Bowne followed closely thro\aghout the development of his meta-
physics. Bowne, too, defined philosophy as a rational under-
taking. The philosophical ideal is
"a rational and systematic ccxnprehension of reality. Or,
since experience is the fundamental fact in all theorizing,
and since reality can he known only in experience, in the
largest sense of that word, we may say that philosophy aims
at a rational and systematic comprehension and interpreta*
ticn of experience."^
Eerhart divided metaphysics Into methodology (the
doctrine of principles and methods), being, inherence, ontology
(change), synechology (the constant), and eidology (phenomena).
He further united with general metaphysics as its applications
both philosophy and psychology. Bowne substantially followed
this procedure throughout his epistemology and metaphysics. In
the metaphysics, Bowne begins with the following categories.
"There are certain general conceptions which make up at
once the framework of knowledge and the framework of exist-
ence. Such are the categories of being and cause, change
and identity, space and time; and our knowledge of partic-
ular things will depend on the conception we form of these
basal categories,"
Following this initial task of reconstructing and correcting
1, Bowne, B.P.
,
Theory of Thoti^ht and Knowledge . p. 3.
2. Bowne, B.P. , Metaphysics , rev. ed.
,
1698. p. 1.
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theee ccminon sense categories is that of developing a critical
and coherent view of the concepts of experience.
Bowne refused to accept Herhart's ideal that psychology
could he erected into a science parallel to physical mechanics
which would explain everything in terms of motion. He covild
accept Herhart's rejection of the old facility psychology hut
Herbart's attempt to e^lain all psychic life mechanically in
terms of the movements of ideas, action and reaction, according
to formulated mathematical relations existing between them
rtd\2cing mental life to the mere complication of ideas, feelings,
strivings and impulses as modified ideas Bowne foxmd useful only
in part. The notion that there can he no free will since the
entire content of the mind follows fixed laws and all psychical
processes are capable of mathematical determination is a point
of view considered by Bowne to be erroneous and incoherent.^
Herbart's determinism reduced the ego from a principle to a
product while Bowne considered it a metaphysical first principle,
Herbart did, however, admit an idea of inner freedcm by which he
understood the agreement of the individual's will with his con-
victions. His mechanical conception of the mental life when
carried into his theory of education, the field in which he
wielded the greatest influence, explains his stress upon instruc-
tion, interest and apperception. All of this presupposes voli-
tion and freedom for which he finds no place.
1. Bowne, B.P., Metaphysics, rev. ed.
, p. 383. Bowne
here disparages Herbart's method saying, "All this is illusion."
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The realistic element is pronounced in both Herbart's^^
andBowne's work. Professor 0. A. Coe says of Boime
"He was probably quite aware of the fundamentally
empirical quality of his own primary procedures. His
dialectic was consciously secondary and defensive —
one might say disinfecting. It did not profess to
discover or demonstrate the real, but only to remove
obstacles from the real and from the perception of it as
real. VKe are to find and know reality by action and irter-
action, by giving play to our sense of need, by contem-
plating historical developnente €md judging values; by
revising thought and conduct and trying again.
And again,
"Who among his students and readers can have
failed to be impressed by his almost constant warnings
against 'merely verbal thinking', the 'fallacy of
the universal
' ,
'logomachies' or 'logic-chopping',
and 'taking the order of thought for the order of
reality'? He who never tired of dialectical con-
tests nevertheless made 'the field of life and action'
his supreme court of appeal as against 'the arid
wastes of formal logic. '""^
Both Herbart and Bowne appropriated the realistic element in
Kantian idealism.
Finally, Bowne acknowledged a debt to the thought of
Hermann Lotze (1817-1681). Hespecting the conclusions of
his metaphysics, Bowne says "the conclusions reached
are essentially those of Lotze. I have reached them.
1. Ueberweg, Friedrich, History pf Philosophy ,
vol. 2, p. 264.
2. "The Bnpirical Factor in Bowne 's Thinking" in
Studies in Philosopher and Theology , edited by E. C.Wilm, p. 20.
Also Methodist Review . 95 (1922), p. 382.
3. ibid ., pp. 18-19.
4. Studies in Theism, Preface, p. vi.
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for the most part, by strictly independent research; but,
so far as their character is concerned, there would be no
great misrepresentation in calling them Lotzean."^ The
Lotzean doctrine of freedom involves an examination of the
types of causality with respect to freedom and necessity.
His point of departure is an examination of the character-
istics by which psychic life may be most unquestionably
differentiated from the whole course of nature. Of all
these characteristics, namely three, Lotze regards freedom
as ordinarily the most significant. He refers to it as the
"Freedom of internal Self-determination , of which we think
we have in ourselves direct and indubitable experience, in
contrast to the unbroken chain of necessity with which the
states of unorganized matter are evolved out of one ano'aer.
.
The dignity and worth of personality and all its activities
root in the notion of freedom from mechanical causation in
both the organic and inorganic realms of existence. We are
unable to directly observe freedoia as a fact of our inner
life even though introspection reveals no determining motive
for our actions, for actions regarded as free self-determination
may, in the last analysis, reveal the fact of determination.
1. Bowne, B, P., Metaphysics
. a Study in First
Principles
, 1882, Preface, vii. Bowne dedicated this work "in
grateful recollection to the memory of my friend and former
teacher Hermann Lotze."
2. Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmus
. Vol. 1, p. 144.
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Due to the incalc-alable character of hiaman conduct and the
incommensiarability of the data of conduct V7hen compared v;ith
the stinruli received, we are convinced of the erroneous natxire
of all reasoning which affirms absolute determinism of mental
life. But lacking invaxiahle proof for freedom, it tiay "be
regarded vise tc retain it as the necessary condition of ethics
and the imperative condition of the fulfillment of moral obliga-
tions.
Lotze argues from the outset for a limited freedom
which does not extend to the inner life generally "hut of a
Freedom of Will in particular, V''- which invades the prevalence
of universal law which constitutes not only the order of the
outer hut also the greater part of ovr inner life. No philosophy
has been able to withdrav/ the association of ideas, feelings
and desires from the domain of mechanical necessity so that at
best if there be any freedom we need to affirm the union of
freedom and necessity as the truth about the soul. The presence
of universal law apparent throiaghout the greater part of ovr
inner life and the presence of a patent interaction or concomitant
variation between our bodily states and our volitions which is
thoiaght to be a proof that everything in mind can b e explained
in terms of the properties of matter with which it interacts
1. Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmus
. Vol. 1, p. 146.
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"artitrarily and erroneously interpret a familiar fact,"
For even thoiigh the highest phenomena of mental life show
historical development -under the influence of mechanical
sequences, such facts do not prove that these changes "are
the single and s-ufficient cause from which, in virtue of
its ov/n energy and without the co-operation of a quite different
principle, the manifold variety of psychic life is exclusively
lip
evolved. Therefore, it hehooves us, in the light of our
present scientific investigation, to insist upon " distinct
grounds of e?:planation for phenomena that cannot he compared."
In addition to ideation and feeling, therefore,
volition represents a unique element of mental activity non-
derivable from Ideation and feeling yet dependent on them as
occasions of its activity, functions and emergence in conscious
life. The extent to which we identify nmoh of our mental life
with volition and effort is usually laiijustif iable since
ideation and feeling well express their meanings and to which
the soul is related not as active being hut merely as spectator.
That is to say, the general mechanisms of consciousness are
experienced hy us as energies of our ovm resolutions or as
energies of the will. This is erroneous. Philpsophers have
always recognized these mechanisms of the inner life and these
1. Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmus
.
Vol. 1, p. 147,
2. ihid.
, pp. 147-148,
3. ihid . . p. 149.
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f-urnish the perennial locus of hope of science in many
quarters that the whole of personality may he event-ually
explained on this mechanical model. But the fact that a
large area of psychic life is so constituted is not the
least validation of the contention that it is unreasonable
to suppose any other ground of e:^planation than that of
mechanical causality for the entire consciousness. To be
sure our sense impulses and the greater part of what we
describe as our actions together with the association of
ideas ajid a great n-umber of the more complex actions of
life which appear in consciousness constitute a blending of
feelings, muscular co-ordinations and the like which are
explicable as the mechanical necessity of sequence in htiman
life. In the case of lower animals , these phenomena are
never tho-ught of otherwise.
The criterion of aji act of will offered by Lotze
consists in our conviction that
"the impulses -urging to action are apiDrehended in
distinct consciousness, where, inoreover, the decision
whether they shall be followed or not is deliberated
upon and is left to be determined by free choice of
the mind which is unswayed by these pressing motives,
and not by the force of these motives themselves."^
The connection between the notion of freedom and that of
volition is very intimate for it is the capacity of the will
1. Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmus
.
Yol, 1, p. 256.
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to make decisions which constitutes the will the -unique
thing it is. The will is limited with respect to the
content or subject matter s-jipplied "by the involuntary
and mechanical aspects of consciousness but it does have
unrestricted freedom of choice "betv/een the objects thus
presented. We cannot deny the reality of volition but it is
a mistaice to confuse unlimited freedom of volition with what
Lotze calls "exhp.ustless capacity of performance" against
which life repeatedly warns us. Scientific investigation
has often committed this error by affirming that the will
implies more than volition, even the capacity of performance.
This prejudice against the conviction of freedom is based upon
the fear that it would destroy the whole order of nature and
the universe wotdd result in chaos because the denial of the
uniformity of law makes it impossible to bring the result of
free resolve into harmony with nature in a dependable way.
But Lotze points out as did Bovme that
"This was to forget within how narrow limits the
power of a finite creature would be confined even
if its will not only were free, but also had the
bodily organization absolutely at its disposal as
the instrumentality of its resolutions. It was to
forget that every effect, however free and arbitrary
may have been its motive, as soon as it happens as
an effect, tal:es its place once more in the circle
of calculable events s-ubject to universal laws, and
that no freedom is allowed wider room for exercise
than falls to it by right in the -undisturbed order
of things Finally, to indulge the fear
that nevertheless the processes introduced by the
animated will at its dioice into the act-ual co-urse
of Nature might, as they gradually acc-uraulated,

-77-
diffuse thenselves in opposition to the plan of
Nature, was further to overlook the fact that even
the uninterrupted and unfree sequence of all states
in psychic life would not lessen this danger."
The consideration "basic to this inquiry is the
character of the assumed universal law of causality requiring
that every effect have a sufficient cause revealing a universe
of an endless chain of "blind effects. This assumption of the
universal character of the law of causality constitutes a
pro"blem of science ishich is today still far from an adequate
solution and is therefore suiject at certain points to ever-
renewed examination. Lotze's examination of freedom in
connection with the law of causality is a procedure which
Bowne himself adopted throughout his analysis of the pro"blem
of freedom and it is well to point out that neither of them
regard for a moment the possibility of thinlcing uncaused
events. The real question was, v*iat kind of a cause is
required to serve as the proper ground of interpretation of
different classes of events^ Suppose the causal law correct
in requiring us to seek a cause for every effect, this in no
wise requires us to regard every event as an effect any more
than to look upon every discovered cause as itself the in-
variable effect of still another cause. For, says Lotze,
1. Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmus
.
Vol. 1, p. 258.
Also BoY/ne, B. P., "The Divine Foreknowledge," Z ion's Herald ,
56 (1879), p. 73.
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"TThat constitutes tiie absolute authority of the
causal law is not that every part of the finite
sum of things actual must in the finite sphere 1)6
produced hy fixed causes, according to universal
laws, tut that each constituent once introduced
into this actual course continues to act according
to these laws."
The thing to which our attention is called usually consists
in affirming that every effect has its cause while, as a
matter of fact, chief stress should he laid on that term of
the proposition which affirms that "every cause infallibly
has its effect'." The meaning of this is that in "both nature
and personality the universal course of things lies open
momentarily to the possibility of innumerable beginnings whose
origins lie outside them but when once they are originated must
continue within them. This provides for contingency in the
world and, therefore, precludes f orelaiowledge of v;hen and where
new points of depart\ire are to be found. And even though
experience would seem to indicate that the events of external
nature are effects rooting in antecedent facts, there still
remains the possibility that the inner mental life is free
from being throughout an absolute mechanism bound by necessity
and that in connection with unlimited freedom of will there
goes also "a limited power of absolute commencement." Thus,
for example, the soul evolves from itself decisions and resolu-
1. Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmus
.
Vol. 1, p. 260.
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tions which constitute self-originated, self-commenced
activities none of which were determined previous
"bodily phenomena yet upon the occasion of the self-origination
of any act the same at once flows into and becomes subject to
the laws of causality working out its consequences under the
limiting conditions of these established laws of universal
being. This is a conclusion of Lotze which comes into sub-
stantial agreement with a favorite affirmation of Bowne to
the effect that "Freedom may choose the seed but it can neither
determine nor escape the harvest,"^
The thesis of Lotze' s discussion of freedom and
necessity consists in the conviction through an examination of
the data involved that there is an essential distinction between
the constitution of the inner life and the peculiar co-urse of
external nature. We are therefore compelled to resort to at
least two different types of causality. And while we have become
accustomed to look upon the assmptions of natural science as
universally applicable means of investigation, we are, at the
same time, compelled to acxoiowledge that with respect to the
inner psychic life we have entered into an entirely unique and
wholly different sphere which requires a method and point of view
applicable to it. The conclusion of the Lotzean argument states
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychological
Theory , p. 234,
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th.e case of causality in relation to freedom and necessity
so classically that I quote it here in full.
"It would "be a mstalre to suppose this demand to he
made in opposition merely to Materialism, which,
denying as it does the independent nature of the
mental "being, must also in consistency decline the
obligation to seek new modes of considering the
subject which it does not recognize to he new; the
tendency vith which we find fault extends far more
v/idely, even among those v/ho, like us, "base their
views on the independent origin of spirit. T7e are
so used in IJature to indirect effects and to their
"being explained "by the consideration of single
constituents, so used to find momentous differences
in properties traced "back to trifling alterations in
the amount and mode of com'bination of homogeneous
elements, that at last we lose all understanding of
anything immediate, and imconsciously "become possessed
"by a passion for construing everything, assigning
to everything a coraplicated machinery as the means
of its origination and operation. We would then
fain assert that even within us there is nothing "but
an exterior concatenation of events, resembling the
communication of movement "by which, in the outer
world, we see one element come into collision with
another; and all else that we find within—conscious-
ness, feeling, and effort--ws would "be almost te^apted
to regard as only a kind of accidental reflection in
us of that real action, unless indeed we see that there
must "be something for which and in which this reflection
arises. That something there is; every several expres-
sion of our consciousness, every stirring of our feelings,
every da^vning resolution, calls aloud that processes,
not to he measured "by the standard of physical notions,
do indeed take place, with unconquera"ble and undenia'ble
reality. So long as we have this experience. Material-
ism imy prolong its existence and cele"brate its tri"umphs
within the schools, where so many ideas estranged from
life find shelter, "but its own professors will belie
their false creed in their living action. For they
will all continue to love and hate, to hope and fear,
to dream and study, and they will in vain seek to
persuade us that this very exercise of mental energies,
which even deli"berate denial of the supersensible cannot
destroy, is a product of their bodily organization, or
tliat the love of truth exhibited by some, the sensitive
vanity betrayed by others, has its origin in their
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cerebral filires, Among all the errors of the himan
niind it has always seemed to rae the strangest that
it could come to doiibt its own existence, of v/h-.ch
alone it has direct experience, or to take it at
second h^d as the product of an external ITature which
we know only indirectly
,
only "by means of the Icnow-
ledge of the very mind to which we would fain deny
existence,"
\7hile Lotze recognized the fact of freedom and while
Bowne found himself in substantial agreement v/ith the conclu-
sions to which Lotze came as we have outlined them above,
Bowne did not feel that Lotze had exhausted the metaphysical
implications of freedom or that he made freedom constitutive
of knowledge which Bowne himself stressed as a most fundamental
phase of the deep speculative significance of freedom. Into
Lotze 's conception of reality as independent auid self-existent,
Bowne introduced the thought of free self-activity not only as
2
an essential hut as the controlling factor.
Hermann Ulrici (1306-1384), a philosopher of religion,
was professor of philosophy in Halle at the tLme when Bowne
studied under him. Ulrici, originally a Hegelian, finally broke
completely with Hegel taking up the theistic position of I . H.
?ichte, "Grott war ihm "d-er schopferische Urheber der Hatur und
die absolute Voraussetzung der Naturwissenschaf t selbst."".
1. Lotze, Hermann, Microcosmus , Vol, 1, pp. 262-263,
2 . Knudson, A. C . , Tlie Fr.ilpsophy
,
Oji Personalism.
p. 433,
3, Hebdorn, "Ulrici, Hermann .," Die Heliig:ion in
Geschichte una Gre.g;enwart
. Band 5, S. 1430.

This position of Ulrici Bo^rae accepted as the entire trath
of theism and worked it out as a "basic principle of his
speculative philosophy. The first mention of Ulrici to he
found in Bowne's works appears in an article^ published in
The Independent while Bowne was studying abroad. In this
pessimistic review of German philosophy, Bo\vne shows that
"Gerraany is materialistic, not from stress of argument hut
from choice; and if ever it recovers from the dreadful slo-ugh
into which it has fallen, it will not he by the power of
Logic, but through the grace of God." He concludes that a
few philosophers including Professor Ulrici "are making heroic
efforts to recall philosophy to the facts of life and con-
sciousness; but in general the German mind, • . . • has
resigned itself to a materialistic and Epicurean philosophy*
• • . • Nowhere this side of China is there such wide-
spread materialism as here in idealistic Germany." In
addition to the above references to Ulrici, Bowne has given
us his critical estimate of two of Ulrici' s works, ^ Compendium
der Logik
.
zweite neu bearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage,
Leipzig, T. D. Weigel, 1872, and Gott und die Natur zweite
A\iflage, Leipzig, T. D. Weigel, 1856. While Ulrici was the
1. "Philosophy in Germany," The Inde-pendent
.
26 (1874), (Jan. 22, 1874), pp. 4-5.
2. ibid., p. 5.
3. ibid
. . p. 4.
4. Bowne, B. P., "Ulrici »s Logif," New Englander .
33 (1874), pp. 453-492. In the Preface of Studies in Theism
. (l879)
Bowne acknowledges "general obligation" to his friend and former
instructor. Professor Ulrici of Halle, p. vi.
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author of other notable works, there is no direct reference
to these in the writings of Bowne and how much he owed to
Ulrici in addition to the latter' s logic, psychology and
philosophy of religion is hard to say.
What Bowne foiind in Ulrici' s logic, he sms -up
as follows:
"We reach definite knowledge only through a
process of differentiation. But this process implies
laws and norms. The laws are those of identity and
contradiction and of causation. The norms are the funda-
mental logical categories. Only through the application
of these can we gain any definite idea, thought,
perception. With tiiis proof the sensational philosophy
is remanded to silence or do^natism. But these laws
and norms compel us to recognize an outer world which
is also subject to thought-law and forms; and this is
intelligible only as the work of a Rational Mind. With
this proof, atheism is driven out of philosophy to
take irrational shelter in the arbitrary ass-umptions
of \anreasoning prejudice. This manifoldness of the
external world, again, can only be viewed as originated*
and hence as postulating an originator. With this
proof, pantheism ceases to have any rational ground,
and sinks to the level of an illogical heresy. Finally,
these laws and forms, being expressions of the essential
nature, of the mind, are necessary and universal in
human thought. Hence whatever knowledge flows from them
is universally valid.
Ulrici denied the categories as innate ideas since the notion
of innate ideas in general is fallacious. The primary
categories, being, activity and act, space, time, and the
categories of simple nature, quantity and quality, admittedly
apply to both thought and things as the conditions of know-
ledge in general. The classes of categories, those of relation
1. Bowne, B. P., "Ulrici 's Logic," New Englander
.
33 (1874), p. 480.
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and those of order, are essentially those of scientific know-
ledge.
"fThatever may be possible to absolute science, hxnnan
science becomes possible only through differentiating the
indefinite multitude of things and power© into kinds
and classes, only by sxabjecting them to the reign of law,
and making them the expressions of a ptirpose; and attains
its final, highest lonity, only by gathering up all these
lower purposes into the harmony and unity of an all-
controlling purpose, thought, idea, in which all else
finds its explanation, and towards which the whole
creation moves. Because of this necessity of our thought,
the author makes the idea the last sind highest of the
logical categories; it is the category which we must
apply in our attempts to reach the highest unity of
knowledge."^
Ulrici rejects Kant's agnosticism by affirming that the
categories reveal rather than mask reality. Thus, both the
lower and the higher categories correspond to objective
nature. Throughout the study, Bowne repeatedly affirms his
wholehearted agreement with Ulrici .both when he agrees and
disagrees with Kant. Ulrici accepts Kant's doctrine of the
active mind along with which goes freedom as both an implicit
and explicit assumption.
What Bowne learned from Professor Ulrici *s philosophy
of religion, may be s-anmed up as follows:
"Science assumes that matter is composed of atoms,
but no one is able to tell us what these atoms are.
They are next endowed with forces, but no one can tell
us what these forces are. The relation of the atom
to these forces is also a subject on which we seek in
vain for information. After the atoms set to
1. Bowne, B. P., "Ulrici»s Logic," New Englander
.
33 (1874), pp. 485-486.
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rork, they give a very unsatisfactory accoxmt of the
facts. The attempt to make mechanically intelli-
gible the simplest chemical change, is an utter
fail-are; while the claim that all this talk1)poles and
pov/ers, molec-ales and atoms, explains the harmony and
order of the universe, is simply to mistake intolerable
STobjective confusion for an objective solution of the
problem. In our or/n opinion, science lias succeeded in
discovering some of the laws of phenomena, and has
made more clear the universal order; v;hile its claim
to have explained anything whatever , is utterly with-
out f o-undation."^
The conclti.sicn reached is that in addition to the conditioned
forces of nature we are compelled to ass-ume a force which is
immaterial, omnipotent and intelligent in order that nature
may be properly co-ordinated and all its specific determinations
accounted for.^ Ulrici held that "We are forced to conceive
it as intelligent, self-conscious, and personal." This view
harmonizes with theism and the divine immanence as opposed to
pantheism and deism. Thus Bowne and Ulrici reject the Absolute
of Hegel for an inductive procedure. Insofar as Ulrici
accepted the Absolute,
"This Absolute, then, must be conceived as working accord-
ing to the methods of a rational mind, as proposing ends
and adapting means to their realization; that is, it must
be conceived as intelligent, free, self-conscious, per-
sonal. Free because absolute; intelligent because it
works intelligently i self-conscious because it has plans
and aimsi and persciial because these notions are the
root-factors of personality.""^
1. Bowne, B. P., "Prof, Ulrici's Gott und die Natur: "
New Englander . 33 (1874), p. 640,
2. ibid ., p. 647,
3. ibid., p. 654.
4. ibid ., p. 645.
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Ulrici proves that science must posttilate God not only as free
and intelligent "but also as possessing an ethical natiare. In
discussing the relation of God to h-umanity and the old problem
of evil and its "bearing upon God's power and goodness, the
vexatious question of freedom is discussed. It is to he regretted
that Bowne recognized Ulrici 's doctrine of freedom hut that "he
did not analyze it. We Icnow, however, that the latter did teach
a doctrine of freedom which had not only moral "but epistemolog-
ical significance. In a letter dated June 11, 1882, which
Ulrici wrote to Bowne after the p-uhlication of the latter'
s
Metaphysics , he called attention to several points in which he
regarded Bowne as standing closer to himself than to Lotze.
First, he starts as does Bowne from the Leihnltzean idea that
"being consists purely in activity or power. Secondly, freedom has
epistemological as well as moral significance. Thirty, mechanical
necessity is not the exclusive principle of natural occurrence,
and Lotze contradicts himself when he denies that this is a
vital power distinct from the mechanically active powers. Fourthly,
he as well as Bowne opposes pantheism in every form and seeks
to overthrow it. Ulrici concludes his letter: "Es w?re mir
naturlich sehr angenehm gewesen, wenn Sie in Ihrem Werke auT
diese Uehereinstimmung zwischen uns gelegentlich hingewiesen
hatteiL."^
1. I am indebted to Dean A. C. Knudson of Boston
University School of Theology for the information here cited from
the letter which Ulrici wrote to Bovme concerning their philosophical
agreement. Cf. licConnell, Bishop F. J., Borden Parker Bowne . His
Life and His Philosophy, p. 37.
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In the second point of agreement "between himself
and Bowne, Ulrici explicitly directs attention to the fact
that he himself laid stress on the epistenological as well as
the moral significance of freedom which is certainly sufficient
evidence of the fact that Bowne fo-und historical precedent for
this notion to v;hich he gave systematic and n:ore or less
thoro-ugh elaboration. It is also apparent that Ulrici saw the
metaphysical significance of freedom as we have clearly
revealed in Bov/ne's critical analysis of the two works from
which we have s-ummarized his conclusions.
The eminent French idealist, Charles Senouvier
(1818-1903), expounds a doctrine of freedom constituting the
same point of view as that defended "by BoTme. Renouvier*s
confession of his indebtedness to his esteemed friend, Jules
Lequler (1814-1862), is, in the opinion of some a-npraisers of
his philosophical thought, an indebtedness which he greatly
overestimated due to his high regard for Lequier as an
original and profound thinker*^ In his classic definition of
determinism he says,
"L*enchaineraent universel invariable des phenom^nes
est l*hypothdse d'une loi de leur succession en vert\-.-
de laquelle, ^ -un ^tat antecedent donn^ des choses de
toute nature dans le monde, un seul et m^e consequent
1. Renouvier, Charles, Les Dilemmes de la
Metaphysique Dure , p. 170.
1)
I
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peut ou a jamais pu repondre, dans toute la suite
des temps; c'est celui qui se produit ou qui s'est
produit en effet; en sorte que chaque ph"6noinene,
pris en particulier, est ^ chaque instant 1 'unique
dont la production ait ete possible dans ses cir-
constances, et qu'il n'y a jamais de possible en
toutes choses que le necessaire. Cette loi du
devenir est le pur et parfait d^termini sme «
On the other hand he defines freedom as
"L'hypothese opposee a ce determinisme admet 1» existence
des contingents et des accidents, quelle qu'en soit la
nature oa I'origine; ce sont des ph^nomenes a propre-
ment parler possibles, non necessaires, dont le
caractdre est de n'exclure leurs contradictoires qu'apr^s
I'dvenement, tandis que, en qualite' de luturs , ils
etaient ind^termines a I'^tre, au m^jie titre cue leurs
contraires. II existe, suivent cette hypothese, une
part d' indl^terr-iinisme dans les rapports des phlnom^nes
successifs, et des agents naturels ont le pouvoir de
produire certains actes, ou des actes differents, et
des actes contraires, dans les niemes circonstances
donnees."^
Eenouvier presents his doctrine of freedom as an
explanation of principles laid dov;n "by Lequier respecting
"Le dilemme du determinisme quant au connaTtre" and "Le
dilerame du determinisme quant a I'etre." He regarded Lequier
as the first to establish the nature of belief by a very novel
analysis of each of the two theses, necessity and freedom,
Lequier also made it apparent that knowledge in the philosophical
sense of the word is wholly conditioned by the degree to which
1« Renouvier, Charles, Les Dilemmes de la
Metaphysique 'oure
. p. 126.
2. ibid . . pp. 126-127.
3. ibid ., pp. 172-183.
II
1
I
I
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one chooses "between necessity and freedom and, at the same
time, it yields the option of the moral and metaphysical
dilemmas with a force of striking alternative that Renouvier
regarded to be one of the most heautifuL inventions of this
order which has ever heen capable of disclosing to philosophy
avenues hitherto unlcnown.^ Both Lequier and Renouvier make
freedom the condition of knowledge and, therefore, the founda-
2
tion of epistemology.
The reality of possible contraries in our deliberate
acts was applied in principle by Renouvier to show how the
problem of truth and error can find no solution in epistemology
except on the assumption of freedom. Unless the will is free
to choose or reject the evidence, the distinction between truth
2
and error is opaque. On the necessarian scheme of things,
both tinith and error are equally effects of antecedents which
would reduce truth to believing that necessary error is truth
as well as is truth itself. The mind is in fact characterized
by an ideal search for reality which requires the power to
weigh evidence and to weed out the contradictions in thought
as well as hasty and superficial generalization. Except ovx
will be free, botli belief and the sense of moral oughtness are
1. Renouvier, Charles, Les Dilemmes de la
Metaphysique pure
. pp. 171-172.
2. ibid., p. 176. "La liberty est la condition de la
connaissance." Also Histoire et Solution ^.es Probl^mes
Metaphysiques
.
p. 460.
3. Renouvier, Charles, Essais de Critique gen^ralle ;
Traite de Psychologie Rationnelle d'apr^s les Principes du
Criticisme
.
Vol. 11, pp. 96-97,
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reduced to illusion. While freedoa is a postulate incapable
of absolute demonstration, it is nevertheless a necessary
postulate of "both knowledge and morality which in the nature
of things may "be accepted. In fact, all knowledge is practical
in the sense that the will is involved in its free adoption
or rejection making Iniowledge and morality "both implications
of freedom. Vfriile knowledge fTindamentally rests on the will,
Renouvier franlcLy repudiated freedom to mean caprice. Both
will and intellect are responsible to each other and reason-
ableness is in no wise excluded by free will. The demands of
the total personality constitute the criterion for the exercise
Of freedom.
-
Tlie period 1386-1903 was devoted by Henouvier to the
revision, restatement and development of his thought in the
construction of a personalistic metapliysics. He converted his
"neo-criticisni" or his phenomenism which was inspired by Kant
into a metaphysics. Phenomena or the metaphysical realities
are products of thouglit or better still reality is creative
thought plus the laws gov^rrning its activity. In this
metaphysical doctrine, the nature of causality was raised to
the level of volitional or free personality as respects the
1. Renouvier, Charles, Esquisse d'-gne Classification
des Systemcs
, Vol. II, ch. 3 and passim . Cf. Perry, H. B.,
Philoso-Dh.y of the Recent Past
, p. 119.
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cause of the world, the personal creator, and the finite
person's direct acquaintance with himself as a free voluntary
activity. He showed "Le dilecme du deterininisme Q-uant S I'^tre"
to consist in the conception of causality respecting its origin
as two-fold. He describes universal and absolute determinism
as an invariable sequence of phenomena whose series is vrithout
a beginning while contingence, accident, freedom and chance are
possible where the phenomenal series is originated but where
the first cause has not itself been the effect of any of the
other causes preceding it in the order of time.^
It is therefore apparent that Renouvier regarded
freedom as having both epistemological and metaphysical
significance. ?irst, freedom is the condition of loiowledge.
Secondly, freedom is the only condition of rational explanation
Y/hen we undertake to think through the problems of pure meta-
physics unless we are to encounter insoluble dilemmas. Thirdly,
his elevation of the category of causality from the impersonal
mechanistic plane to that of personal volitional causality ivarks
out the most productive point of view for the discussion of
the problem of freedom, one which Bowne made central in his
study of freedom.
Renouvier, Cliarles, Les Dilem.ies de la M'^taohysiaue
pure
, pp. 177-183.
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In a letter dated Augast 17, 1908. written to
Bowne by William James (1342-1910), we have a direct state-
ment of the relation existing "between the philosophical Doints
of view of these two men as James tmderstood it. In evaluating
Bowne 's Personal ism
.
James says,
"It seems to me that you and I are now aiming at
exactly the same end, thoTjgh, owing to oior different
past, from which each retains special verbal habits,
we often express oiirselves so differently. It seemed
to me over and over again that you were planting your
feet identically in footprints which my feet were
accustomed to— quite independently, of course, of my
example, which was what made the coincidences so
gratifying."*^
Both were opposed to absolute idealism which they considered
to be a form of dogmatic abstractionism. Both undertook to
reinstate a norainalistic logic providing concrete personality
with an independence and individuality of its own. In their
interpretation of consciousness, Bowne' s position of "tran-
scendental empiricism" which is decidedly Kantian is opposed
to James' "radical empiricism" which is of course closely
related to that of J. S. Mill. James explicitly affirms that
he has been tremendously confirmed in his radical empiricism
and emancipated by Bergson. James argues that the differences
between himself and Bowne are not so essential as is the fact
that their emphatic footsteps fall on the same spot.
1, Knudson, A. C, The PhilosoTjhy of Personalism.
p. 406,
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Y/e have elsewhere in this study outlined James*
doctrine of freedom and noted its position in his thou^t as
a whole and it only remains here for us to indicate tliat his
stress upon the doctrine dealt primarily with ethical^ and
cosmic freedom. He did not, even thou^ influenced "by
Renouvier, stress the epistemological as well as the ethical
significance of freedom. In this respect, he also differed
from BovTne. Even in the case of cosmic freedom, the grounds
on which James postulated it are exactly opposite those on
which Bowne rested his doctrine of freedom. James argued that
his theory of freedora is desirable on the ground that
•'It gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no
single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and
to a mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it
will, no doubt, remain forever inacceptable. A friend with
such a mind once told me that the thou^t of my universe
made him sick, like the sight of the horrible motion of a
mass of maggots in their carrion bed.
But v;hile I freely admit that the pluralism and the
restlessness are repugnant and irrational in a certain
way, I find that every alternative to them is irrational
in a deexDer way. The indeterminism with its maggots, if
you please to spealc so about it, offends only the native
absolutism of my intellect ,-—an absolutism which, after
all, perhaps, deserves to be snubbed and kept in check.
On the other hand, Bowne argues that free intelligence is the
only solution to the demand for unity. He argues that a
1. In the Introduction.
2. James, William, The Will to Believe and Other Essays
in Popular Pliilosophy
. pp. 176-177.
3. ibid . . p. 177,
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fundamental pl-aralism is "altogether aborainable*' and that the
f-undaznental demands for monism can only te gratified ty free
intelligence. On the "basis of freedom a concrete -unity can "be
discovered. "Reason, indeed, calls loudly for unity "but it
has no means of integrating a plurality into a true unity or
of differentiating a unitary necessity into a plurality. Here
is another deadlock for the speculative reason, and the only
way out of it lies in the notion of free intelligence."^ It
would then appear that, while there is much in common in the
philosophical demand for freedom from the ethical and cosmical
point of view of its significance as taught ty James and Bowne,
the doctrines were worked out very largely independently. And
as has already been indicated, Bowne attached a:i epistemological
significance to freedom which James did not seem to have found
necessary to his understanding of the problem of icnowledge.
After examining the available data, it appears that
Bowne was very little influenced by the philosophy of Henri
Bergson (1859- ) relative to his teaching about freedom, how-
ever much there may be in common otherwise between Bergson and
personal idealism,^ Light is thrown indirectly on this matter
in a letter which Bowne wrote to Professor G. li. Duncan of
Yale University.'^
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review
.
77 (1895), p. 692.
2. Flewelling, R. T., Bergson and Personal Idealism .
3. McConnell, Bishop F. J., Borden Pariser Bowne . His
Life and His Philosophy, pp. 277-278. Prof. J.C.Wilson's letter
serves also to define Bowne 's relation to Bergson.
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"I meant to mention to you a work which you may have
seen and which I think will prove to "be interesting.
It is "by Bergson and has the title L' Svolution
Creatrice. I have not come upon it myself as yet,
but I have seen notices of it, especially one hy
Father Tyrrell, the Modernist who has been banned by
the Roman Church. It seems that Bergson in this book
sets forth very strongly the complete failure of the
mechanical doctrine of evolution and on essentially
the same grounds which are familiar to us, namely,
that logical equivalence of cause and effect in the
impersonal scheme reduces every such scheme to mere
tautology and endless regress. How much he malces out
of the creative idea or how he conceives it, I do not
know. Of course nothing can be done with it except
on the plane of personality, but in any case it is
progress to have the mechanical idea shown in its
logical emptiness."^
Freedom for Bergson is the point where psychology and meta-
physics intersect and the doctrine of freedom which ensues
constitutes one of the central achievements of his philosophy.
It is freedom through which we come to know the meaning of
very being and in it converge the main lines of Bergsonian
research. In telling what we mean by freedom, Bergson denies
that psychological freedom is an appearance, it is a reality
grasped by intuition, a reality which can only be verified,
not constructed. "We are free when ovt acts proceed from otir
entire personality, when they express it, when they exliibit
that indefinable resemblance to it which we find occasionally
between the artist and his work»" On this view, action depends
1, Wilm, E. C. (ed.). Studies in Philosophy and
Theology , pi). 12-13.
2. Bergson, H. , Sssav on the Immediate Data . p. 172.
Qp-oted by E. LeRoy, The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson
.
p. 83.
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upon the individiml and is insofar free. Freedom is rare in
personality and is never achieved by many persons. ' It exists
in degrees and is constituted in our capacity for the inner life
which is capable of exercising it, Bergson establishes nega-
tively his proof for freedom by showing that mechanism is not
demonstrated but is rather a hypothesis awaiting demonstration.
Nor is the hypothesis self-sufficient. "With man consciousness
breaks the chain. In man and in man only it obtains its freedom."^
Bergson develops his conception of freedom intermediate
between wliat has been called by philosophers moral freedom and
free rill. By free will he does not mean the power of contrary
choice since this in his opinion involves grave error with respect
to the nature of time for it is in duration that we are free and
not in spacialized time which many determinists erroneously
suppose when the conception of freedom is being discussed. "Liberty
such as I understand it, is situated between these two terms,
but not at equal distance from both. If I were obliged to blend
it with one of the tro I should select 'free-will, Never-
theless, Bergson argues that personal life as a creative process
is not wiiolly determined by the deeds of the past so th^t, in
the moment of the present, the self may become the sole condition
1. Bergson, Henri» Creative Evolution
, p. 264.
2. LeRoy, Edo-uard, The New Pliilosophy of Henri
Bergson
. p. 183.
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of the future. But while Bergson grants indetenninism and
therefore novelty in consciousness as a part of his evolutionary
theory, he conceives the elan vital as a process where self-
consciousness has "been very partially achieved. This half-blind
and capricious indetenninism is not hy any means Bowne's notion
of personal autonomy which is conditioned "by freedom. Bowne
therefore differs fundamentally from Bergson at two points in
that he first insists upon freedom as the pov^er of deliberative
choice "between alternatives and further that it implies autonomy
or self-direction and self-control even though such powers "be
strictly limited.
In view of Bowne's teaching about freedom, he would
have agreed with Bergson' s teleological and free universe as
opposed to all forms of dysteleology and determinism. But he
would doubtlessly have considered Bergson' s notion of freedom
as standing in need of supplementation and extension. The pro-
phetic words which he wrote concerning Bergson' s L' Evolution
Creatrice to the effect that nothing can be made out of the
notion until it is elevated to the personal plane is just what
is required to elevate Bergson' s freedom to the meaning which
Bowne gave the notion. And it is precisely here in the fact
that there is this difference between their teachings that we
1, This point of view is developed in Henri Bergson'
s
Time and Free Will
.
(1
I
I
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discern wherein Bowne's personal free intelligence goes beyond
the freedom advocated hy Bergson. It is very probahle, from the
study of Bowne's writings, that he made no special study of
Bergson and that such agreement as does exist "between their
views on freedom groves out of a common philosophical inheritance
developed into a quite independent teaching on the part of each.
Attention should "be directed to a fundamental difference in
their views about freedom with respect to time. M. Bergson
protests that
"since free-will, in the usual meaning of the term implies
the equal possibility of two contraries, and on ray theory
we cannot formulate, or even conceive in this case the
thesis of the equal possibilities of the two contraries,
without falling into grave error about the nature of time."
Bowne, on the other hand, argnies that the question of freedom
has been very much misunderstood by most speculators who have
discussed it "from the standpoint of the reality of time."^ He
felt that the "great time-phantom" served merely to mislead
and confuse the whole matter of freedom since, of course, the
discussion is naturally carried on upon the impersonal plane.
There is every possibility that Bowne may have been acquainted
with M. Bergson' s metaphysics of time and his objection to
freedom on the ground of his inability to think through the
categories of tinie and freedom. If the reference in Bowne 's
1. LeRoy, Edouard, The IJew Pnilosophy of Henri
Bergson, pp. 192-193.
2. Bowne, B. P., Personal ism , p. 198.
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Personalism just cited does include a criticism of Bergsonian
freedoD, it throws light upon the relative merits of their
views.
In "bringing to a close a survey of Bovme's relation
to modern philosophical tho-ught with special reference to his
doctrine of freedom, we may s-uramarize "briefly ovs results.
"Bowne's relation to previous thinkers in the history
of modern philosophy is not a matter of douht to anyone
conversant with the course of nineteenth century specula-
tion. He "belongs to that large school of thinkers "broadly
classed together under the head of post-Kantian idealism.
I.ei"bnitz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Hertart
,
G-reen, Lotze
—
these names s-uggest the philosophic tradition to whose
influence he owes the main direction of his ov.ti thought.
Although as said, he set small store "by the merely
historical study of philosophy, and made scanty reference
to other philosophers in his own writings, he has himself
clearly indicated his historical affiliations. . .
While there is much to commend the truth of this statement in
the result which our study has revealed, it needs to he supple-
mented and extended. Our study has shown that the names Hermann
Ulrici and Charles Henouvier ought to "be added to this list
especially with respect to Bovme's doctrine of the epistemological
significance of free"i.om. If we permit Bowne to speak for him-
self on the question of the historical affiliation of his tho-ught,
he says
"It is hard to classify me with accuracy. I am a
theistic idealist, a Personal is t, a transcendental
1. Wilm, E. C. (ed.), Studies in Philoso-phy and
Theolo^
.
p. 9.
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emplriclst, an idealistic realist, and a realistic
Idealist; but all these phrases need to be interpreted.
They cannot well be made out from the dictionary.
!Teither can I well be called a disciple of anyone. I
largely agree with Lotze, but I transcend him. I hold
half of Kant's system, but shairply dissent from the
rest. There is a strong smack of Berkeley's philosophy,
with a complete rejection of his theory of knowledge.
I am a Personalist . the first of the clan in any thorough-
going sense."!
The whole matter is well summed up in the words of one of
Bowne's able st-udents*
"That Bowne owed much to those who had gone before him
should be gladly conceded. No one would have been more
ready to acknowledge the debt than Bowne himself. He
received much undoubtedly from Lotze, though he was
never the faint shadow of Lotze tiiat sorae would make him.
Lotze was weak in nis metaphysics and in his metaphysics
Bowne was strong. Lotze' s system lacked grounding and
Bowne was conscious of the fundamental nature of this
lack. This may have led him to incur the charge of in-
gratitude toward Lotze. To suffer the misunderstanding
was certainly more noble than to point to fatal dis-
crepancies in one to whom he felt so deep a debt of
obligation. Bowne's debt to Kant and others can be
acknowledged wituout in any way invalidating his inde-
pendence."^
While Bowne drew heavily upon the philosophical resources of
modern thought, he made these materials thoroughly his own
and employed them to rethink and to solve the problems of
thougiit in a way that justifies the claim to both originality
and clearness and not che least of Bowne's philosophical
gifts is clearness.
1. Bowne, B. P., A-Letter Dated May 31, 1909, The
Personalist
. 2 (1921), p. 10.
2. Plewelling, H. T., "Bowne and Present-Day Thought,"
Methodist Review . 105 (1922), p. 377. Cf. "An American
Exponent of Lotze," New Princeton Review . 6 (1888), pp. 278-283.
Wahl
,
Jean, The Pluralist Philosophies of England and America,
p. 319,
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A Critical and Systematic Exposition of Bowne^s Doctrine
of the Speculative Significance of Freedom.
With this p-urview of the doctrine of freedom in its
historical orientation clearly "before us, we may advance to
Bowne's doctrine of the speculative significance of freedom.
It is well to begin with his conception of the nat-ure of
freedom. This requires a careful examination of the various
definitions formxdated by Bowne throughout his writings. In
the first edition of the Metaphysics , he says "Now by freedom
is meant, not a power of acting without or apart from motives,
but -simply a power of choosing an end or law, and governing
one's self accordingly."^ In the Introduction to Psychological
,
Theory . Bowne says in discussing volition,
"In short, we may sum the conception of will as it
exists for spontaneous thought before any theories
have been formed about it in the notion of a power of
self-control. The will is the power which the soul
has of controlling itself within certain limits, and
a volition is an act of such control. Within these
limits the soul can elicit or guide, intensify or
repress, its activities, according to a preconceived^
rule, or for the realization of a preconceived end."
In the same work, he further defines freedom as follows: "The
conception of freedom in spontaneous thOTjght always involves
the thought of a possible alternative. This view has the ad-
1. Bowne, B. P. , Metaphysics : a Study in First
Principles
. (1882) , p. 16y.
2. Bowne, B. P. , Introduction to Psychological Iheory .
(1886) , p. 222.
i 4
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vantage of teing intelligrole and valua'ble."-'' Freedom is thou^t
of as "self-determination" ajid, again, freedom is developed
in conjunction with causality. "The law of causation says
simply. For every event seek a cause. In this sense a free
act has a cause as much as any other. Its cause is the free
spirit, "3 In an article devoted entirely to the prohlem of
freedom, Bowne's opening words are as follows:
"By freedom I mean the power of self-control and
self-direction in an intelligent being, llore specifically,
it is the power to forra plans, purposes, ideals and to
work for their realization. Or it is the pov/er to choose
hetv/een competing or conflicting possihilities and to
realize the one chosen. Y/herever this power is present
we call the agent free. To unsophisticated tliought men
are manifestly free in this sense. Their freedom is,
indeed, not unlimited and lawless, for it exists only on
the basis of fixity provided by human nature and the nature
of things. But, within the limits set by our constitu-
tion and the physical environment, men have a power of
self-directioa. They are able to form plans, purposes,
ideals and to devote themselves to their realization.
Moreover, this povver seems to be involved in the very
thought of a personal and rational life.""^
Elsewhere in the same article, we read "Now, it is clear that
freedom, which I defined as the power of self-direction in an
intelligent being, is not to be t.-ken to mean absolute and
lawless arbitrariness Freedom, except on a basis
of uniformity and fixity, is valueless and fatal to rationality."^
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychol Oi°:ical Theory
,
(1886), p. 223.
2. ibid . p. 227.
3. ibid . . p. 229.
4. Bov/ne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom^" Methodist Review
.
77 (1395), p. 681.
5. ibid
. , p. 587,
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In the revised edition of the Metaphysics, we have the follow-
ing definition:
"By freedom in our hman life we mean the power
of self-direction, the power to form plans, p-urposes,
ideals, and to work for their realization. We do not
mean an abstract freedom existing "by itself, "but this
power of self-direction in living men and women.
Abstract freedom exists as little as abstract necessity.
Actual freedom is realized only as one aspect of actual
life; and it must always he discussed in its concrete
significance.
In relation to the category of causality, Bowne says "By
definition, a free act is an absolute beginning, and as such
is not represented by anything before its occurrence. We trace
it to a specific volition, and beyond that it has neither
existence nor representation."^ Elsewhere in the same work,
we read "We find also a certain element of self-determination,
3
and this is our idea of freedom."
In calling attention to the fundamental characteristics
of Bowne' s definition of freedom, we point out as a prior task,
three controversial aspects of the nature of freedom as he
defined it. The first is largely a misunderstanding due to the
use of language rather than to fundamental difference of opinion.
The soft determinists and certain libertarians strenuously object
to the use of "self-determination", a term hit upon by Bowne to
precisely convey the idea of freedom. Professor Palmer regarded
1. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics , rev. ed., p. 405. J?or
the same definition, Personalism
. p. 199-200.
2. Bowne, B. P., Theism
, p. 189.
3. ibid . . pp. 197-198.
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the literty of self-determination to te largely fictitious
on the ground that freedom means more than "unimpeded internal
constitution."^ It is not absence of alien influence merely
or a question of vrhether causation "comes from within or without,
but what is its character and whether it expresses a closed past
or an open future,"^ Kant showed that self-determination can
never "be an adequate statement of freedom which is something
more than this, Bowne answered this objection "by declaring
that those who attempt to include necessity in their definition
certainly do obscure the issue and deny freedom. It is obvious
that he himself never intended that self-determination, the
poT/er of self-control and self-direction in an intelligent beingt
should be so construed as to imply determinism although his
definition may be too narrow and even ambiguous at this point,
Fortunately Bovme has left himself unmistaka.bly clear with
respect to what he meant by freedom even though linguistic
expression might prove to be confusing,
"ilany attempts have been made to define freedom so as
to include necessity. Ti.us , that is free whidi is
not coerce;' or impelle I from without; or that is free
'"iiich unfolds v/ithout hindrance its own nature. At
the same time this freedom may be absolutely determined
by some internal necessity. But when this inner
necessity is extended to the entire activity, we have
nothing of freedom left but the name; and it would
tend to clearness if this were dropped."*^
1. Palmer, G. H. , Tlie Problem of Freedom, p. 192,
2. ibid . . p. 191.
3. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychological
Theory
, p. 223,
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A f-urther preliminary consideration hinges upon what
Bowne included in his definition of freedom. He insisted that
freedom is not only "the power to choose "between competing or
conflicting possibilities"^ but he further insisted that it
include the power "to realize the one chosen."^ This
additional demand would mean that freedom implies the power
to realize one's chosen plans, purposes and ideals as well as
the power to choose them.*^ Either this constitutes looseness
in Bowne 's use of language or a structural defect in his
definition since the power to work for the realization of a
freely chosen procedure is certainly not the same as the power
to realize the one chosen and he insisted upon both of these
points in nis definition. Freedom does not seem reasonably
to demand that we be not only free to choose but also to
realize the choice. Our himan experience literally teems with
choices to which heredity and environment deny fulfillment.
There is not the least reason why the will cannot exercise
choice and continue to will a choice in circumstances which
render the achievement of the choice forever impossible. The
definition, therefore, is too inclusive in that it loads the
notion of freedom more heavily than tiie facts warrant even
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 681.
2. ibid., p. 681. Also Metaphysics . rev. ed.,
p. 405. JSfills^BaJJLSB , pp. 199-200.
3. ibid., p. 681.
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from the point of view of a synoptic consideration of
Bowne's teaching on the subject of freedom.
A third objection to Bowne's definition of freedom
pertains to the inadequate way in which freedom is related
to the self. True enough, he argues
"If anything is free it is not the will, hut the
knowing and feeling soul; and this soul determines
itself, not in the dark of ignorance or in the
indifference of eraotionless and valueless life, hut
in the light of knowledge and with experience of
life's values. "1
The thing which we find lacking in this deliverance and which,
to our way cf thinking, guarantees the one unique condition
under which the self attains to freedom, is when it functions
as an organic whole not unambiguously determined "by the past,
or by the present environment. The truth about freedom is
probably best discovered through the synoptic use of the
reason rather than through its scientific or analytic em-
ployment. Bowne's own philosophy travelled in the direction
of hostility toward the analytic method of studying con-
sciousness and toward the organicity of function v/hich
exercises freedom as one of its fundamental characteristics
when the self is an integrated whole. Although Bowne implicitly
assumed synoptic methodology and coherence in expounding the
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Spec-'jlative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 681.
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protlems of philosophy, he did not explicitly show in his
doctrine of freedom how freedom can be discovered and achieved
only as an attribute of personality functioning as an organic
whole. There is nothing in his teaching, however, to prevent
such a conclusion and, if anyone chooses to perfect the argu-
ment, it only strengthens his philosophy.^
Apart from the controversial aspects of Bowne's
definition of freedom the correction of which by no means
requires a fundamental reconstruction of his point of view,
he has made a positive contribution to the nature of freedom
through his careful analysis of it. This is first seen in
the inductive character of his definitions. Througliout the
study of freedom, he was careful to discriminate between the
value of the results vfiiich were purely formal in character and
the value of the results of his study which were practical
in character. He always emphasized the empirical element.
"We shall always have to resort to experience to learn both
the purposes of the system and the method of their realization. "2
One of the .T.ost outstanding contentions of Bowne's definitions
of freedom consisted in its limitation to a rational agent.
1. Brightnian, E. S., A£ Introduction to Foilosophy
.
p<p. 22-25, 27-29, 140-142. Also "Personalistic Method in Philos-
ophy,? Methodist Heview . 103 (1920), pp. 368-380. The philosophical
contribution of Professor Brightman to Personalistic Idealism
constitutes one of the most significant extensions of this point
of view since Bowne's death.
2. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics ; a Study in Tirst
Principles
, p. 172.
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"It may still occur to us that the" affirmation of intelligence
is compatible with automatism; and hence it "becomes necessary
to point out that intelligence and the "belief in freedom stand
or fall together."^ And elsewhere he insists that "Proper
rationality is possihle only to freedom; • . . ."^ Through-
out Bovme's philosophical writings the relation "between freedom
and intelligence is expounded from every point of view in order
to convey with unrrilstakable clearness a fact which to him
appeared to "be of the greatest significa.nce. It seemed to him
that freedom was involved "in the very thought of a personal
and rational life. "3 jt of the greatest importance to point
out that Bowne also felt a close relationship "between freedom
and the category of purpose. Purpose he regarded as the final
and highest category which would "be lmpossi"ble in its most
significant implications on any other assumption than that of
freedom.^ He also stressed freedom as a condition of our
a'bility to choose and work for the realization of ideals. More
than this, his definitions signify the originating and creative
aspect of freedom which is of great importance to the doctrine
1. Bowne, B. P., Metauliysics ; a Study
_
in First
' PrinciTiles
. p. 159,
2. ' Bovme, B. P., Theism
, pp. 125, 126. 197, 212.
3. Bowne, 3. P., "Tlie Speculative Signif icajice of
Freedom';!' Methodist Review , 77 (1895), t). 681. Also Personal Ism ,
pp. 199, 201-^^02.
4. Bowne, B. P., Meta-ohysics ; a Study in First
Princiioles
. p. 173. Also Studies in Theism, p. 198.
5. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics
.
rev. ed., p. 405.
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of progress, a development which in recent philosophy has
"become identified with creative and emergent evolution.^
Again, his definitions of freedom are conservative in pointing
out that htiman freedom is "not -unlimited and lawless, for it
exists only on the basis of fixity provided "by human nature
and the nature of things. "2 freedom is related to the notion
of causal uniformity rather than to tychism or any form of
capriciousness , arbitrariness or any other view that would
tend to introduce the notion of chaos and thereby set the
world adrift. It is important also to note that he stresses
freedom of the vlrill as limited to the power of contrary choice
or choice between possible alternatives'^ but interprets the
will as a function of the entire personality described as
the soul.
It rexnains to point out that, however satisfactory
may be the analysis of the nature of freedom on the part of a
philosopher, this part of his v/ork is entirely independent of
the question as to whether any such thing as freedom really
1. Bowne, B. P., Philosophy of 'iheism , p. 142.
Proceedings of the Sixth International Conisyess of Pnilosophy ,
1926. artt.Hans Driesch, "Snerger.t Evolution^" pp. 1-9;
H. Wildon Carr, "Life and Matter," pp. 9-19; Arthur 0. Lovejoy,
"The Meanings of 'Emergence' and Its Modes,", pp. .?0-33;
W. M. Wheeler, "Emergent Evolution of the Social^" pp. 33-45.
Morgan, C. Lloyd, Emer^^ent Evolution . IToble, Edmund, Purposive
Evolution . Muirhead, J. H. (ed.), Contem-oorary British
Philosopliy
.
art. C. Lloyd Morgan, "A Philosophy of Evolution,"
pp. 275-305.
2. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom^". Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 581.
3. Bowne, B. P., Intro luction to Psychological Theory
.
p. 229.
4. ibid., p. 223.
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exists. Agreement upon what we mean "by the concept of
freedom is no proof of its reality. The reality of freedom
therefore remains as a prohlem still to "be considered. We
are therefore required to examine Bowne's method of investigat-
ing the prohlem of freedom for the two-fold purpose of hetter
understanding his final conclusions and of evaluating the
grounds for affirming the reality of freedom.
Bowne's method of investigating the problem of
freedom is instructive. In the first place he stressed the
necessity for an empirico-inductive approach to the study.
For him, freedom is not a postulate from which universal the
concrete facts of human experience are deduced. He rather
developed his argument "by reading freedom as a universal out
of particular facts admitted "by all. Given the facts of
experience, an interpretation is necessary "before they have
meaning. The method is to show that the only hypothesis
available to rationalize these facts is freedom. Thus, freedom,
instead of "being viewed as an intuition or as a proposition
"based upon a direct appeal to consciousness, "becomes a deduced
necessity to "be sure "but it is an inference from the facts of
experience resting upon its coherence as an explanation of an
area of personality which remains unintelligi"ble on any other
hypothesis. This does not change the fact in the least that
if freedom is the fact a"b:ut human life we v/ill never experience
it any ..ore profoundly than we actually do. "The argument,
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then, must "be somewhat apagogical, that is, it must consist,
not so much in direct a.ppeal to consciousness, as in sliowing
that free lorn is involved in facts which all admit ."^ Nowhere
does Bowne*s transcendental empiricism exiiihit itself more
clearly than at this point, where he refuses to try to explain
the explanation. Into how freedom is made or how it is possihle,
Bowne does not pretend to probe. It was a fundamental coiatention
of his that it is not incuinbent upon the philosopher to tell how
reality is made but to interpret reality reasonably vdthin the grasp
of finite intelligence. At no point does Bowne reveal himself
more of a Herbartian than at this point.
The purpose is, then, not to demonstrate a theorem
but to solve a problem. "Por all that we can absolutely prove
to the contrary, there may be no such thing as freedom. But
when it comes to choosing between the world as a chaos and the
world as a cosmos, a case can pretty clearly be made out to
demonstrate reasonably that chaos, contrary to the opinion of
those v/iio hold it for the very opposite reason, is the only
logical conclusion of determinism. If the facts of experience
can be more reasonably and intelligibly ejrplained by assuming
freedom to be true, then freedom may be held as the solution
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom'^." Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 682.
2. -McConnell, Bishop F. J., Is Sod Limited? p. 119.
Gf. Gunn, J. A., Llodern French P-iilosouhy
. p. 142. "From a
strictly demonstrative point of view Renouvier thinks it is
impossible to prove freedom as a fact."
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of the problem. "We may not view it as absolutely proved;
yet it is certainly a necessary postixLate of reason and con-
science and as such we hold it."^ Freedom, therefore, is a
necessary postulate of rational existence whose origin as a
problem of creation lies beyond our scope of inquiry^ but as
an idea of reason required to regulate and fill out our
notion of the r;orld as a \7hole is indispensable. The procedure
of the study of freedom, therefore, consists in an examination
of the pertinent and patent facts of experience v/hich pertain
to conscious life for whose interpretation freedom would appear
an unconditioned presupposition.
This now requires us to point out what Bowne included
under the speculative significance of freedom. It is primarily
a study of the epistemological significance of freedom. Bowne's
formulation of the problem is as follows. "I am persuaded,
therefore that one wishing to find his way into the problem of
freedom will do well to consider, first of all, the question of
freedom in intelligence itself and the collapse of rationality
involved in the system of necessity."^ Nevertheless, Bowne
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychol o/^ical Theory ,
pp. 231-232.
2. Bowne, B. P.," The Speculative Significance of
Freedon^" Methodist Review
.
77 (1895), pp. 694-695. "Of course,
we cannot tell iiow freedom is made or how freedom is possible;
.... But, .... we seem to have some experience of it
as a fact," Metaphysics , rev, ed., p. 415.
3. Bov/ne, B. P., Personal ism , pp. 01-202. "The Specula-
tive Significance of Freedom." yiethodist Review . 77 (1895) , pp. 683,
689. Metaphysics
. rev. ed,
, p. 408.
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admitted tliat, if one were looking for the most important
field of freedom, he shoiald certainly find it in the moral
realm. But recognizing this fact he nevertheless insisted
that "if we were seeking the purest illustration of freedom we
should find it in the operation of pure thought. The
doctrine of the speculative significance of freedon. shifts
the venue of the problem from ethics to a study of freedom
from the point of view of its implications for the rational
life and in so doing Bowne insisted that certain advantages are
made apparent over the traditional treatment v/hich historically
attaches itself to discussions of ethical freedom. The first
advantage of the study of freedom in connection with reason
is to "be found in the avoidance of the tangle of discussion
concerning motives in the determination of the will.^ Secondly,
it calls attention to freedom and its significance for the
inner thought life rather than associating it v;ith ejrecutive
activities in the outer world.^ Thirdly, freedom in thought
is practically admitted by everyone and, therefore, escapes
much of the ambiguity which attaches to it in historical
ethics.^ Firially, it is iir.plied in the nature of debate and
argumentation where its significance can be made apparent.^
1. Bowne, B. P., "Eie Speculative Significance of
Freedom^" Ivlethodlst Review
.
77 (1895), p. 687.
2. ibid . . p. 687. Introduction to Psychological
Theory
, p. 227.
3. ibid . . p. 686.
4. ikid.. , p. 586.
5. ibi^
. f p. 686.
6. ibid . . p. 687.
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With these advantages in mind, it liecomes apparent that a
unique approach is designed for a rest-udy of the nat-ure of
freedom in a field where the facts are less likely to "be con-
fiised with old theories of their interpretation so often them-
selves mistaken for facts.
The scope of application of the speculative significance
of freedom wherein the doctrine has permanent significance is
two-fold. The first movement of Bovme^s tho-u^t is in the
direction of the microcosmic aspect of freedom. The second
movement of his thought is embodied in the macrocosmic aspect.
"In considering the possibilities of rational laiowledge, two
points have to be considered, (l) the nature of the fundamental
being, and (2) the nature of the finite knower. Our conclusion
is that we must view both as free and intelligent."^ An under-
standing of the notion of freedom from the point of view of the
finite sxibject requires a knowledge of Bowne*s doctrine of
the self. Tiiis understood, the epistemological argument for
freedom becomes intelligible. The main argument consists in
showing that the denial of freedom involves the collapse of
reason. And since this is true, freedom "becomes the analytically
necessary precondition of any and all rational science whatsoever.
The theoretical or scientific interest is a function of rationality
1. Bowne, B. P., y.etatDhysics ; a Study in First
Principles , p. 172.
2. ibid.. -013. 171-172.
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conditioned ty the possibility of freedom. But the theoretical
or scientific interest does not exhaust the spec-ulative im-
plication of freedom. There is the ethical or practical interest
where freedom has the greatest significance for life itself.
"The great time-phantom has lent its misleading s-uggestions
further to confuse the matter, and so it has come to "be
an accepted dogma with many that freedora itself is a
considerable affront to reason, so much so that the pure
reason left to itself is always deterministic; and belief
in freedom, if held at all, is maintained only for moral
or sentimental reasons. This, however, is a fundamental
misconception, as we have seen and shall further see.
Freedom itself has the deepest speculative significance
for reason and B,cience, as well as for morals and religion."
There is no ::iore profound and clear statement of Bov/ne's con-
tention throughout his writings than this brief outline state-
ment in which he has er^tiressed his conviction of the deep
speculative siA,'nif icance o^' free:-om.
The macrocosmic aspect of freedora Bowne considered of
equal importance. The speculative demand for freedom in his
writings as a basic postulate not only of all scientific know-
ledge but likewise of all philosophic knowledge is stressed
time and tim.e again.
"The speculative significance of theism and of
freedom has been especially em^^hasized in these pages.
Of late years, the Impression has widely prevailed that
the belief in God and freedom exists only by suffranee,
so that if logic were allovred to have its way, this
belief would soon be beyond the reach of hope and mercy.
1. Bov.'ne, B. P. . Personallsm. pp. 198-199.
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Not sharing this conviction, althoiagh it is said to have
the fullest endorsement of the spirit of the times, I
have rather so-ught to show that the truth of this belief
is a matter of life and death to all philosophy and
rational science. This has been done, however, from a
purely speculative interest, and not with reference to
the ethical and religious bearings of the question.
These must be considered by themselves."^
Bowne insisted that the possibility of rational knowledge requires
us to affirm the nature of fundamental being as free and intelli-
gent. It is a unique stress of his that freedom and intelligence
rise and fall together, a fact of tremendous importance for
his metaphysics in its macrocosmic implications. Bowne, therefore,
contends that philosophy as well as science is impossible where
freedom is denied. Freedom is, therefore, a speculative demand
of reason.
Even though Bowne insisted upon the necessity of a
purely speculative investigation of the bearing of freedom
upon reason and philosophy, he by no means excluded from the
general doctrine of the speculative significance of freedom
the ethical and religious bearings of the question. We there-
fore call attention to the significance of freedom for theology
or the satisfaction of the religious interest in behalf of
which Bowne speaks eloquently,
"But while spec\ilative discussions must not be coniused
by irrelevant practical issues, I may add, even at the
risk of another disagreement with the spirit of the
times, that neither reflection nor observation enables
me to regard an indifference to moral and religious
1. Bowne, B. P., Meta-physics ; a St-udy in First
Principles . Preface vii-viii, p. 124.
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interests as the suprene proof of mental power or
even of -philosophic inpartiality. 'G-allio cared for
none of those things,' and was not the most just of
judges after all."^
The problem of religion insofar as its problems are thotight
thro"ugh is implicated in freedom v;hich we shall later show.
The scope of freedom, then, includes "both a micro-
cosmic and a macrocosmic aspect and is affirmed to "be "basal to
"both epistemology and metaphysics. In fact, Bovme*s doctrine
of the speculative significance of freedom consists in showing
that rational ideals are Impossible without freedom. Our
cognitive, moral, religious, philosophical and scientific
ideals all depend upon it and cannot be realized apart from
it. In view of the field of freedom in relation to human
problems as herein set forth, we are now prepared to enter
into an ana-lysis of BoTme's doctrine. Tlie study must hinge
about the nature of the self which must first detain us for
a short examination.
The self is a central doctrine in Bowne's philosophy,
2
sa much so that he called nis system Personalism. He made
personality the key to reality since it constitutes the solu-
tion of all the other difficult problems of philosophy. It is
itself a mystery but one which throws light upon all others
1 • Bowne , B . P. , Ivletarihysics; a Study in ?irst
Principles
.
Preface viii.
2. Bowne, b'. P., "Aa/>", Tlie Independent . 41 (1889),
p. 788. Personality is defined ai; "Self-hood, self-laaowledge
and self-control and, this is the only sense of personality
that any theist v/ould care to maintain."
d
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and therefore constitutes bed-rock in philosophical thinking
and the master-light of all otor philosophical seeing. He
defended the self as -ultiniate reality on the one hand against
materialism and all forms of empiricism which denied its proper
•unity and identity, and on the other hejid he defended it against
all forms of impersonal absolutism v?hich ended in the denial of
the integrity and proper individ-uality of the self. Tiie fimda-
mental problems of his psychology, logic, epistemology and
metaphysics all find their solution through the principle of
personality. This is the teaching of his transcendental em-
piricism that we have a kno7/ledge of the existence of the self
which is deeper than the mind's categories and explains them
rather than being explained by them.
In his psychology, Bowne ably refutes the empiricism
of the associationalists . As opposed to the sensational scliool
which reduces all mental movement to an occurrence in the mind
and affirms that the mental life can be reduced to physiological
processes and that all ideas are deducible from the empirical
data of the sensibility, he leans toward the rational school
which denies that o-ur entire thought activity is reducible to
sense experience and insists upon an independent menta.1 life
which conditions all articulate experience, finding the origin
of certain of our ideas existing in the mind as immanent laws
or constitutive principles prior to all experience although
experience is the condition of their activity.^ The burden
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduct ion to Psychological Tlieory
pp. 115-117.
^ ^
i!
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of the teaching of Bowne*s psychology is the defense of
consciousness as it embodies the mental life as a sui generis
term. It is neither definable nor dedueibis. It cannot be
resolved into anything else and the reality of the mental
life as an independent order of existence is to be recognized
as over against the physical order of existence. The self and
its conscious life represent both mechanism and freedom. The
mechanisms of consciousness are spontaneous and automatic
while another aspect is reflective and volitional, thus a part
of our mental life proceeds by the laws of psychological
necessity and is insofar passive while another part is active
and proceeds on the self-conscious plane of self-directing
volition and freedom.
The principle of self-hood and the independent
character of the aental life is not only conserved inBowne's
psychology but becomes thoroughly explicit in his analysis
of our thought life as set forth in his logic The most
important truth tatight in the Theory of Thouicht and Knowledgce
is Kant*s classic doctrine of the constitutive activity of the
mind. Bowne greatly extended this doctrine v/hich Kant had
concluded by way of a criticism of British empiricism and
continental rationalism. Kant had shown, as opposed to Htune's
1 • Bovme , B . P
, ,
Theory of Thqusiht and K-qOwled^e
.
pp. 20-35.
1
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sensationalism on the one hand and the Taarren formalism of
rationalism as developed "by Leitnits's disciples on the other,
that "Experience is possilale only throio^ a certain constitu-
tive mental activity, according to principles immanent in
the -understanding."^ Bowne considered this contrihution of
Kant his greatest gift to -philosophy which remains tri-umphant
against all hostile criticism as an endiiring possession of
reflective thoiight.^ In answer to the question, Eow is
experience possible?., Bovvne accepted Kant's theory that the
raw materials of the sensibility which are nothing intelliglhle
of themselves can be built into a rational world of experience
and knowled^^^e only thro-u^ the ordering and interpreting
3
function of the mind itself. Therefore, Bowne shows that
the conditions of tho-ught must imply the unity and identity
of the thinlcing self. The unity of the self conditions the
subjective or psychological aspect of thought v;hile the law
of identity constitutes its logical aspect. Thus the unity
and identitj?- of the self are involved in thouglit which means
that the self is the analytically necessary pre-condition
4
of any and all experience whatsoever. Apart froa it, j-odging
is impossible so that, in the last analysis, neither psychology
1. Bowne, B. P., Personalism
. p. 55. Kant and
Spencer
, pp. 10-17,
2. Bo\7ne, B. P., Studies in Theism
, pp. 120-121.
3. Hocking, W. E. , The
.
Self Its Body and freedom
,
pp. 151-152.
4. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psyc?-ological
Theory
, p. 22.
I
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nor logic can dispense with this unifying abiding self.
Thought and Icnowledge consist in judging but, apart from
the unity and identity of the self, judging is impossible.
It is the unpicturable anc sensuously non-oresentable self
which provides consciousness of states as opposed to mere
states of consciousness and furnishes the conditions of
embracing the subject and predicate of every proposition
into a union otherwise impossible."
In his epistemology, Bowne discovers the nature of
knowledge to be involved in a necessary dualism so far as
finite knowing is concerned. Throu^iout the argument, the
knowing mind is defended as an independent order of reality
as opposed to all forms of monism which tend on the one hand
to eradicate finite personality and, on the other, to destroy
the extra-mental order of reality,
"The argument from epistemology is essentially this:
that nothing whatever can be known except mind ani its products,
and hence that if mind is knowable by us it must be essentially
a rational work, the expression of thouglit , which in turn
presupposes a thinlcer at the other end." But if it be true
and, it is as a matter of fact, that Bowne defended psycholog-
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psy^cholo.^ical
Theory
, p. 23.
2. Bowne, B. P., "Present Status of the Conflict
of Paith," !^ethodist Review . 105 (1922), p. 368.
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ical freedom^ and tliat in Ms logic he made freedom the
2
condition of the solution of "both the proTslem of thotight
and that of error, when we come to the prolDlem of knowledge
as he interpreted it, he made freedom the one condition of
its possibility,^ It therefore appears that the self hecomes
the central doctrine of Bovme's personalism and one
most fundamental attriljutes is its freedom.
In his metapliysics , Bowne accepted the Leibnitzian
doctrine of reality as dynamic and active. He finds personality
the one thing which fulfills the requirements for true causal
agency. He thus affirms the reality and substantiality of the
self since personality alone meets the requirements of reality.
The reality of the self consists in the power to act, to think
and to feel and is insofar given to us immediately in experience.
Its identity consists in its power of intelligence. But here
again it is not only the self as an agent v/ith the power to
act but it is rather the self as an intelligent free agent that
constitutes personality the only solution of the metaphysical
problems of change and identity, unity and plurality, space and
time, as well as causality and explanation.^ Only personal
1. Bowne, 3. p., Introduction to Psycholo.^ical
Theory
, pp. 219-234.
2. Bowne, B. p., Theory of Thou2:ht and Ky^ owl edge .
p. 17.
3. ibid. , pp. 239-244,
4. ibid . . pp. 17-18.
5. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics
.
rev. ed., p. 428.
Theory of Tliou^zjlit and Knowledge , p. 244.
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freedora will suffice to solve tiie protileiiis of tliou^t and
explain reality. In order to sunmarize Bov?ne*s doctrine of
self in this connection, we call attention to the analysis
of Bishop McConnell.
"In the fifteen years in which I knew Dr. Bovme
I heard him talk his way thro-a^gh from ohjective
idealism to personal ism. It will "be remembered tliat
when Bowne first published his L'etaphYsics he was an
iealist of the type of his old friend and teacher,
Hermann Lotze. The idealism was from the first of
the objective type rather than of the subjective,
or Berkeleyan type, though Bovme of course had un-
mitigated contempt for crass criticism of Berkeley
• • . • Bowne' s idealism was directed at an
explanation of the reality of the external world
—
not a denial of that reality—an idealism whic""-^
maintained that only the active could be real, . and
that only a spiritual agent could be active. There
co"uld be no lump stuff existing in itself and by its
own right. The only reals are selves.
"Prom tliat idealism Bowne advanced ir.ore and
more to emphasis on the supremacy of the self, or of
selves—finite selves and God. Not only did he seek
to free the self from bondage to any inert st\:iff • He
also sought to free it from anything impersonal—like
categories, or natures, or la.ws. That is to say, he
sought to aa^:e a spiritual agent, or rather. The
Spiritual Agent, the fundamental reality back of
catei;;ories and laws. This view Bovme called trans-
cendental empiricism, the empiricism which seeks for
truth in the :.;ovement of a spiritual agent working
through categories, rather than the lower empiricism
which too often gets things reversed and misses the
self in the study of assumedly self-existent lav/s.
He talked the whole problem out to me as he found his
way along, and one day in the summer of 1905, I think
it was, he told me that he was going to change the
name of his system from objective idealism to
personalism. I remarked that I feared that would
minimize the idealistic feature, and asked why he did
4I
I
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not call it persoi^al idealism. He replied that he
wanted th| emphasis kept umiistaka'bly on the personal
element."
But the self of which Bovrae spoke comhines freedom and
intelligence in such a way that freedom "becomes the regulative
idea in personality. This fact is adequately recognized in
the definition of personal ism given "by Dean A. C. Knudson
who says, personalism is
"that form of idealism which gives equal recognition
to hoth the pluralistic and monistic aspects of
erf)erience and which finds in the conscious unity,
identity, and free activity of personality the key to
the nature of reality and the solution of the ultimate
problems of philo^: opiiy."^
In stating Bowne's theory of the self we have not assumed
that an argument has been given for freedom "but have merely
called attention to the fact tliat freedom as postulated
by Bowne can neither be understood nor appreciated if
studied out of connection with the self. Whoever would
understand Bowne *s doctrine of freedom must be content to
study it in connection with the self for on the impersonal
plane where freedom and intelligence are divorced there can
1, McConnell, Bishop F. J., "Borden Parker Bowne,"
Methodist Reviev?
. 105 (1922), p. 342. Cliarles Henouvier
published his Le Personnalisae
.
1902, a v/ork which Bowne had
in his library and which may have influenced Bovme to call
his system personalism since Henouvier' s work contains
idealistic metaphysics similar to the Leibnitzian raonadology
stressing the two characteristic features, pluralism and
per :^onalism.
2. Knudson, Dean A. C, Tlie P.iilosophy of Personalism .
p. 87,
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be no such thing as freedom as he expounds the concept. From
this vantage point, we enter more intelligently into the
auaalysis of his teaching about freedom.
The relation of freedom and reason constitutes the
starting point for Bowne's investigation of the problem of
freedom. He formulated hie thesis by pointing out that
"in the field of thou^t proper everyone, in spite of
himself, assumes that reason is a self-controlling
force. I^eedon of thought cannot be rationally dis-
puted without assuming it Here we have
a self-directing activity, which proceeds according to
laws inherent in itself and to ideals generated by
itself. "1
Bowne defined thoiight as "that form of mental activity whose
aim is truth or knowledge." By knowledge, Bowne meant
"the certainty that our conceptions correspond to
reality or to truth. By reality, we mean any matter
of fact, whether of the outer or inner world. By
truth, we mean rational principles. By certainty,
it is plain that we cannot mean any thoughtless
assurance, but only that which results from the
necessity of the admission."'^
It can now be shown that in the processes of reasoning there
can be no proper distinction made between truth and error
if freedom is denied. The argument has, first, a negative
character but permits, in the second place, of a positive
1. Bowne, B.P. , "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Lethodist Beview . 77 (1895), pp. 686-687, 683.
2. Bowne, B.P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge .
p. 9.
3. Bowne, B.P. , Studies in Theism, pp. 13-14, 23.
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character so that it is strengthened "by the fact that it
takes "both the defensive and the offensive form.
Negatively stated, the argument for freedom takes
its point of departure from the problem created "by the
dilemma of determinism. Tliis dilemma arises in connection
with the prohlem of error.^ It is perfectly obvious that
rationality requires the essential trustwortliiness of our
rational faculties or the essential trustworthiness of
reason. Notwithstanding this postulate, it is a patent fact
that a large part of hvunan thought and belief finds itself
involved in error. The antinomy which emerges turns about
the possibility of reconciling the fact of error in finite
thought with the necessary faith in the reliability of
reason. Proceeding negatively, we are impressed with the
incompetence of the hypothesis of necessity to deal with
this antinomy of thought. According to this view, universal
law and necessary causation of the mechanical type invade
completely the personal as well as the impersonal world. On
such a scheme of things everything is equally determined
and both true and false ideas are equally effects of their
antecedents, in which case the distinction between truth and
1. Bowne, B, P,, Personalism . p, 200. "T7ith this
understanding of what freedom is, we recur to its speculative
significance. This appears first in its bearing on the problem
of error." I>'eta:ohysics
. rev. ed., p. 406,
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error is meaningless.
"For in such a system every tho-u^t, "belief, conviction,
whether truth or superstition, arises with equal necessity
with every other. Tlie "belief in freedom is as necessary
as the "belief in necessity. Tlieism and atheism, spiritual-
ism and materialism, freedom and necessity, consistency
and caprice are alike necessarily produced in tho-u^ht.
Thoughts and "beliefs "become effects; and to speak of
true and false thoughts seems like speaking of true or
false chemical action or true or false "blood. On this
plane of necessary effect the t.ctual is all, and the
ideal distinctions of tru.e and false have as little
meaning as they would have on the plane of mechanical
forces ."^
Obviously there is a necessity for a standard, norm or criterion
for j-udging "between false and true ideas for we have already
defined loiowledge such that true thoughts correspond to reality
while erroneous ones do not. But the possi"bility of achieving
such a criterion on the necessitarian plane is hopeless. If
all our thoughts, "both true and false alike, are produced with
equal necessity, it is hard to see in what a criterion for
truth would consist for if we make necessity itself the criterion
of true ideas while its opposite serves as the norm in the
light of which to judge erroneous ones, we face disloyalty to
the tryst we keep with mechanism which demands that all ideas
are equally necessary effects. The strange situation is then
encountered tliat the "belief in freedom is just as necessary
1. Bowne, B. P.., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 685. Theory of
Thought and Knov/led-e
. pp. 241-242. CC. G-onn, J. A., Modern
French Fhiloso-phv
. p. 157. A Fouill^e, himself a partisan of
freedom, directed a prolonged ani powerful dialectic against
this point of view in C. Renouvier's philosophy on the ground
"that the distinction between truth and error is by no means
parallel to tliat between necessity and freedom."
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as the belief in necessity and vice, versa. If, however, tlie
meclianists with superahundant confidence try again ty way of
the psychological route affirming that true ideas are normal
while false ones are abnormal, we are confronted V7ith the
same diffic-ulty, namely, the discovery of a noun "by Y;hich to
judge norioality. If, next, an appeal were made to consensus
gentium , the anomalous situation arises wherein it is necessary
to be demonstrated that there is a fundamental connection
between majorities and the notion of truth. Finally, the
embarrassment is accented by life itself which, expressed in
terms of the unsophisticated mind, seems to carry on by
freedom which notion is far n;ore spontaneous and universal
than that of necessity.
Finally, however imperative the necessity for a
standard by which to discriminate between ideas of truth and
error, and however remote the chance of discovering it, granted
that it were possible, the application of s\ich a criterion
for truth would, in Bowne's opinion, be impossible.
"The tiiougiit of a standard implies a power to control oijir
thoughts, to conpare them with the stanilard, to reserve
our decision, to thinlc twice, to go over the ground again
and again, until the transparent order of reason has been
reached. But on this theory there is no such power.
Thoughts come and thoughts go. Some are displaced by
others, not because of any superior rationality, but because
the new conditions have produced new conceptions.
"Tliought as thoiigiit counts for nothing. The under-
lying dyiiamic conditions determine the rational movement
without being determined by it, VHien, in a chemical
molecule, one element displaces another the nev,' combination
is not truer but stronger than the old. So when a mental
grouping is broken up and displaced by another it is not a
question of truth or rationality, but of change in the
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underlying dynamic relations. There is, then, not only
no standard of truth, hut no power to use it if we had
it. Thus all beliefs sink into effects, and one is as
good as another as long as it lasts.
Freedom therefore enters intimately into the structure of reason
Itself and any denial of this fact is equivalent to the denial
of the possibility of knowledge. Bowne never tired of the refu-
tation of Herbert Spencer's nescience which grew out of Spencer's
necessiteurianism. The insolubility of the problem of error on
every necessitarian scheme consists in the fact that error be-
comes cosmic in ch^acter and therefore constitutional to reality.
The objection of Spencer to freedom was that science in assuming
the vmiformity of law compels us to deny freedom because freedon
allows the possibility of a different result under like circum-
stances which scientific causality precisely denies. But as
Bowne has established his thesis, freedom is the very condition
of reason and it is a necessitarian system which destroys the
possibility of science. Thus the antinomy which Spencer encount-
ered proves to be illusory since the facts require the opposite
interpretation from that to which he comes. If every system of
necessity destroys freedcai and the admission of freedom destroys
science, the antinomy becomes unmanageable, but clearly if the one
1. Bowne, B.P., Theory of Thou^t and ICnowledgp .
pp, 242-243. The behavioristic psychology reduces thinking to
this sad pli^t. Cf. Avey, A.E. , The Function and Forms of
ThouAt. pp. 104-109, for a brief but excellent refutation of
this view.
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ftindaiaental condition of science is reason, then the suicidal
or self-destructive character of every conception of science
which undermines that very reason which conditions its life
and existence forces -as to assume free reason as the only
condition of science,
"There is no solution of the problem of human error
except in the fact of human freedom, at least none
which does not overthrov/ reason itself. A rational
activity must he a free activity—not a lawless or
capricious one, indeed, but one \7hich directs and
controls itself froiu v/ithin according to its own
inner light and law. \Yhen this is not the case,
reason sinlis into a mental mechanism, for which the
ideal distinctions of truth and error have neither
meaning nor application. In that case error Is not
a human, hut a cosmic fact."^
Thus Spencer's ultimate reality, the Unknown Cause, produces
truth and error alike indifferent to rational distinctions
forcing us to conclude that "both reason and unreason are
cosmic in character. Bowne's able successor in Boston
University, evaluating Bov/ne's work at this point, says
"Bovme has pointed out uore clearly than anyone else the
fact that without freedon the possibility of arriving at
any distinction between truth and error is blotted out."^
Bovme himself felt that this matter had never been suffi-
1. Bovme, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 688. Personalism .
pp. 200-201.
2. Srightman, E. S., A Fx^ilosophy of Ideals , p. 84.
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ciently recognized "by philosophers in general-'- and by
necessitarians in particular. They have taken Icnowledge for
granted on any philosophical theory thus ignoring the obliga-
tion of every philosophical systea to construct its epistemology
out of principles to which it is entitled and those only. It
was Bovme's special nerit that he more clearly than anyone
else pointed out the suicidal and fatal character of philoso-
phical theories such as materialism, necessitarianism and all
related points of viev/ which shattered confidence in reason
itself. On all such views where error is made cosmic and
necessary, skepticism inevitably follows. Such a view makes
the foibles, blunders, caprices and errors of men merely the
product of the universal unreason working itself out through
human minds. Thus every man, be he prophet or seer, philosopher
or poet, politician or religionist, savant or fool, stands
equally as a determined effect of fundamental reality. In this
1. Descartes, Rene, aleditations on the First
Philosopliy
.
Meditation IV. Philosophical Classics Religion of
Science Library, No. 51, p. 59. Deocartes attributed both error
and sin to the freedom of the will. "Ihence, then, spring my
errors? They arise from this cause alone, that I do not restrain
the will, which is of much wider range than the understanding,
v/ithin the same limits, but extend it even to things I do not
understand, and as the will is of itself indifferent to such, it
readily falls into error and sin by choosing the false in room
of the true, and evil instead of good." Au^stine, De vera
relip-;ione
. pp. 33, 61; De Trinitate . xi , pp. 10, 17, also ascribed
error to the freedom of the v;ill, Brochard, V., De I' Erreur
.
(1879), p. 47. In this work this point of view is developed.
Eenouvier, Charles, Psycholo^^le rationnelle
. Vol. 2, p. 96.
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case all their ideas are alike necessary and equally important
and those of the genius and the fool must have equal sanction
and authorization.^
"I know of no philosopher vrho has so ably and so
persistently insisted upon the impossihility of
basing a theory of knovrledge on any necessitarian
system, materialistic or pantheistic, any system, .
that is, that robs the finite person of essential
freedom. Bowne never tires of insisting that
proper rationality is possible only to free agents,
persons, and that on the plane of freedom alone
truth and error first acquire significance. There
are passages in practically every one of his books
that ought to be regarded as classical on this
point. The effective use that he makes of this
position is adiuirably illustrated in his criticism
of Spencer. "2
The positive side of the arguiiient for freedom contains
Bown^s ovm solution of the problem and his constructive state-
ment. He starts from the postulate that "the trtistworthiness
of reason and the validity of knowledge are the presupposition
of all science and philosophy," and that "Tlie general trust-
worthiness of reason presupposes that thought is a free activity
based on rational insight."^ The constitution of reason is
only partially automatically conditioned. In our rational life
we find the basis of uniformity and la.w as well as the basis
of freedom. These laws of thought and the fixed connections
1 . Bowne , B . P. , Theory of Thought and Knowledge ,
pp. 240-241. Kant and Spencer , pp. 270-272.
2. Duncan, G-. M., "Bowne vs. Determinism end .
Pantheism," Methodist Review . 105 (1922), p. 385,
3. Bowne, 3. P., Theism , p. 146.
4. Bov/ne, B. p., Theory of Thought and Knowledge ,
p. 296.
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of o-or ideas lie "beyond our power to make or -uiiniake so
that there are mechanisms in consciousness through which
the reason functions analogous to the uniformities in external
nature. But these unifom.ities of consciousness as the lav/s
of thought and the fixed connections or association of ideas,
even though they lie securely "beyond our power to create or
destroy, nevertheless fall into error and do not of themselves
unerringly make for truth. If they did, there would "be no
such thing as error. It therefore appears that in addition
to the fixed nature of rationality there is required, in order
to correct the careless use of these mechanisms of thought,
an act of ratification and self-control of the oioeration of
thought according to an ideal of truth. This requires freedom.
The power of self-control in thought implies the ahility to
weed out contradiction!: in thinl-:ing due to h&.tit, association,
prejudice and the like in view of arriving at Judgments Avherein
ohjective and logical connections of thought have replaced the
merely psychological laws of association. On the "basis of
necessitarianism and materialism, logic should be relatively
insignificant yet such thinkers attempt to reflect and, insofar
as they succeed, they transcend the order of necessity and not
only ass-ume "but attri"bute freedom. Yet, who would for a moment
inpute to machines and mechanical forces praise for reaching
truthful conclusions and demerit for grinding out erroneous
ones? Manifestly a free rational life in self-possession and
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acting -under self-control is essential to truth.
"The attainment of trvth implies the existence of
a standard of tinith in the mind, and the possihility
of directing our rational activity accordingly. The
one thing vrhich the truth-seeker must he on his guard
against is the tendency to conclude hastily. He must,
then, test his facts, criticize his processes, repeat
his arguments, tear assunder the misleading conjunctions
of association, and reserve his assent until the
crystalline and necessary conjunctions of reason are
reachel. "Ihen this cannot he done, there is no proper
rationality, hut only a psychological succession of mental
states Freedom is no less necessary to
rational action than it is to moral action. Indeed,
the purest illustration we have of self-detenaination
is in the case of thinking. We direct and maintain
attention, we criticize every step, and look hefore and
after, until we reach the rational conclusion."-^
UThere rationality and freedom are united, a criterion
for truth is not only possible hut it can he used. It is
on this condition alone that truth and error acquire meaning.
The mind is free to control its states and regulate its ideas.
It becomes self-conscious of the part which such mechanisms
as those 01 habit, instinct and related associations of an
irrational character play and it is therefore able to inter-
pose a demurrer in the interest of attaining logical connections
in reasoning. On such a theory the finite mind may be con-
sidered a real so-urce of error which relieves cosmic responsibility.
All beliefs tested by the law of contradiction are not true,
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychological
Theory
, p. 227.
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which woiild argue for the fact of error, "but, if the admission
of error in our finite knowing means the destruction of the
trustworthiness of reason, then the oossihility of truth is
denied. The only way out of the dilemma into v/hich we are forced
"oy the universal trust in reason on the one hand and the fact of
error on the other lies in our appeal to freedom. On this view
our faculties of reason are considered to he trutliful "but, through
carelessness, willfulness and the refusal to accept responsihility
for thinking, error may arise. We cannot explain truth and
error on any other assiamption than freedom "because necessity, we
have seen, destroys confidence in reason itself and makes know-
ledge Impossiole,. But making this claim the vindication of reason
herein set forth is not eqxiivalent to saying that we can hy
volition or freedom exercise power to alter the truth and thereby
malce things true or false at will. The mechanisms of conscious-
ness and nature lie "beyond interference so that premises and con-
clusions logically follow and, were it not for this fact, the
mind, running foul into lav/lessness , would result in the collapse
of reason no less certainly than it does on any necessitarian
system. At this point we encounter Bowne's alleged discovery
of the unity of freedom and \mif or-nit-^'- in rationality. "And
this leads to a discovery. Freedom and uniformity must he
united in rationality, and neither can dispense with the other.
1. Bowne, B. P., "Txie Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review
. 77 (1395), p. 687.
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This afiims that freedom is as fatal to rationality as is
necessity except for the fact that in o-ur rational life we find
the -unifonnity of the laws of thou^ght and the mechanical
associations of ideas. With these considerations in mind,
Bowne makes the arresting assertion that "Here, then, in
freedom is the source of both truth and error in 'onowledge."^
This conclusion we shall find occasion to examine critically
when we estimate Bowne' s analysis of the problem of freedom and
rationality.
Bowne* s allusion to the argument for freedom as
revealed in the lOt^ical character of debate where the self-
abnegating character of determinism becomes explicit is well
worth our attention. It was his contention that "the logical
character of a debate in which the point denied has to be assumed
to save the discussion from becoming farcical" argues for the
necessity of freedom. For if the object be to convince a
libertarian of the validity of determinism, the determinist is
forced to assume the truth of the point denied in order to
save the discussion from becoming ridiculous. If this can be
shown, the determinist is inconsistent to argue at all for if
he succeeds in his argument, he has proven freedom and not
1. Bowne, 3. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review
.
77 (1395), p. 688.
2. ibid
. . p. 687.
11
I
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determinism. For either the lihertarian is or is not free
to change his mind. This truth and that of a similar kind led
Bomie to the discovery that the purest illustration of freedom
to he had is in the operation of pure thought. While he implied
this point in connection with the logic of dehate, he did not
sufficiently develop it.^ In pointing out that a mechanical
doctrine of mind reduces all mental activity to passive occurrence
in consciousness, Bowne showed that the power of reaching any con-
clusion is canceled. The denial of the independent activity of the
mind reduces it to a form of physical mechanism whose judgaents are
the resultants of antecedent mental states conceived as forces of a
physical character rather than the resultants of reason. Out of
mere physical mental states (however contradictory this phrase,
it is nevertheless what determinism affirms) are supposed to flow
logical thought while in fact we have no riglit to expect any one
thing any more than any other since all effects are equally
1. Spaulding, E.G., What Am I?, pp. 33-69. Professor
Spaulding has developed in a most convincing way the necessity for
indeterminism or freedom as the sole condition of argumentation,
showing hy a more extended argument the hrief analysis which we have
made of Bowne ' s statement concerning freedom as the ground of
logical argumentation. Lk:Connell, Bishop F.J. , God Limited?,
pp. 115-116. Here the same argument appears. "Even those who
strenuously deny freedom as strenuously call upon the rest of us to
deny it, therehy assuming the force they are denying." j^. 120.
"Argument is out of place in a deterministic system, for all
utterances stand alike on the same plane as to causality, and all
talk of choosing between them is folly, whatever folly means on
such has is.
"
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detennined. Obviously, reason at this point vanishes and
epistemological skepticism or nescience takes possession of
the field. Any theory of mind which reduces all its products
to the mechanical level of effects whereby it is affirmed that
all beliefs are equally authoritative while they last independent
of the implications of reason destroys the distinction between
truth and error. Where the mind is not free to tear assunder
the mechanical conjunctions which appear as states of conscious-
ness and reunite them according to its own logical ideal, nothing
like knowledge will e-'/er appear and reflective thinking is but
a spectre of the imagination. It is Just here that one of the
most significant conclusions of this research emerges: freedom
is a significant speculative postulate of thought which has not
received in contemporary philosophical thought recognition
commensurate with its importance.
The significance of freedom for loiowledge which is here
brought to light is of the greatest importance for education,
a field into v/hich Bowne carried it by in.plication rather than
by explicit teaching and professional interest. In his utterance
on education, he made it clear that "Tlie materialistic psychologist
has really not the slightest occasion for going out of his science;
but I never knew one who was ot perpetually making the most
na^ve onslaughts on the soul or free-will."^ At no point does
1. Bowne, B. P., "Religion in the Schools," Zion'
s
Herald
.
63 (1336), p. 217. ^-oncan, G. M., "Bowne vs. Determinism and
Pantheism," I,!ethodist Reviev . . 105 (1922), pp. 335-385. Prof.
Duncan says Bowne' s system "-urnishes the soundest possible basis
for ethics, pedagogy, and civil society, . . . ."
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Bowne come into stronger clash of opinion with HerlDart than
over this point of educational psychology which presupposes a
deterministic theory of mind. It was not Bowne's aim to do
more with the speculative significance of freedom than to show
the principles involved in the nature of rationality itself at
this point and he left it for educators who did not wish their
philosophy drawn too mild to see the iiirplication of his work for
their practical programs, A hint at such application in the
hands of a cort5)etent interpreter is to be found in a work like
that of Professor J. A. Leigliton,^
Bowne urges with Lotzean perspective "that our freedom
is far fror;. aL^-olvte"*' and in so doing sectired for his teaching
a modesty and scientific sanction which saves the entire point
of view fron collapse on the one hand and secures for it a
deferential hearing on the other. Wliile freedom may to some
extent pervade all our mental functions, at the same time certain
factors of the mental life lie forever beyond all interference
from our volition. To the latter, Bowne referred as constitutional
activities of the mind which lie beyond our pov;er to control. He
included among these the follov/ing: (l) the laws of tho-ught,
(2) the forms of experience, (3) the categories of tho-ught, (4) the
laws of association of ideas, (5) little or no direct control over
1 . Individuality and Education
.
.
2#. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychol o^^ical Hieory
.
p. 234.
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the feelings, (6) the Judgments of conscience lie outside
volitional modification.
"Thus the essential nature of the susceptihilities and the
constitutional activities is independent of volition. The
lavr's of mental procedure and of mental change and comhina-
tion also admit of no volitional control. Such are the
interactions of tho-ught and feeling, the laws of formal
tho-ught, and the judgments of conscience. These are forever
secure from volitional modification."^
ITot only are we limited ty cur mental and physical constitution
tut in addition "by the intensity of the desires a.nd impulses
vrhich it has to control. "2 Uniformity is therefore always allied
with freedom however narrov/ or wide o-ur power of freedom and this
in the absolute being as well as in the finite person so that
freedom in Bowne's doctrine is never to be interpreted as a
synonym for caprice, lawlessness, arbitrariness and c?iaos.*^ In
answer to those thinkers who are intolerant of freedom, either on
account of prejudice, ignorance or because of reasons however
illogical, v/ho argue that indeterminism sets the world adrift,
he says
"In truth, this objection, so far as it is an^'^thing but
cant, rests on confusing the abstract notion of freedom
with the real freedom which we possess. If the creatiire's
freedom were utter arbitrariness backed by infinite
power, the objection would be relevant; as it is, it is only
a home-made goblin. The limits of our freedom are very
narrov/ at best. Even the order of our thoughts is largely
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychol o.":ical Theory
.
p. 2S3.
2. ibid.
. p. 234.
3. Bovme, B. P., Personalism
. pp. 204-206,

-Mi-
ls eyond our control. The existence and order of ovx
feelings is still more independent. The laws of o-ur
ovm nat-ure and of external natvire are quite independent.
The field for choice is small, and our choice consists
almost entirely in deciding to do or not to do. The
result is , that the great outlines of life and history
are drawn "by a power which we cannot control. TTe can
originate no new and unforeseen possibilities. The
law of our nature cannot he escaped. Hehellion is
possible, but defeat is sure. The universe is going
our way and will help us along if we choose; but he
riho will not be led shall certainly be dragged. Thus
on every side our freedom is henrned in by massive
necessities which we cannot escape."
Within these circumscribed limits accorded to freedom by
Bowne, it has its scope but it is v/ell to add here that he
further insists that within these limits even freedom is not
fixed and for the reason that volition crystallizes into the
mechanisms of claaracter in such a way that "the soul" may
securely bind itself by it^' ovm freedom of choices which can
never be rescinded. At this :oint both the sublime and tragic
aspects of freedom appear. Here we come upon one of the
strange paradoxes of personality which seem.s to say that the
more one exercises his freedom, the more his character becomes
determined, and the more determined his character becomes, the
less freedom he has; and yet it is ijnlikely that one in a
world like oiors would ever exhaust all of the possibilities
for free dioice. If this were possible and each chosen action
upon the occasion of the choice flowed immediately into an
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zion'
s
Herald
.
56 (1879), p. 73.
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order of law as it does taking its place in the order of
causal uniformity, it might appear that mechanism would one
day swallow all the freedom of which one were capahle.
This difficulty is, however, abstract and speculative and, on
the concrete and practical demands of life, it tends to partially
if not wholly disappear.
The validity of Bowne's teaching concerning the
relation of freedom and reason has both a negative and
positive aspect. V»e call attention first to the points of
correction and extension required in the argument. It was
Bowne's contention that mechanism can produce no criterion
for truth. This is not as self-evident as Bowne seemed to
think. There is nothing in his aurgument to preclude the
conceivability of a necessitarian scheme's prodxicing a
standard for truth. The irrefutable aspect of Bowne's
argument is encountered when it is declared that a criterion
would be useless on the hypothesis of necessity if it were to
emerge. If all ideas are equally necessary effects, a crite-
rion for truth is useless. True enough the logic of necessity
does not naturally suggest the achievement of a criterion for
truth nor the need of one, yet in the nature of the concept
there is no apriori reason why the notion of a standard is
1. Bowne, B.P., Theism , p. 126.
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excluded. Further, the criterion might exist without any
universal knowledge of it hut our sorry plight consists in
our inahility to make use of it even rhere knowledge of it
exists.
Bowne's conclusion that freedom is the source of
both truth and error in knowledge is open to criticise on the
ground either of aubiguity of language or of misstatement of
fact.^ In the first objection, it might be urged that some
insight into truth results from such involvjitary mechanisms
as the subconscious. Yet our loiovvledge between truth so
obtained and the mech^anisms of the siibconscious which mediate
it for consciousness may be and probably, in the greatest
number of cases, are mechanical products of previous volitional
activity. It is certain that, if freedom is real, then on
the occasion of the free choice the act which passes into the
realm of sequential causation may thro-ugh subconscious
mechanisms assist in the attainment of tru.th under conditions
where freedom se.3ras to be at the time negligible. So it would
appear that the involuntary mechanisms of the sxOb conscious
might conceivably acco-unt for some truth since the explanation
offered is insufficient entirely to deny the affirmation of
necessity. The chief difficulty with Bowne's contention that
1. BoTOe, B. P., "Speculative Significance of Freedom,"
Metliodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 688.
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freedom is the so-urce of lioth truth and error lies in its
violation of the principle which affirms that origins do not
determine validity uhich is as true vrhen applied to freedom
as the soxirce of truth and error as when applied elsewhere.
It is not origins which determine validity. Freedom is there-
fore not the so-uxce of truth and error in Imowledge hut it is
rather the only dependable or trustworthy condition of the
discovery of truth and error, or the sole dependable or trust-
worthy means "by vfaich tinith and error may te discovered. Freedom
makes possible judgments of both truth and error, to be sure,
yet this is quite different from considering it as the origin of
truth and error. It is just at this point where the real
relation of freedom to truth and error becomes clear and this
consists in showing tliat freedom is the sole condition under
which any criterion for truth can be applieil after such a
criterion has been discovered.
The essential correctness of BOT.-ne's argument never-
theless remains and its significance is hard to gainsay. The
insight that freedom and uniformity must be united in rationality
and tliat neither can dispense with the other is the only produc-
tive point of view for a s;^Tioptic interpretation of experience.
His claim to originality with respect to this insight where he
argues that '.is analysis of freedom leads to a discovery^ raises
1. Bowne, B. P., "Tlie Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Heview . 77 (1895), p. 687.
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a question. This idea was certainly an explicit part of
Kant's discussion of freedom in the Kritik der reinen Vernunf
t
and it certainly is explicitly formulated as a part of Lotze's
analysis of the concept of freedom as has previously "been
established in this study. The value of this aethod of formulat-
ing the case for freedom is that it provides for indisputable
facts of experience which call for e:>rplanation hut provides in
the explanation against tychism or any form of absolute freedom
on the one hand and it provides equally against the notion of
universal necessitarianism on the other.
Again, the thesis tliat proper rationality is possible
only to freedom^ is given the equivalent of a logical demon-
stration which, though it will not carry the conviction of
absolute demonstration to all minds, certainly approxliiates the
ideal of coherence :;iore nearly than any other. Wlien it can be
shown that the presuppositions of knowledge require that freedom
and reason are organically and functionally interrelated, there
is no error in concluding that a high degree of logical
verification and probability has been achieved. In brief, we
conclude that freedom and reason rise or fa.ll together.
Attention should also be called to the fact that
freedom, which implies reason, also implies the highest category,
1. Bowne, B. P., Theism, p. 125.
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that of p"urpose. The fact is, according to Bowne, that
rational p-urpose^ is the only way out of the -unstable equilibri-um
into vzhich thought falls when it tries to steer a middle course
"between the Scylla of necessity and the Charybdis of absolute free-
dom. It is an important part of Bovme^s teaching about freedom
to see clearly the position which purpose occupies in the union
and stabilization of freedom and uniformity. This problem will
be developed under the cosmic aspect of Bowne 's doctrine and needs
merely to be cited here as one of the significant characteristics
of his exposition of freedom involved in the career of reason.
Tlie hypothesis of rational freedom also offers the only
explanation of any depth for the ability of groups of persons
widely separated and with different heredity and environment to
independently arrive at the same truth, such as the principles of
morality and these of mathematics. In t'.iis way free intelligence
is able to establish universals of a transcendental character which
are cliaracteristic of the human mind wherever it has not lost con-
fidence in itself. And as long as the reason is free, it never
more than occasionally, due to a materialistic gust and its
accompanying skepticism, loses confidence in itself to universalize.
In fact, it is only free intelligence that is competent to dis-
cover universals. VTnerever rationality/ chooses to think it is
free to distinguish truth from error to the extent that certain
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Spec-jlative Significance of Freedom,"
Methodist Review . 77 (1395), pp. 596-697.
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xmiversals emerge tut which could not "be accounted for on any
other ground than that of free intelligence. It is therefore free
rationality rather than empiricism that gives us the "best historical
insight into the nature of many of our ideas or concepts \7hose
genesis othervdse remains opaque and mysterious.
The general cliaracter of the problem of freedom and
reason is now "before us and it next remains to show the kinds of
knowledge which are fundamentally conditioned "by freedom. It
was not enough for "Bovme to show that freedom is the presupposition
of knowledt^e in general "but he shov;ed very clearly how the various
epistemological ideals are conditioned "by it in science, morality,
philosopliy and religion*^ In fact, he made freedom the condition
o
of the realization of any and all rational ideals whatsoever."'
The work of freedom in relation to science Bowne stated
as follows. "Science itself is one of the great achievements of
hiarnan freedom,"*^ It is "by this time apparent that "both the truths
of reason and tliose of physical science are independent of our
volition. Tliis fact, which points toward an order of reality
which lies "beyond o-ar power to make and unmake at will and which
constitutes an extra-mental order of truth , in no wise guarantees
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Spec^jlative Significance of
Freedom." Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 692.
2. Bowne, B. P., 1/IetapIi.ysics
. rev. ed.
,
p. 408.
3. Bowne, B. P., "The Spe.rjlative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review
.
77 (1895), pp. 687-588. Theory of
Thought and Knowled,g:e
. pp. 17-18. I.-etaphysic"; ; a Study in First
Principles
. p. 124. Meta-oly/sics . rev. ed.
,
p. 409. Personalism .
p. 199.
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OMT knowledge of it. The v/orld which the mind knows is not
given in the forin of ready-made knowledge as a finished product
previously adapted to perfectly fitting into the receptacle of
mind. The truths of "both reason and nature do not possess the
power of self-communication and self-revelation. The "given"
element in experience is a task or challenge to the mind which
signifies the ohjective condition or possibility of Icnowledge.
Our minds as active instruments are required to huild up their
worlds. In manj'' resr^ects this constitutes an infinite task
or an ideal of science. Tliat is, we come to know the reality
of the external world and the truths of reason through the
pains-taking, laborious and persistent research of the active
mind. Science is no accident. It is the product of the will
to know. It is volition which directs the processes of reason
according to a rational ideal of truth coupled v/ith diligent
application through long centuries which lias resulted in the
body of knowledge captioned science. It is all too obvious
that spontaneous thought is without depth-effect, superficial
and inclined to be dogmatic, vague and self-contradictory.^
Science demands that 1-mowledge be profound and exact and when re-
flective thinking of this sort is indulged we have passed
beyond the mechanical :.;overaent of association to the work of
1. Eussell, Bertrand, Fnilosoo-y
. p. 1,
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freedom. Science, as all the higher forms of Imowledge,
therefore, is a product of free achievement rather than of
mechanism. The scientific ideal is implicit in a free mind
devoted to tmith. This is the only explanation of the higher
forms of loiov/ledge.
The contention that freedom is the condition of any
rational science v7hatsoever has not "been universally conceded
and the converse argument that freedom annuls any and all
rational science has its advocates. Tlie truth of this claim is
"based upon certain postulates of science thought to he fundamen-
tally antithetical to freedom. The first of these is the notion
of the uniformity of law. Under sucii a scheme freedom can only
he an illusion for a universal reign of law includes human action
as certainly as it does the action of the physical universe.-^
Tliis scientific postulate has gained wide currency on the "basis
of its pragmatic verifiahility in the physical sciences and
v;ithin the field of psychology as well during the course of the
last half century. Tlius it is argued that certainly freedom as
a fact is unthinka'ble and is fast "becoming unthinkahle even as
an idea. The mechanical model of the world which reqiiires a
physical scheme of things, it is said, is a "perfectly clear
and self-evident notion," "v/hile freedom is the difficult notion.
1. Bowne, B. P., Metaph.7sic3 . rev. ed., pp. 413-414.
2. Bowne, B. P., Personal ism , p. 202.
3. Bowne, B. P., "Tl-ie Speculative Significance of
Freedom, " Metliodist Review
.
77 (1895), td. 592.
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The -uniformity of lav/ by such thinkers is no longer looked
upon as an idea "but as a fact objectively and empirically
verified so that the whole mechanical scheme is thoiight to have
"been shifted from the abstract, speculative and transcendental
realm to that of concrete science wiiile freedom is regarded as
abstract speculation which in the nature of the case lies beyond
all concrete empirical cor..prehension.
In addition to the uniformity of lar, science regards
the mechanical conception of causality to be the only clear
and fruitful construction to place upon the notion of this
category. Every event or occurrence is looked upon as the
invariable consequence of an invariable antecedent which is
its necessary cause so tliat the conception of a causal nexus
running throughout nature forever precludes the possibility
of freedom just as though the conception of freedom implied
the possibility of causeless events.^ At any rate, it is
unmistakably clear that necessary causation means to affina
the impossibility of uncaused events and further that the nature
of causality is that of physical determinism of such a character
that every act described as mental or physical is equally
determined by something other tlian itself due to necessity,
1. Bovme, B. P., Metaphysics
. rev. ed., pp. 414-415.
Johnson, \7. E., Lo^ic
.
Part 3, p. xxxiii. "I/.any disputants on
the subject of freedom of the will have put determinism and
freedom in antithesis, whereas the true antithesis is between
deteminism and indetermini sm."
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From this the conclusion is thou^t logically to follow
(despite the fact that necessitarianism denies the possioility
of logic) that every event is therefore physically determined
and that if it v/ere not, so that freedom is true, science
would "be impossible.
The doctrine of necessity is often defended on the
ground of its clearness and demonstrable character but closer
examination fails to reveal grounds for this conviction. In
the first place rational necessity or that which attaches to
relations between ideas of a logical or matheinatical character
constitute the only clear conception of necessity which we
possess. But rational necessity is not objectively experienced
within or without and the whole order of the elements of ex-
perience are, as far as connections go, contingent. There is
no way of our passing from the logical notion of causality to
cosmic reality by deduction of the latter from the former. If
necessity exists it must then be metaphysical, a notion of
which a positive conception cannot be had for it evades both
rational and sensuous apprehension. The fact of observation
merely reveals the fact that a certain kind of event appears
with certain conditions. Tie are in the habit of relating such
events with these conditions under the category of necessity
but this is not directly observed, it is an added interpretation.
It is uniformity only which we observe and for aught we know
may be administered by freedom as easily as by necessity. Here
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a fact appears which is overlooked "by superficial thinking
which is namely that "The freedom and the necessity are no
part of the observation, "but theories offered for its
explanation."^ If we suppose that necessity is true and that
events are brought about by the compulsion of certain ante-
cedents, how shall we think of the power of these antecedents
to produce their events. First, remember the event is not
actual until it has occurred. But what and where is the
event before it becomes a fact? On David Hume's hypothesis,
all events succeed one another without any inner ground or
connection so that both necessity and reason perish. But if
we stay with the doctrine of necessity we are compelled to
affirm that somehow events are determined by their antecedents
and are in some sense contained in them. Scientists have often
appealed to potentiality as the explanation. What this
necessary metaphysical potentiality consists in constitutes
our problem. It must possess some actuality because it is held
to modify actuality, and yet, if it is regarded as an actual
actxiality, it antedates itself. We are then required to say
that potential actuality and actual actuality are facts but
we are in the dark respecting the proper distinction between
them. It was this difficulty v/hich J. S. Mill felt so strongly
that he proposed either to abolish the notion of a necessary
metaphysical causality or to substitute the notion with a
strictly positivistic and empirical notion of uniformity.
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review, 77 (1895), p. 593.
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Necessitarian causality to him lacked the proof of any corre-
sponding fact and was in addition an obsciare notion.
If we elevate causal explanation from this impersonal
to the volitional plane, are we able to explain causation more
coherently? Instead of a necessitarian metapliysical potentiality,
let us substitute a free metaphysical potentiality \7hich makes
the ontological ground not a syste:"r. of obscure physical forces
but the self-determination of the free spirit. Freedom is the
ground of progress and connection between events. Such freedom
determines the order of events accordir^ to what we describe
as a system of law and is responsible for what we mean by necessity
in things. It is only a scientific misapprehension of causality and
the post-uJLates based thereon that seem to preclude volitional
causality as the tr^'oly real ca-osal agency, furthermore, volitional
causality has the additional advantage of possessing an analogue
In experience and therefore constitutes the only kind of causal
agency concerning which v/e have any direct or immediate insight.
Mechanical causality on the other hand talks about ultimate physical
forces which are pure costulates of e;q)la.nation concerning which we
have not even the remotest hint in life and experience.
Bowne, follovving in the footsteps of Lotze^ and, like
him, recognizing that this problem of science which involves a
1. Lotze, Herma.nn, Microcosmus
. Vol. 1, pp. 259-261.
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universal law of causality which necessarily converts the universe
into an endless chain of "blind effects is far froa a happy
solution, proceeds to subject certain aspects of this common
conviction to renewed exaiuinati on. The thesis v,'hich Bowne urges
against the so-called postulates of science, uniformity of law
and mechanical causality, is that freedom and causality and
freedom and law are not ir-co:..pati'ble. Finite volition continually
plays into an order of law and there is no reason in the nature
of the case why cosmic freedom does not also have this capacity
which, on a fiiller -understanding of our problem, is just what
the facts demand,^ Freedom is no barrier, therefore, to the
uniiorniity of lav/, nor is law in the least a concept hostile to
freedom. The laws of nature are at best contingent and equivalent
to statistical approximations. Freedom and uniformity are not
antithetical but correlative terms which unite in rationality.*^
Instead of the erroneous assumption that freedom and lawlessness
are synonyms which is borne out neither by the facts of life and
experience nor by profoTjiid reflection but v^hich is merely the
product of verbal intimidation or abstract speculation, Bovme
urges that
"Freedom everywhere presupposes a "basis of fixity or uni-
formity to give it any meaning. An absolute freedom,
1. Mather, K. F., Science in Search of Ood
. pp. 125-126.
2. Bowne (misspelled Bcorne) , B. P., "Aspects of
Theism," Nev^ Eiy-ls.n'er'
.
31 (1372) , p. 456.
JT" McConneil, Bisnop I. J,, Borden Parker Bowne . His
Life and His Philosophy
, p. 142.

unconditioned ty any law wliatever, is siraply oiar old
friend pure "being, and cancels itself. Even for the
absolute lieing, we nrast affirm a fixed natiire as the
condition of ireedon; and without this, thought perishes."^
The difficulty which grows out of the notion that there is but
one kind of causality and that is necessity of the mechanical
sort lies in the notion of abstract freedom and abstract
necessity neither of which exist. The contradiction is irrcie-
dia-tely removed when the concrete facts appear. When the
facts of experience replace abstract notions we find both a
meas-'ore of self-control and an order of uniformity and these
facts constitute the only concrete notions of freedom and
necessity v;hich we ':iossess. Nowhere else does Bowne*s empiricism
and nominalism emerge with greater emphasis. Experience is
made the test of both reality and possibility and, since both
facts of freedom and necessity are given in experience, we must
start with it. Further, they appear in such connection that
experience becomes articulate only on the ground tliat both are
true which requires us to cut the theory to fit the facts rather
than to torture the facts into our abstract imaginings. There
is no call for the denial of freedom except where academic dis-
cussions usurp the field, for in our concrete intellectiaal life
we find freedom and uniformity united so that reality presents
both aspects not as compounded of these notions as pre-existing
1. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics
, rev. ed., pp. 410-411, 412.
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elecients "but merely as antithetical aspects -under wliich
reality expresses itself. It is therefore only liypothetical
and abstract rather than concrete science which siaffers the
objection that freedom cancels science.
Attention has already "been calle l to the contingent
character of the laws of nat-ure. Tliere is not a clearer chapter
in Bowne's philosophy than that in which he shows how the
debate between the schools of empiricism and apriorism is unable
to prove that e:rperience can be predicated and depended upon."^
J. S. Kill, \T. K. Clifford, Josiah Eoyce, Snile Boutroi^x,
K. Pearson and H. S. Jennings liave all called attention to the
contingency of the laws of nat-ure. Bowne regarded this point of
view as "really the s-um of wisdom in the case." Our science is
held for its practical service to h-uman life and is therefore
relative to our practical needs; tliat is, Bowne insisted that
our faith is practical rather than spec-ulative which demands
that life by tl:e right of eminent domain takes precedence over
abstract spec-ulation conceming'the nat-ure of -universal necessity.
The contingency of n^.t-ural laws is perfectly expressed in the
idea that "Laws of nat-ure I believe to be ideal constructions
1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thouj^ht and Knowledge ,
pp. 364-366. Personal ism , pp. 206-207.
2. Bov/ne, B. P., Personal ism , p. 207. Theism ,
pp. 211-212. Calkins, Mary W., The Persistent Problems of
Philosophy
. 5th rev. ed.
, pp. 434-436, 474.
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formulated by man for liis convenience and i.vitli little reality
if parted from intelligent ends."^ At this point Bo\vne conies
into siibstantial agreement v/ith 0. H. Palmer who esteemed Bowne
very highly.^ Professor Palmer says "I doubt if there is any
sequential causation without antesequential , and am sure there
is no antesequential without sequential •"'^ Here it is affirmed
that two kinds of causation are observahle at work in our world,
at least the facts appear to demand both mechanical and
volitional causation. In personality "we have a self-directing
activity which proceeds according to laws inherent in itself
and to ideals generated by itself." But, however much the cate-
gory of causality is a necessity of thought, Bovme was dis-
criminating enough to point rat that it does not determine what
events shall be caused or the method of causation. The law of
causation requires us only to .seek an agent for every act while
the nature of sucn an agent is left undetermined so far as the
law goes. Pree or volitional causation is as possible as is
mechanical or determined causation or any other variety in the
nature of things if the facts of e-perience demand it. So far
as experience goes, it is questionable rrhether we have contact
1. Palmer, G. H. , The Problem of Freedom , p. 203,
2. ^Vilm, E. C. , Studies in Philosouhy
^
and Theology
,
pp. 14-15. A published letter from Professor Palmer to the
author.
3. Palnrr, G. H. , The Problem of Freedom , p. 203.
4. Bowna, B. P., Metapkysics
.
rev. ed., p. 408.
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vrith any other cause so intiiriately and directly as that of
a free intelligent agent, the self. Therefore, "such self-
directing activity does not violate the law of causation."^
Instead of freedom and uniformity standing antithetically in
our experience, we now see that it is not only possible for
them to unite in rationality hut that it is absolutely neces-
sary that they so unite in reason in order to provide the
ground for scientific laiowledge.
Whatever else freedom may mean, Bowne intendei that
it can never he equivalent to lawlessness^ and, when uniformity
is not united with freedom, the result is no less chaotic in
the absolute being than it is in the finite subject although
such a union of free'''o:;; and necessity by no means precludes
the fact that uniformity becomes regnant through freedom and
in no other waj',** Nor does the objection that the weightiest
motives determine volitior^l action in the light of which freedom
is an illusion carry conviction. For freedom, as has been seen,
never involves the least intention of asserting uncaused events
but only that volitional cau.sality is a free activity. The point
at issue respecting freedom is not a denial that m.otives influence
conduct but v;hether or not the' will is free to choose from among
1. Bov/ne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of Freedom,"
i;ethodist Heview
.
77 (1895), p. 694.
2. IToble, Edmund, Purposive Evolution
, pp. 486-493.
Mr. IToble brings a strong argument in defense of the position taken
by Bowne.
3. Bovme, B. P., Metaphysics . rev. ed., p. 412.
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motives. Finally, the deterniinist may point out that freedom
means, what a self can do, that it must do. Such a notion of
freedom wo-uld exactly cancel the meaning of freedom, Freedom
does not imply that all the possibilities of choice raust "be
exhausted in the Interest of self-realization. As Professor
Hocking points out, "A self is a hope."^ As such, the self is
selective and preferential which means that, to he a person,
discrimination is exercised "between alternatives in the interest
of realizing certain ends. Tliis means that volition requires the
exclusion of certain possihllities in the light of the ideal as
a conscious act ry.ile it implies the conscious choice of others.
The notion, then, that what a self can do, that it must do is
not a real problem of freedom and cannot he urged against it.
The notion of self-control and self-direction and the power to
choose is juct what we mean "by freedom and that a self must do
what it can do constitutes a determinism which cancels this
power.^
It is now clear, and in what sense if any, whetlier
freedom invalidates science. The arguments are mainly irrelevant
when the problems involved are understood. Confusion in thought
1. Hocking, V.'. 3.
,
The, Self Its Body and Freedom
.
Preface ix, p. 147.
2. Bo\7ne, B. P., Theory of Thou-rlit and irftowlftrlgfi
^
p. 103.
"Possibility is another of the doubtful categories. Its only clear
meaning is based upon the self-determination of a free agent; apart
from this it is metaphysically nothing." Introduction to
Psychological Theory
, p. 231.
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was usually found to consist in confounding abstract with
concrete points of view respecting freedom. \Tnen the field of
science and that of philosophy are properly defined and their
protlen-.s st&ted, the antithesis which is thought to exist tetreen
freedom and necessity disappears.
"Concrete science, as we have so often said, concerns
itself solely with the modes of "being and happening
among things and events, or with the uniformities of
coexistence and sequence to "be found in experience.
This work is entirely independent of the question of
freedom,"-^
The work of science, in order to "be profound,- rather presupposes
freedom so that none of the special sciences are hindered "by
it "becraise, as lias "been po'nte' out previously, it is freedom
which req-uires law and uniformity as the very condition of its
existence. The fact that law is an instrument of rational utility
"by no means makes any special science impossi"ble, unless it "be
asswied that the method of science which is "based on causal
uniformity is erected into a scheme of universal necessity. Such
a notion of science is an abstraction and not a concrete
experience. There is no :;.ore ground on which to predict the
future on the "basis of necessity than on any other point of view
except to sav thr t wliat happens is necessar:^ and is all that
will ever happen. The only science to which freedom is opposed,
1. Bowne, B. P., Personalisn
. p. 208. "The Ifet-ural and
Supernatxiral , " !,!ethodist Review
.
77 (1895), p. 20.
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then, is that v,'liich abstractly assirues -universal, mechanical
causation v/hich, from the point of view of experience , "so far
from "being science, is only inconsistent and illiterate dog-
matism, a pseudo-science and an enemy of h-uraanity."^ From Bo\Tne's
point of view the reason for the uniformity and order of things
is to "be grovaided in the will and plan of God ultimately rather
than in any metaphysical necessity of an abstract and impersonal
sort. It would thus appear that the kind of lav/ which satisfies
the scientist is no harrier to freedom and certainly freedom
implies uniformity as the condition of its executive activity.
i!7ith the ideality of space and time, mechanical causeJity of
the metapxiysical type which is required neither "by experience
nor logic vanishes. Such a notion is no fact of experience
for "Experience certifies only volitional causality as real and
our thought of causality must he either that or nothing." Science,
then, studie?^ the uniformities to he found in the physics!, n-.ental
and social worlds, -cnowledge of v.-hich laws is of the greatest
practical value. "But these uniformities do not touch the
question of freedor. and p-urpose at all. The laws of physics are
fixed; and this very fact fits theu: to he our servant. The laws
of ramd are equally fixed; hut freedom works througli them."
1. Bowne, B. ?., Personal Ism , p. 20S.
2. ihid . . p. 215.
3. Bowne, B. P., "The Natural and Supernatural,"
Llet.^odist Review
.
77 (1895), p. 20.
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Bowne f-urther points out that
"The fancy that physical science is overthrovm if we
allow the continuity of physical movement to "be affected
hy anything "beyond the physical series, is a piece of
intelligitle , hut not intelligent, scientific prudery.
Along with this must he placed the fancy that mental
science is overthrow if we allow arjy freedom of will.
The continuity which a sane science demands is simply
a community of law for all events, old and new alike.
This discussion of freedom and science \70uld he incomplete if we
did not cite.Bowne's most classic summary of this point of view
which he state? as follows:
"ITow, the ohjection to freedom in the interest of
science is mainly a closet difficulty. It may he foi^idahle
in closet spec-'olation and academic theorizing, hut it has
no real weight. It is, indeed, irrelevant to the true con-
ception of hoth freedom and science. It tacitly assumes
that freedom means pure lawlessness, whereas freedom itself
presupposes the order of law as its condition. Freedom uses
this order, and science studies this order. Science concerns
itself with the modes of heing and happening among things and
events, and their existence and natui*e are in no way affected
hy the question of freedom. The forms anrl laws of sensihility,
the laws and categories of intelligence are not involved in
freedom; and, whether we affirm or deny freedom, these laws
and forms exist as the proper subject of psychological study.
The belief in freedom vacates the science of psychology just
asnuciii and just as little as it vacates the science of physics
or chemistry. In both mental and physical realms the believer
, in freedom finds an agent acting in accordance with an order
of law and, by miCans of that order, freely realizing his own
aims. Freedom, then, is not opposed to physics or chemistry
or psychology or any other modest science v;hich studies the
laws of tilings and events, but only to • science'—that is,
tliat speculative dream which s.ims to bind up all things in a
scheme of necessity; and thus, so far from being science, is
simply one of those uncritical dreams of which the dognatic
intellect has ever been so prolific.
1. Bowne,
Methodist Review
. 77
2. Bowne,
Met.i odist Review
.
77
B. P., "Tlie ITatural and
(1895), p. 23.
B. P., "The Speculative
(1895), pp. 695-596.
Supernatural .
"
Significance of Freedom,
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We next investigate freedom and life, or the ethical
or practical interest. Bovme considered that, while freedom
received its purest illustration in the realir. of pure thought,
its ethical ir-"pli cations certainly constittite "the most important
field of freedom."^ In the notion of morality, he pointed out
that
"the notion of freedom is implicit. As the study of the
V7orld of physical changes leads to the assvimption of the
law of causation, so the study of the world of moral
action leads to the assuaption of freedom, as the law and
condition of the same. An order of mechanical heneficence
or maleficence is indeed possible without freedom, hut it
would have no more moral quality than the sunshine and
storm. "2
Ethics offers no proof of the fact of freedom which must he
sought in psychology and metarjhysics. It is merely a postulate
of the moral consciousness rather than a pro.Tuct of speculative
reason. But where it is denied, notions of responsihility
,
luty,
merit and demerit are cancelled. All fatalistic schemes of
ethics are a direct product of its denial."^ Despite the im-
possihility of any apriori demonstration of freedom and in the
absence of every form of apodeictic certainty, the moral con-
sciousness of the hmian race clings tenaciously to freedom as a
moral conviction apart from wliich life must collapse in one of
1. Bov/T.e, B. P., "The S-neculative Si^inificance of Freedom,"
Methodist Review . 77 (1595}
, p. 687.
2. Bowne, B. P., Princi jles of Ethics
, pp. 154-165.
3. Bovme, B. P., Intrcduction to Psycholoj:ical Theory
,
p. 228. Cf. IToble, Edmund, Puroosive Evolution , pp. 112-115.
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its nost significant hurnan enterprizes. By the recognition
of freedom as a postulate, morality wouLd not ignore the
assistance which speculative reflection may render in educing
the idea into a clear consciousness and in rendering it consistent
while at the same time indicating the inconsistent character of
moral necessitarianism. On this point, Bowne registered his
conviction "that the metaphysics of necessity, while r.ore plausihle,
is vastly ...ore difficult than the metaphysics of freedom."^ But
the appeal here made is .not primarily to the theoretical reason
hut to life Itself, or the practical reason. In this respect,
Bowne was greatly influenced by Kant's doctrine of the primacy of
the practical reason and he too permitted in this doctrine a
content which he felt inaccessihle to the scientific reason. He
further recognized the pragmatic character of this point of view.
"The intellect, considered "by itself as a purely
speculative faculty, is not contradictory, hut it is
limited, and it is not ahle to reach a great many of
those truths in which nevertheless we steadfastly
helieve. But while it cannot positively reach them, it
can overturn the arguments against them, and thus, as
Kant said, it may at once destroy "aiowledge and mal-ce
room for rational "belief. Now, assuming the legitimacy
of life and of cur human instincts, we may ask rurselves
what life implicitly implies; and Kant says it implies
G-od, freedom, and ims-iortality, as postulates without
which the mind would fall into discord v.'ith itself and
life wo-uld lose itself in inner contradiction. ITe may,
then, hold these postulates, hot as som.ething :^iven hy
the speculative reason hut as something rooted in life;
and then we may work them out into the great and ever-
growing conquest of science and into the progress of
humanity in civilization and morals and religion. "2
1. BoT/ne, B. P., Principles of Ethics
, p. 165,
2. Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer
, pp. 212-21S,
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But while freedom cannot "be proveci "by the speciilative
reason, the postulate is something rooted in life itself as the
precondition of any and all morality whatsoever. The nat-uTe of
the practical basis of "belief requires us to rega.rd our human
"beliefs as facts,
"The great catholic "beliefs of the race are no products
of human invention, or adventitious accretions, from
without. They, like r^ian himself, are a part and product
of the system. Reflective speculation has something to do
in bringing them out into cler.r consciousness, and in
securing; their mut\aal consistency, hut their roots lie
deep in life itself, Tlie power not ourselves is evolving
a ir.oral and religious race."-^
The reason for accepting our "beliefs as facts is that the great
catholic interests and tendencies of the race are held to reveal
the fundamental structure and needs of the mind and therefore,
as any great cosmic product, they carry logical weight. In a
very real sense they transcend us "because they are ms-de for us
and their denial plunges the rhole system of loiovrledge into ruin.
In any evolutionary theory of .mowledge, these "beliefs, organized
interests and emotions are of primary significance. Theistically
2
viewed, they argue teleologically. Such "beliefs are largely
independent of logical processes and are far more the product of
life and history resulting from the interaction of man and nature.
These "beliefs are lines of least resistance followed by life and
1. Bowne, 3. P., "Tne Foundations of Belief," Zion'
s
Herald
.
73 (1895), p. 274.
2. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and K>iowled-:e
. p. 378.
Theism, p. 25.

-166-
constitute the natiore of tilings just as surely as do the physical
laws of nature. Such "beliefs of which G-od, freedom and inmiortality
are primary constitute the truths men live "by and apart from
which their "best life cannot "be acliieved. It was Bowne's con-
viction that "There is no surer test of reality than this,"^ a point
of view deserving of the most discriminating analysis to v/hich we
shall return a little later, ^is doctrine stresses the notion
that our "beliefs are made both for us and "by us through life and
action rather than through speculation. They are natural cosmic
products of a supra- individual character^ implying the lines along
V7hich the. mental universe is moving. Such "beliefs rise above
individual peculiarities or accident and become organic to the
nature of things. Yet in all this Bo\7ne v/as not conscious of
having contradicted any logical test or evaluation of experience.
He still maintained that human freedom is the explanation in
principle of the aterrations of thought but to recognize this in
no way discredited the "great catholic beliefs and tendencies of
humanity without involving the whole system of knowledge in
disaster. Tlieir universality and necessity in human life are
the best of gro-ands for belief." It appears that Bowne was
attempting to bring to a belief like that in freedom, through
1. Bovme, B. P., Theism
, pp. 27, 34-33, Theory of
Tliought and KnOwled.p:e
. pp. 380-335,
2. Bovme, B. P., Theory of Thou::ht and KviOwled;2:e
. p. 378.
3. ibid ., p. 377.
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its history and origin, a reinforcement of a "universal and
transcendent character. T.iis is a supplement to the logic
of the individ-ual.
To deny freedora as a -universal belief of the race,
apart from v;hich life falls into discord with itself and fails
as a consequence to realize its highest and "best life "because
of inner contradiction, is therefore unthinlcahle. The method
of rigor and vigor is irrelevant in testing our faith in
freedom since the true function of logic is regulative, not
constitutive, and life itself is deeper than logic.^ What, then,
life demands imist, in the alisence of absolute proof to the
contrary, te allowed^ and in this instance life requires the
"belief in freedom in support of which it "brings, on the subjective
3
"basis of "belief , a soiaewliat positive consciousness. In addition
we find it also implied in the principles "by which men and
societies live.^ And, finally, the experience of freedom in
human consciousness could not "be any clearer if proven true
5than it actually is. In the face of all this mechanism appears
as the sophisticated product of an ideal of reflection which
gfalls of sheer a'bsurdity when invoiced to explain personal life.
1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Tho-u^~ht a.nl Knowledge , p. 38
2. Bowne, B. P., Theism^
, p, 31.
3. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psychol Optical Theory ,
p. 232. Bergson, Henri, Les Donnee_s Ir;j:i^diates de la Conscience t
p. 140. Eucken, Rudolf, Grundlinien einer neuen Le'bensanschau^jjig
.
p. 147.
4. BoMme , B. P. , Introduction to Psychological Tlieory
.
p. 232.
5. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Ireedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1395), p. 682.
6 . i"bid .
, p . 582
.
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For necessity destroys not only faith in the cognitive reason
as such hut also in the moral or practical reason as well.
While we cannot therefore ahsolutely prove freedom, it is un-
disputahly clear that it is a necessary postulate of reason
as has already "been shown and that it is no less a necessary
postulate of conscience as we are here attempting to show and on
such grounds it must he held,^ The speculative ohjections
urged against freedom are products of a theoretical, academic
and abstract character v/hich carry no weiglit against real
freedom which is a demand of life itself. Thus freedom hecoraes
2
an autonomous validity which stands in its own right.
3ovme»s attempt to eaploy life as a category for the
validation of the demands of the moral life carries significant
conclusions with it; hence an inquiry into the validity of the
argument tha.t freedom is true "because it is a postulate of
practical necessity, Negatively considered, life as the criterion
for truth is an unclear notion and this along with other objec-
tions which may be -orged makes it extremely difficult to apply
the doctrine. Tlie exact relation between history, evolution,
psychology and logic in discussing the origin, development and
validation of our ideas is at least in Bowne's thought not the
object of his central philosophical interest and the introduc-
1. Bowne, B. P., Introduction to Psycholor'iicp-l Theory ,
pp. 213, 232.
2, Knudson, A. C, "Religious Apriorism," Studies in
Pailoso-phv and Tlieolo>?y
.
edited by E. C. ^"ilm, pp. 93-127.
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tion of it into his system does not on all points appear
self-evident. First Bowne was accustomed at least toward the
last lialf of his philosophical career to spealc of "life" as
if it were a well-defined category. The demands of life are
said to 06 autonomo-as hut Just v/liat it is that is meant "by
this statement is not always clear. Sometimes life is stressed
as opposed to logic and at other ti;nes life is hrought under
the principle of contradiction in such a way that nothing is
foreign to logic. Bowne prohahly meant hy the notion of life
as its ovni justification to stress the practical or moral
interests of its career. Thus hman freedom is said to he a
catholic conviction of the hman mindi while mechanism is a
sheer ahsurdity. But a mechanist might reply that many ahsurd-
ities in history have turned out to he nearer the truth than
their orthodox rivals. Heliocentric astronomy, hacteria and
evolution were once considered ah surdities. Mechanism, on the
other hand, is not absolutely ah surd and, in a large realm, is
even a reasonable type of explanation. As such it has heen
extremely productive perliaps equally as productive as the notion
of freedom. Tlien, too, freedom as a catholic belief of the race
admits of no proof. The fact, if it be adr;iitted, would lie
beyond the power of scientific investigation for no in;luctive
evidence of a complete character can be educed.. The notion is a
deduction based on a liraited observation of the race even v;hen its
utmost scientific boundaries are included. Consciousness is in
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a sense individual and private and that freedom is a universal
"belief or a necessary "belief admits of no proof. If, "by the
notion, Bovme nieans freedom as an ideal o-oght to iDe universal,
that is quite a different question.
A^ain freedom, as a catholic "belief of the race, is a
fallacy of a"bstraction of tlie type against which Bo\Yne else-.vhere
argued \7hen discussing the pro"blen of freedom. His notion that
?uch "b.eliefs as free 'or. arc to "':^e regarded as possessing a s"ijpra-
individual character and that they are an indication of the purposes
of a universe of mind T/ould seera to viev? freedom as an abstract
rather than concrete" experience. There is no such thing as
freedom existing apart from our experience of it and a race
experience from the point oT view of Bovme's oTrn nominalistic
position is no less a fiction than that of Herbert Spencer.
Freedom can only "be the experience of e concrete personal experience
and how a supra-empirical universe of mind makes the "belief for
us is hard to see except as ve make the "belief x^or ourselves
thro\:igh particioation in individual experience, TThat a universe
of mind may call for in particular is an inference on our part
and no direct product of observation. Bo\7ne himself, on specu-
lative grounds, strongly v::.rns against this acadeir.ic procediire of
assuming *hat abstract freedom might be.
Then, too, freedom, as a catholic belief of the race,
seems to imply consensus ;::entiun-i as a criterion for truth. Suppose
the expression of the life of the race should turn out to favor

171-
freedom. The "belief might still he false, Majorities are
too often confused v/ith judging principles to he true or false
in a democratic age, hut logic fails to show any real connection
hetween them. Actually, ideas and heliefs which laave persisted
throughout the length and hreadth of civilization so far as our
knowledge of then goes have teen shown to be false and even
after their falsity has been capable of demonstration they have
persisted indefinitely. This alojical element in hman nature Bowne
recognized in his criticism of Ger-ian materialise^ as a state of
cult-ure in the nineteenth cent-ary where he points out that, althougli
educated G-ermans adriiitted that it was based on principles of bad
logic, they nevertheless -read and believed the more. Bowne concliides
that "Tliere are conditions of the r^oral atmosphere in v/hich clouds
of unbelief form incessantly and necessarily, and argument is
entirely powerless against them."^ Ti\e fact that a belief may be
catholic or universal is no guarantee of its validity.
Again, it is said that freedom could be no clearer in
consciousness if it were a demonstrated fact, which is probably
true; but the clearness of the notion in consciousness or its
vividness as opposed to va^rae and obscure notions fails to convince
us that we have struck a criterion for validity. True ideas are
1. 3ov.ne, 3. ?., "PhilosoiDhy in G-ennany," Tlie Indet^endent.
26 (1374; Jan. 22. 1874). p. 5.
2. Bowne, B. P., 'Tne Divine Foreknowledce," Zisn'
s
Herald
. 56 (1879), p. 73. "For, in the first place, a true act of
free will is a rare occurrence in our daily life; and, in the second
place, we have no proper certainty in the case."
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not necessarily clear in consciousness and more often must te
educed into told relief "by great effort in thought. On the
other hand, some of the clearest impressions in consciousness
may te psychologically explained as illusions or hallucinations.
In this connection, Bovrne called attention to the
validity of the subjective "basis of "belief.^ He regarded feeling
as a cosmic fact and, therefore, insisted that :^ur feelings,
emotions an<l or£j£.r.ized interests an' beliefs are not to "be
talren lightly. As true as this is, when we leave the plane of
individual whim and fancy and fece the more permanent of the
feelings of the race, thir is far from any proof that oxir feeling
mediates the reality of freedom. If dignified feeling constrains
us to postulate feel^'ng, it '"re "^ar.e time warrr. v thrt ferling
is an extra-logical ground \7i:ereon we stand. The e;..otions,
especially when considered racially as in this connection, con-
stitute s. chapter of experience so varied and chaotic that one
hesitates to predict which "beliefs find justification in it and
which do not, for most "beliefs have evoked almost every emotion
at different tire- '^r even at the seme time. Without rational
control feelings uay be worthy of consideration "but are not
likely to prove oroductive in the g^jidance of life.
In justification of life as deeper than logic, it is
argued that logic is regulative, not creative, "but this very
1. Bowne, B. P., Studie s in Tlieism
. p. 53. Tlieisr.: . p. 26.
(»
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conclusion is meaningless apart from reason to which it is
clear and if life at any time asserts itself on.tside the law
of contradiction, we can malce nothing of it. Briefly, reason
cannot be denied without at the same time being affirmed and
certainly it cannot be denied without denying life insofar as
it is a part of life. The only reasonable meaning which life
as larger than logic can convey is that through the use of the
reason as laoral , v/e have revealed an insight into reality v/hich
the use of the reason as theoretical cognition denies us. Life
is not larger than lo.jic but it certainly is larger than logic-
chopping. Bowne liiu.self accepted, at least in his Studies in
Theism ,^ the Hegelian formula that the rational and the reol are
one as a necessary ^^ostijlate of scientific lcr.O'.-led::e . But while
rational beliefs require rational grounds and while "logic must
try the beliefs as well as the spirits", Bowne nevertheless
transcended fiis -notion of validity and frankly r.f fir-re':'^ the
supreme test of reality to consist in the effects of c-ai' belief
on life. Ihis is essentially pragmatic and at least raises the
question as to whether he did not surrender a superior for an
inferior criterion for tr^ath.
VHien our attention is callel to the debate between
necessity and freedom as a drawn battle so far as speculation
1. p.lis.
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is concerned and therefore life is called upon to decide in
favor of its organized interests, feelings, and enotions in
favor of freedom, have we not on this point siirrendered to still
another criterion for the truth of freedom, namely that of
intuition? But this is not Bov/ne's intention for he calls atten-
tion to the fact that freedom is not an intuition hut a deduced
necessity.^ If nothing is foreign to the law of contradiction,
life's intuitions must also he subjected to it and reduced to
coherence. Even though reason could not he surrendered and
even though it v/as s own to he inadequate, as a standard for
truth, this would not he the slightest cause for reasoning less
efficiently than is absolutely necessary in the attempt to make
experience coherent. And this would mean that moral judgments
he logically treated just as all other classes of judgments must
he logically criticized. At any rate the fact that the dehate
hetween necessity and freedom can end in no more than a drawn
hattle is an argument which Impresses us hy its looseness of
thinking. Certainly where it has been affirme:^ that rational
principles constitute our laiov/ledge of reality hoth of these
arguments cannot he of equal value. Freedom must he truer
than necessity or vice versa or they must hoth he true or they
are hoth false; in any case, whatever the truth is, it must he
1. Bowne, B. P., LCetaiohysics ; a Stvdy in First
Princi")les
. p. 171.
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a truth of rea::;on. \7e are r.ot helped far in the direction of
a solution of the prohlem of freedom to iaiow that reason is
entirely impotent in the natter especially v.'hen the main thesis
of Bovme's speculative significance for freedom consists in
shoT/ing that reason, when united with freedom, is the condition
of knowledge. The ooject of this point is not an invalidation .
of Bowne's main contention so much as it is an effort on our
part to point out that there is no otjection to uniting the
theoretical or scientific and the practical or moral reason as
functions of the ^t^me reason, a conclusion to v.hlch Eant himself
was forced to come in the interert of the integrity of our mental
life.^ A viev; which makes it -003 311:16 to reach a more satisfactory
solution of the jrotlem of free 'oi.: v.ould he to ^licv; that the
logical absurdity of mechanism is to "be sure no proof of freedom
and no disproof of ir.echanism "but that vrhen all the facts of
experience are evaluated, freedom is a far more coherent viev/
than mechanism or that "both are facts within limits. Such a
conclusion would "be the eqn.ivalent of logical denionstr^tion as
far as such demonstration is pocsihle and for those to v/hom
reasonableness appeals as the ground for "believing anything, it
affords a colvtion to the -irr^'blem. To show that freedom is the
analytically necessary presupposition for the explanation of certain
1. Kant, Immanuel, Theory of Ethics
, tr. hy T. X. Abbott,
p. 261,
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important facts amounts to a degree of logical demonstration
which cannot be lightly set aside except where problems are
surrendered to prejudice and passion for their solution.
Bovvne apparently did not feel the force of the necessity
of a criterion for truth, and, if one were necessary, he directs
unfavorable criticism against the possibility of ever attaining
it. The problem of truth was nevertheless a central problem in
his epistemology , but his thinking, due to this attitude, was
necessarily of an eclectic character vrhen viewed synoptically.
One characteristic attitude wnich Bowne took toward the question
of what it is to know was that
"We learn that we can walk by walking, and in the same way
we learn that we can know by knowing. Academic discussions
of the standard of certainty or of the criterion of truth
are barren of any val^oable result. There is no general
standard which the mind can mechanically apply. The
standard is the mind itself, dealing with particular and
concrete cases; and any given item of .aiowled:';e must stand
or fall, not because it agrees or disagrees with some
assumed standard, but because of the evidence with which
it presents itself to the living mind in contact with the
facts.
Just as explicit is his assertion that "A universal standard
of certitude is a chimera; but certitude is possible for persons."
Bowne accepted the rationalistic conception oi tinith in arguing
that the mind's ideal is to bring all experience under the laws
of thought. The cognitive ideal demands that all reality is
1. Bo\7ne, B. P., Theory of Thou<g:ht and Knowledge
, p. 293.
2. Bowne, B. P., Sttuiies in Theism
, p. 58.
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rational, an assmption which actoits of no proof but rests upon
faith of the mind in itself as an ideal toward which it approximates
indefinitely. The native over self-confidence of the hianan mind
is best corrected by the world, another way of affirming that life
is a balance to reason.^ In his article on "'ffhat Is Truth?"^
Bowne stated no definitive position except to indicate that it
scientifically equals matters of fact while it may slIso embody the
projection of our nature upon the world of reality. But elsewhere,
Bowne restricts the meaning and says "By truth, we mean rational
principles Rational truth is seen to be valid
everywhere and always; and as the result of this insight, it is
said to be necessary and universal." But while Bowne insists
that a test for truth is concretely necessary in each case of
knowing, he does not agree that the test is always the same. For,
while he £Lffirms that by truth we mean rational principles neces-
sary and -universal which apply to a reality assumed to be rational
in structure, he does not hesitate to affirm that there is no
surer test of reality"^ than life itself whose beliefs are
validated in the light of their practical necessity in assisting
man to live his best life. Here the criterion of coherence is
frankly exchanged for pragmatism as a superior test for truth#^
1. Bowne, B. P., "What Is Rational ism?" The Independent
.
40 (1888). pp. 99-100.
2. The Independent . 36 (1884), p. 1185.
3. Bowne, B. P., Studies in Theism , p. 14.
4. Bowne, B. P., Theism , p. 27.
5. Bowne, B. P., Kant and Spencer , pp. 212-213.
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In addition to these two higher criteria of a philosophical
order, he also -unites the philosophical criteria of intuition
and empiricism* The result is that Bowne uses these criteria
in more or less varied form throu^out his work leaving the
problem of finding a criterion for truth unsettled and the
entire problem in unstable eqxiilibrium. In this respect, he
is not in his conclusion, at least in spirit, dissimilar to
the conclusion reached by Professor William P. Montague,^ who
takes an eclectic attitude toward the problem of a criterion
for truth wherein he provides for all the ways of knowing.
Positively considered. Bote's discussion of freedom
and life is instructive in that the precedence of concrete life
over formal logic is stressed. Then, too, the fact that freedom
has evolved as one of the nigher forms of mental evolution, as
an act of faith, is certainly significant. And, finally, the
utility of freedom or its necessary assumption by life as the
principle by which men and societies live is apparent. The
recognition and assumption of duty and responsibility is the
very condition of social intercourse and, ^rtiatever may be said
of the criterion by wnich freedom is derived as the precondition
of ethics, these facts remain unchanged.
To this point, the significance of freedom in relation
to the finite subject has occupied our attention. In the two
1, The Ways of Kr.owing , pp. 39-234,
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remalning fields in which Bowne examined the speculative sig-
nificance of freedom, metaphysics and religion, we encounter
the macrocosmic aspect of his doctrine. The contention is that
freedom is the condition of all philosophy^ and therefore the
speculative demand of reason is no less significant here than
its necessity was seen to be as the fo\mdation of the ideals of
science and ethics* The formulation of the thesis for this part
of the argument is that "without assuming a free cause as the
source of the outer world the mind is unable to satisfy its own
rational nature or to bring any line of thought to an end.''^ It
Is of the utmost importance that wa indicate that Bowne regarded
this passage as the conclusion of his entire metaphysical research
which fvirnishes us incontestable evidence of the fact that the
postulate of freedom was a salient, pivotal and fundamental doctrine
for his system of thought as it was for Kant who regarded free
causality as the identical problem of metaphysics.*^ There are
four problems in this field for which freedom is demanded as the
only intelligent solution and which, if they remain unsolved,
constitute the utter collapse of reason and hopelessly and utterly
defeat the mind's ideal to know reality. The first of these is
the mind's desire for explanation and the insight that freedom is
1. Cf. Wilson, G. A., The Self and Its World , p. 346.
2. Bowne, B. P., I/etaphysics
.
rev. ed.
, p. 408. "The
Speculative Significance of Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895),
p. 689.
3. Kant, Immanuel
,
Prolegomena zu einer .ieden idlmftigen
Meta-physik
.
die als Wissenschait wird aui treten konnen . S. 113.
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the condition of any real explanation. Secondly, free intelli-
gence is the only possible solution of the problem involved in
the categories of change and identity. Thirdly, freedom is the
condition of the fulfillment of the speculative demand for unity.
Fourthly, freedom is the condition of "the unification of the
system of things in a common source*^ into a plan of purposeful
activitiy.
We examine the demand for explanation first. By ex-
planation is meant the mental effort to unite the things and
events of experience according to the demands of the mind's own
nature in the aope of accounting for them. The motive grows
out of the rational demand for systematic connection and totality
for the system of experience. At no point are the implications
of freedom more apparent than in the meaning of explanation. Of
the three main types of explanation, the explanation of classifi-
cation, scientific explanation and metaphysical explanation of
which there are two main types, that of the explanation of mechanism
and that of explanation by free Intelligence, it is the last only
which furnishes the ground for any ultimate and satisfactory ex-
planation. Explanation by classification is the assembling of
similar facts together with other known facts whereby a sort of
systematic connection is obtained as a resi;It of the isolated
objects of experience having been brought together. This lowest
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 689.
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type of explanation does not carry -us far for "The nature
of a given fact is in no way revealed by the discovery that
there are many other facts of the same kind,**^ In hrief , it
establishes no identity and abolishes no differences. Scientific
explanation is a higher type than mere classification of objects
and attempts to connect the phenomenal or physical -universe
by cause and effect according to empirical laws. Inasmuch as
phenomena and their laws are what they are apart from any view
of reality, this explanation is largely independent of metaphysics.
Therefore no insight into ultimate causes can be gained for it
is proximate and not remote causes that are sought. Moreover the
discovery of the phenomenal connection of things and events affords
no speculative insight, that is it reaches nothing final*
"The study, then, of the connections of phenomena,
while practically of the utmost importance, leads to no
speculative insight, and reaches nothing in which thought
may rest. Its explanations only carry the problem one
step backward and leave us as badly off as ever ,"2
This method of explanation is forced to presuppose the order of
phenomena and their laws and merely succeeds in showing how the
things and events in this system cohere. The real problem of
explanation begins where this leaves off, namely insight into the
order wnich in^lies things and events and their laws. The mere
tracing out of the relations in an order which is given cannot
1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge , p. 217,
2, ibid ., p, 225,
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be accepted as xiltimate explanation. For the system which
implies the coexistence and sequence between the facts and
their laws is fo-und itself to "be without any explanation. In
dealing with mechanisms, analysis and synthesis work very well
"but "In organic and rational wnoles the elements do not explain
the wholes hut are explained by them."*^ Thus scientific ex-
planation fails as anything final since it merely explains the
connection of events in the empirical order or series but leaves
insight into how the order or series itself is caused an opaque
fact which means that its explanation merely moves in a circle
when anything final is attempted. Such explanation remains on
the surface of things and is limited to the purposes of scientific
method.
Metaphysical explanation of a mechanical type is an
extension of scientific explanation in that the attempt is made
to infer from phenomena not only their coexistences and sequences
and their phenomenal antecedents, but in addition their ontologlcal
grounds. But a metaphysics of forces and laws must presuppose an
invisible, dynamic system in order to account for the effects
we perceive. Given only atoms and the void we must assume an
external mover or internal forces operating under laws of the
structure of matter but, as before pointed out, such a principle
will apply fairly well in the analysis and synthesis of nmerlcal
1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thouejit and Knowledge
.
p. 225.
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and inorganic wholes but are incompetent to deal with organic
and rational wholes. But the assmption of internal forces ta
to explain interaction is not a phenomenal "but a hidden dynamism
of a metaphysical order. A spatial interaction can he pictured
while volitional causality can be experienced. "But what that
is which is less than the latter and more than the former is an
exceedingly difficult problem."^ For spatial change is among
things while inherent forces constitute a hidden dynamism of a
metaphysical nature which is a change In things. Moreover we
are not only lodged in mystery but the logical difficulties in
explanation by such inferred causes are insuperable for the
reason that wherever these causes lie outside experience or
beyond the ajialogy of experience so that they can no longer be
used to extend knowledge, the circular and unprogressive character
attaching to all systems of mechanical or physical explanation
appears to infer causes from effects and then explain the effects
by the causes. 'Ihe sense in which mechanical explanation cannot
satisfy the demands of rationality appears in the fact that it
can bring no line of thought to an end.
Retracing our steps, immediate perception reveals phe-
nomena only. Their causes, together with the nature of those
causes, constitute the problem of thought and not of sensation.
Attempted mechanical explanation furnishes no insight into the
1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of i'h ought and Knowledge , p. 229.
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nattire of causes other than to ass-ume that like cause, like
effect, and like effect, like cause, deducing causes from
effects and vice versa without anything more simple being
reached. The present is read into the past which in turn im-
plies the present in such a way that as far "back as we go with
our explanation the problem with all its complexity still remains.
No simplicity is achieved when we read the present backward and
no progress is made by reading the identical equation forward
for
"In a necessary system the antecedents which are to
explain anything must already imply that thing to its
minutest details. If they do not imply it they cannot
produce it; and if they do not imply it our thought
moves in a circle. The net restdt is that things are
as they are, and no icore can be said about the matter.**
Two reasons keep thought from seeing the stultifying and suicidail
character of such explanation. Practical needs are usually
gratified by proximate caxises and hence ultimate reasons and
causes may become habitually ignored. Thus the practical interests
of life unconsciously obscure the speculative demands of reason
and real explanation is either ignored or confuBed with empirical
causality. Or, and this is true of the majority of popular under-
standing, we fail to see that all explanation of a necessitarian
type overlooks the simplification of words for that of things.
Thus the previous types of explanation either singly or collectively
commit the error of identifying the logical order of thought with
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review
.
77 (1895), p. 691.
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an order of reality which results in hypostasizing the system
into "Nature" or "the Universe" or "the Cosmos" as a self-
sufficient organism needing no further acco\int or explanation.
The same thing is done with respect to the use of such terms
as "matter" and "force". All attempts to explain the whole
merely by the action of its parts or the resultant of its parts
constitute no final explanation. The difficulties of erecting
metaphysical explanation of a mechanical type into our final
explanation of things are fo-ur-fold. The notion can only lapse
into a groundless "becoming. It involves an infinite regress.
Evolution and progress are rendered exceedingly superficial if
not denied outright "by the infinite regress in one direction and
the unprogressive character of explanation in the other direction
and the circular reasoning of the explanation as a whole. Finally,
the whole conception of mechanical explanation as the ontological
ground of things ignores the fact of the contingency of the laws
of nature to which we have already called attention. That these
laws represent the activities of fundamental being may be
allowed but that the order of law may itself be erected into an
ontology is not clear.
In order to escape the collapse of reason and to bring
any form of explanation to finality, we must have recourse to
the category of purpose or final cause.^ "As we need the con-
1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge .
p. 253.
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ception of freedom in man for the solution of the prohlem of
error, so we also need the conception of freedom at the fo-undation
of the cosmos to make it amenable to the demands of cur intelli-
gence."'^ And in particular we cite freedom as the only means of
escape from the contradiction which infests the notion of neces-
sity as a metaphysical or universal category. Free intelligence
is here as everywhere else the only real explanation of anything.
We may then conclude that much which passes for explanation in
uncritical circles of tho-ught is iniperfect and unsatisfactory in
character while explanation by the conception of free intelligence
is the only ultimate and satisfactory explanation to be had. The
advantages of such explanation are to be found in the fact that
any line of thought can be brought to an end, that we may escape
a groundless becoming and an infinite regress. Actual progress
can be made In thinking and the phenomenal world together with
its problems becomes intelligible on no other grounds.
In the same way free intelligence is the only possible
solution of the problem involved in the categories of change and
identity. The problem of change on the impersonal plane arises
in the following way. The abstract notion of change would imply
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 689. Theory of Thought
and KnowlecUce
. p. 233.
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slmply a departure from the present order of things in a law-
less and chaotic way in any direction whatsoever. Science and
philosophy reject this notion of change which makes it a lawless
and gro-undless sequence in which case all loiowledge including
the fields just mentioned would be annulled. Change according
to causal continuity is its only legitimate meaning. According
to Heraclitus everything is involved in the process of change
so that only phenomenal identities are possible. The inherent
defects of the Heraclitean position are met by popular thought
by just reversing the doctrine so that substance may be viewed
as a changeless thing with changing states but the problem of
change wo\ald vanish at this point for if the thing does not change
then the ground for its changing states vanishes. Being mtust
be brou^t into change and change into being if change does occur
and only a changing thing can possess changing states. Nor is
the matter improved by saying that the relations between the
units of structure like the atoms change while things remain the
same, ihere emerges at this point what appears to be an ultimate
antinoiny in tho\aght for the two categorical principles of the
mind, change and identity seem to be inherently in conflict. In
addition, the difflcralty of distinguishing a changing thing frcan
a series oi' different things becomes weil-nigh impossible since
what we call a changing thing is really a series of different
things which are inter-controvertlble. On the impersonal plane
the fact of change is an unmanageable datum for we have on the
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part of intelligence an eqiaally strong fundamental demand for
identity. By identity we mean the concrete law of action of a
thing, not changelessness of s-ubstance, so that a thing* s
identity is constituted in "the continuity and constancy of this
law,*^ If absolute sameness were urged on the impersonal plane,
one would encounter the ELeatic form of identity which reduces
all change to illusion just as it appeared that change, if granted,
reduces all identity to illusion. Identity may mean logical
identity or the law of fixity of the idea or it may mean phenomenal
identity or the continuity of equivalent appearance or, as we use
it here, metaphysical identity or the equivalent of reality behind
the appearances. The meaning of identity on the impersonal plane
is untenable as is also the Eleatic notion of changelessness. As
equivalent to continuity and constancy of law, on the other hand,
it comes into an apparent irreconcilable conflict with change.
On the impersonal plane change clashes just as certainly with
identity.
The only solution of the apparent inherent ultimate
antinomy between the two principles of reason, change and identity,
is possible on the personal plane. On the impersonal plane the
antinomy arises out of the inabilit;/ to conceive how things can
!• Bowne, B. P., Metat)hysics . rev. ed., p. 54*
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remain the same and yet change or how changing things may still
retain their identity. It Is well to remember in this connection
that in Identity no core of material being is demanded for identity
but only the inherent law of a thing's action. The removal of
this abstract antinomy on the personal plane is self-conscious
Intelligence. In experience we have a union of identity and
change. The self persists as a concrete changing thing which
preserves its identity throughout its change. Yet, self-identity
is no rigid and -unchanging substance. The self is rather a
changing reality whose identity and continuity are constituted
throu^ memory. It is true that the union of change and identity
in self-conscious experience is in character inexplicable. Bowne*a
transcendental empiricism reveals personality and intelligence as
ultimate facts and here the mind Is seen to be deeper than its
categories and explains them rather than being explained by them.^
Hence change and Identity are categories explained on the personal
plane in free intelligence whereas on the Impersonal plane they
remain an irreconcilable contradiction of two of the most patent
facts of experience. The free self may thus exercise the power
of self-identity through the experience of self-change which is
mysterious enough we admit but nevertheless a fact of self-
experience which can not be gainsaid. It is the only insight
1. Bowne, B. P., Personal ism . Preface v-vii.
Metaphysics . rev. ed., pp. 66-67.
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which we possess into a rational explanation of this antinony
which makes it possi'ble for tnought to achieve any satisfactory
or final resting place. It is only in thou^t on the plane of
personality in free intelligence that we find the so-urce of hoth
change and identity and an "understanding of how their apparent
contradiction is to be removed,^
"Metaphysics fiirther shows that if we insist upon having
sone abiding and identical principle superior to change
and constant in change, it can be found only in personality.
And here it does not consist in any rigid core of being,
but rather in tne extraordinary power of self-consciousness,
whereby the being distinguishes itself fron its states, and
constitutes itself identical and abiding. Where this la
lacking, there may be a continuity of process, but nothing
more. The unciErg^ability is iDurely formal, as when a given
note is constantly produced.
We encounter the same problem in the consideration of
freedom and the speculative demand for unity. On the necessitarian
plane it is Impossible to achieve more than a merely formal, con-
ceptual or verbal unity. The ideal of unity or systematic
totality is a legitimate demand of reason. The speculative problem
is to discover a concrete unity v/hich nas real as well as conceptual
existence since most of the unities of experience are purely formal.
Mechanical explanation as an ideal of speculative unity can never
succeed in escaping a groundless plurality. The plurality of the
universe can never be united into a uni-verse if plurality is the
1. Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics , rev. ed., p. 428.
2. Bowne, B. P., Philosophy of Theism
, pp. 146-147, 143.
3. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge , p. 105.
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fact from which we start; and, if unity is the fact from which
we start, mechanism is just as impotent to pass to a plurality
of cosmic manifestations. "If we start with a plurality we
never get 'behind it; and if we start with a unity it refuses to
move at all."^ In what -unity and plurality consist in mechanical
explanation we can never experience other than to note the inter-
acting states of things. This presents another antinomy for
thought.
"Reason, indeed, calls lo\xdly for unity, but it has no
means of integrating a plurality into a true unity or of
differentiating a unitary necessity into a plurality. Here
is another deadlock for the speculative reason, and the
only way out of it lies in the notion of free intelligence.
This is the one thing that can be manifold without "being
many, that can posit plurality over against itself and
maintain its own unity, and that can bind the many together
in the unity of plan and purposeful activity.
On any theory which condemns the world to an ultimate plurality
and has only a formal unity in our thought, we must either
encounter an endless regress or surmount necessity to the notion
of free mind as that on which the cosmos depends and by which it
exists. Freedom, therefore, becomes the condition of a unifica-
tion of a system of things into a systematic connection and also
the condition of passing from unity to a plurality of cosmic
manifestation without the collapse of reason. The speculative
demands of reason insist upon the integrity of the categories of
unity and plurality but on every mechanical scheme there is no
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review , 77 (1895), p. 692.
2. ibid . . p. 692. Theory of Thougjat and Knowledge .
p. 105.
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way of deducing one from the other or of telling in what either
consists.
"This p-uzzle can "be solved only "by leaving the
mechanical realm for that of free intellect. The free
and conscious self is the only real unity of which we
iiave any isnowledge, and reflection shows that it is the
only thing which can be a true unity. All other unities
are formal , and have only a mental existence. But free
intelligence, by its originating activity, can posit
plurality distinct from its own unity, and by its self-
consciousness, can maintain its \mity and identity over
against the changing plurality. Here the one is mani-
fold without being many. Here unity gives birth to
plurality without destroying itself. Here the identical
changes and yet abides. But this perennial wonder is
possible only on the plane of free and self-conscious
intelligence. For mechanical tliinking the problem admits
only of verbal solutions."
Free and conscious selfhood constitutes the only unity we know
and reflective thought insists that it is the only unity which
Is real. Our conclusion is that until we elevate the categories
of unity and plurality from the impersonal to the personal
plane of existence where we have available free intelligence for
the understanding of our problem there is no solution for these
two f"undamental demands of the mind which otherwise constitute
a hopeless antinomy of reason.
The speculative demand of reason which requires freedom
as the condition of the unification of a ^stem of things in a
common source into a plan of purposeful activity remains to be
considered. What is the relation between freedom and purpose?
1. Bowne, B. P., Philosophy of Theism
, pp. 142-143.
Metaphysics . rev. ed., pp. 427-428.
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Purpose, defined as Bowne accepted the term, is as follows:
"Conscious purpose represents the future in the present,
foresees, transcends time, and thus possesses properties
that are clearly foreign to the principle of mechanism,
Unconscioois purpose is a concept from which almost every-
thing that is significant has been stripped, it cannot
foresee the future, it does not transcend time, it gropes
blindly toward its goal. The difference between uncon-
scious purpose and mechanism is negligible,"^
Does, then, purpose include freedom? Bowne recognized diffi-
culties in the empirical, teleological argument. Teleology
cajinot be based on experience much of ^(rtiich reveals no purpose.
To argue that that which appears purposeless belongs to an
unseen plan is a matter of belief, not experience. Then, too,
where purpose is discernible in the operation of natural agents,
the end rarely appears of sufficient value to sacrifice for its
attainment. Since we cannot prove that nature's agencies are
designed to produce ends, it is argued that we must conclude
that wherever ends are realized in nat\are, they are but the
necessary results and outcome of natural agencies, Bowne* s counter
argument consists in snowing that teleology is not demonstrable
from experience to be sure but as a necessary assumption to every
theory of knowledge it is indispensable. Then, too, all natural
science is based on the assumption of a rational universe, and
denial of this postulate is as suicidal to science as it is to
teleology.
1. Brightman, E. S., An Introduction to Philosophy ,
p. 308. Bowne, B. P., Theism , p. 159.
2, Bowne, B. P., "The Design Argument," The IndeT>endent
.
29 (1877, July 5, 1877), pp. 2-3,
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The assmptions which underlie the anti-teleological
argTjment must be understood in evaluating it»^ The two "basic
ass-umptions of the detenainist against purpose are the principle
of continuity and the ass-umption that physical agents include all
being. On these grounds it is said that natural laws are
universally \aniform and everything has its physical antecedents
which are sufficient explanation. Again, the anti-design argument
assumes that mind must be observed in nature in order to be proved
and that this is the most perfect world and order of atoms is
merely an assmption. In the fourth place it assumes that the
physical agents of the universe which are the true causes are
endowed with whatever is necessary to explain their activities so
that mechanism, therefore, explains nothing but assumes everything.
Finally, the mechanist argues that the present is the necessary
and only possible result of the past.
Certain subtle fallacies infest these arguments of the
determinist which require caref\il examination. In the first
place, the uniformity and continuity of law do not preclude the
fact that such law may be the very fulfillment of purpose. "It
does not follow, therefore, that because natural causes are working
necessarily and in accordance with their own laws, that they are
not also working for the fulfillment of purpose." It is an
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Anti-Design Argument Stated,"
The Independent
. 29 (1877, March 22, 1877), pp. 1-2.
2. ibid ., p. 2. "Aspects of Theism," New telander
.
31 (1872), p. 459,
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"unwarranted ass-umption that originally the atoms held such
indeterminate relations among themselves that with an infinity
of directions possible to them all possible arrangements which
have ever appeared may well be the res-ult of such determinations*
To assume that the present is the only possible result of the
past is illegitimate as a conclusion because mechanism as stones
that disorder preceded order in cosmic procedure, itself a hypoth-
esis devoid of proof. It assumes that everything had a beginning .
and that disorder preceded order whereas, on the other hand,
every system including science is required to posit something
eternal and, so far as order goes, there is no cogent reason for
denying that order was first. Moreover, the teleologist does
not rest his case on the empirical observation of mind in nature
and freely admits the difficulty involved in the problem created
by the facts of dysteleology as revealed in the orders of lower
life.
The argument for purpose can not only be stated
negatively but can also be stated positively. It is true that to
say design proves a designer is a question-begging statement.
The real question is, How do we know that an adaptation is a work
of design, intentioned order and purpose? Certainly design would
prove a designer but the problem of ejqjerience is how to know
that design and not chance produced the effect or adaptation
observed. Bowne's solution of this problem consists in pointing
to the complexity and prolificness of adaptations which render
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chajice a far less reasonable hypothesis to explain these
adaptations than is design. Therefore the universe is "better
explained on the reality of a designer described as Self-
determining Force, or Free Mind. Bowne held that he was able
to show that the -universe is possible only on the reality of
"a Self-determing Force, or Free Mind, a spiritual Being; an
Ever-Living Will."^ Volitional causality as free and purpose
are here united. Bowne may have been influenced at this point
by the insight of Dr. Thomas Brown. In the history of metsf
physics, the argument which reduces all force to a dependence
upon will is in principle identical with that of Hume against
physical causation. Hume's argument was for a long time regarded
as atheistic and Hume himself thou^t so. Dr. Brown showed,
2however, that it is the only theistic one, and, when physical
causation is denied, the only alternative consists in that of
moral or volitional ca\isation of which we are already conscious.
It is the erroneous notion that we are shut up to physical
causation or none that smacks of atheism and is repugnant to
the laws of thought. This is Bowne* s argument for the fact
that purpose, which is the highest of the logical categories
and which we must apply in our attempts to reach the highest
order of knowledge, includes freedom. Free purpose is the only
1. Bowne, B. P., "Aspects of Theism," New Englander .
31 (1872), p. 468.
2. ibid ., p. 467.
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solution of the relation between freedom and mechanism or
freedcan and law*
"The only way out lies in the notion of rational purpose,
or of a Creator vho is working a rational work in accordance
with a rational plan. In this plan everything will have
its place and function and will be comprehended in an all-
embracing purpose. In this work we shall have no unin-
telligible metaphysical necessities called laws, but rather
uniformities of procedure, freely chosen with reference to
the plan. At the same time we shall have no lawless and
chance events, as all will arise in accordance with the
p\irpose of the whole.
Bowne was also influenced by Ulrici in this conclusion. TJlricl
had regarded human science possible only where nature is brought
\inder the reign of law but where its things and powers are con-
ceived as expressions of a pvirpose. The final and highest unity
consists in including all lower purposes into the harmony and
unity of an all-controlling purpose, thought or idea which
explains everything else and toward which the whole creation
moves. This is the highest demand of our reason and this
highest category conditions the highest reach and unity of know-
2ledge. Ulrici describes his ontology as omnipotent, intelligent,
self-conscious and personal and above all as free. That Bowne,
like Ulrici, united purpose oi the highest type at least with
freedcm is incontestably clear.
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Speculative Significance of
Freedom," Methodist Review . 77 (1895), p. 697.
2. Bowne, B. P., »Ulrici»s Logic," New Englander
.
33 (1874), pp. 485-486, Theory of Thought and Knowledge , p. 1C4.
3. Bowne, B. P., "Prof. Ulrici* s Gott und die Natur ."
New Englander . 33 (1874)
, p.654.
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Purpose is never regarded "by Bowne as causal "but
only as the norm according to which the agent , capable of creating
it, is able to direct itself.^ Furpose here appears not as the
2
condition of freedom "but as its expression. It is from esrperience
that we learn those purposes which a free system is capable of
expressing and which could appear on no other ground than as the
work of freedom. Whether there is any purpose which can be ex-
plained without freedom is a problem still remaining untouched,
Bowne does however conceive freedom as a type oi causality and
one of its f\andamental forms of causal activity is purpose,
"The causality of freedom means self-determination.
This is a causality which looks to the future and is not
driven by the past. It is a causality which forms ideals
and plans, and devotes itself to their realization. Instead
of being snoved out of the past, it is self-moving into
the future. It may posit an order and maintain it. It
may conceive purposes and realize them. Our experience of
such causality is limited to the inner life, but it is in
fact the only form of proper causality of which we have any
experience whatever. And there are reasons for tninking
that, instead of being a special case of causation, it is
really the typical form to which all cases of real causation
must be assimilated."'^
There is still another idea in tais connection which characterizes
the thoroughness with which Bowne grounded purpose in freedom.
This is to be found in his stress upon freedom as a means in the
nature of things and not as an end. Unless through freedom there
1, Bowne, B. P,, Metaphysics ; a Study in First Principles ,
pp. 172-173,
2, Bowne, B. P,, Theory of Thous:ht and Knowledge , p, 106,
"Purpose is a category involved in the nature of free intelligence."
3, ibid ., pp. 96-S7.
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"be some ethical objective toward which the whole creation moves
that is to be realized,^ a free world wo-uld "be no more desirable
than a necessary one. The mere facts of freedom and necessity
apart from the ohj active of creation which is mediated through
some rational meaning leave no ground for choice. One scheme is
as little to "be desired as the other hut where rational purpose
contributes the law by which personal activity is guided and this
is the meaning of things, freedom hecomes the one condition of
2
the fulfillment of purpose.
Attention should be directed to several features in
Bowne's argument where correction and extension of his thougiht
are needed. The counter argument of the teleologist ^that if we
deny a free rational mind in nature science as well as teleology
vanishes at least appears to leave the argument just where it
was. To create a deadlock where the problems are difficult may
stay the fearful consequences temporarily but sooner or later
conclusions will follow and the sooner the prohlem can be pushed
through to a decisive victory the sooner thought can advance to
higher ground. Drawn battles were too often favored conclusions
with Bowne when dealing with the antinanies of thought and
which furnished the occasion for "life" to decide in favor of its
1. Bowne, B. P. , Theory of Thought and Knowledge . p..316.
"To escape the fatalism of the purely logical reason we have to
appeal to freedom, and to escape the abyss of chance and arbitrari-
ness we have to unite the fixity of the intellect with the freedom
of volition in the notion of purpose, itself fixed and determined
by the notion of the good.** Theism , p. 213.
2. Bo^vne, B. P., Theism , p. 230.
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own interests, Bowne*s statement that mechanism explains nothing
is a criticism which he -urges against every system of necessity.
"The system which the anti-teleologist has outlined for us really
explains nothing, but tacitly assumes everything—as, indeed, all
mechanical systems must do, whether they adopt the atomic con-
ception or any other."^ But it is conceivable that mechanism is
competent within a limited field to offer some explanation, a
fact which Bowne himself admits when he points out that it is
only when scientific explanation seeks to become all-embracing
that it is empty or self-stioltlfying.^ The matter is considerably
cleared up for us where he affirms that freedom is the only
condition of any real explanation,'' What is meant is that the
scientific hypothesis constructs causes with which physical agents
are endowed in order to explain certain activity. Such procedure
uses teleology as the model of explanation and then proceeds to
deny teleology. Thus imponderability, attraction, repulsion,
and the like are attributed to atoms and ether in such a way
that everything is assumed to provide an explanation within the
limits of physical agency. To this Bovme rightfully objects and
had he always been clear in his statement of it by insisting
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Assumption of the Anti-Design
Argument," The Indeipendent . 29 (1877, March 29, 1877), p. 1.
"Darwin and Darwinism," Hibbert Journal . 8 (1909-1910), p. 130.
"The Design Argument," The Inde-pendeut
.
29 (1877, August 2, 1877),
p. 2.
2. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thowdit and Knowledf;e
. p. 227»
"Explanation—a Logical Study," Methodist Review, 70 (1888), p. 665.
3. ibid . . pp. 244, 233,
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upon ultimate, final or real explanation as his meaning, it
would serve to modify the sweeping and misleading emphasis that
mechanism can explain nothing when as a matter of fact there is
a scientific explanation of all facts as far as it goes and it
is even conceivable that some adaptations might "be and probably
are accounted for by mechanism. A noticeable development in
Bowne*s writings in this direction is traceable. The conclusion
is then that, ^riiile it is conceivable and possible that mechanism
and chance do explain a few adaptations there are many which they
do not explain*
The further question arises as to i4iether we are
Justified in assuming that freedom and purpose are coincident
throughout nature. It is a fact that we find ends continually
being attained in nature without foreknowledge of them, that is,
where we are not free to foresee consequences. It is also true
that ends may be foreseen in nature but not chosen, finally,
ends may be both foreseen and chosen. Prom this it is plain
that we are not entitled to the conclusion that all types of
purpose are the same. There are different kinds of purpose and
only the highest type of ptirpose involves freedom. It here
appears tn&t mechanical explanation may therefore explain in-
stinctive purpose and such related kinds of e:cperience while
1* Bowne, B. P., "Explanation—a Logical Study,"
Methodist Review
.
70 (1888), p. 665.

'202-
a more complete type of explanation, the metaphysical, is
required where freedom, value and purpose are involved.
The elements of enduring value in Bowne's argument
are two. First, mechanism is an incoherent hypothesis if
posited as final or coraplete explanation. It is one type of
explanation perfectly legitimate when dealing with the phenomenal
categories, the space-time world. It is not therefore the uni-
versal or metaphysical type of explanation which involves the
fundamental or metaphysical categories. In view of this in-
complete gratification of the legitimate mental demand for unity
and systematic totality, we must transcend mechanism and find
a place for explanation "by free intelligence.^ Secondly, within
the limits which we have shown, purpose does include freedom and
it is only through free mxielligence that the notion of an all-
inclusive purpose providing the ground for systematic totality
is thinkable.
It is now apparent in what sense purpose includes
freedom and likewise in what sense freedom includes purpose.
It is logical to say that freedom includes the notion of purpose
and that purpose of the highest type involves freedom. The
nature of freedom demands the power of contrary choice in the
light of purpose which leads to the significant conclusion that
freedom in reason, therefore, is always teleological in character*
1. Bowne, B. P.. Theory of Thowiht and Ktiowledge , p. 235.
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This, as we have pointed out, is the one condition on which a
free world is preferable to a world of necessity* The mechanist's
contention that the solution of the prohlem of freedom confines
us to the alternatives of absolute freedom or absolute mechanism
is impertinent. For a more coherent solution is found in the
conclusion which we have already established and which consists
in the notion of an all-embracing rational purpose. Metaphysical
necessity is required to give way before uniformity administered
by freedom for the attainment of the rational goals of history.
In o-ur final conclusion we point out that while a world might
conceivably reveal a purpose without freedom the facts about the
act-ual world which we know at least require us to conclude that
the highest type of purpose only reveals freedom but that freedom
must include purpose and from the point of view of the Supreme
Person it is more than likely that freedom conditions the entire
world in every aspect of its activity and realization.
This brings to a close that part of o\ar research devoted
to the task of showing that freedom is the condition of all
philosophy and therefore has a deep speculative significance.
Our conclusion has consisted in showing the futility of attempting
to solve the speculative problems of philosophy on the plane of
impersonal existence. The mind is lost in hopeless antinomies
and reason is doomed to utter collapse. No explanation of an
ultimate character is possible because of the infinite regress
past which we cannot go. Then, too, we enco-unter the antinomy
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of change and identity which philosophy has often ignored and
which is "unintelligible on any impersonal plane of existence.
Nor do we fare any better with the categories of unity and
plurality and finally with the problem of purpose until wis
recognize that all iaipersonal non-intelligent and mechanical
conceptions of ultimate causality are strictly speaking doomed
to 8pec\ilative failure. In view of the legitimate speculative
demands of reason which require a solution of these problems we
are forced to postulate personality as their ultimate solution
and to carry the wnole problem of causality up to the plane of
free intelligence.^ Here it is abvious that
"Metaphysics shows that the metaphysical categories elude
any real apprehension or presentation, except in terms of
personal experience, and this is especially the case with
the category of causality. When we do noi conceive it
under tae volitional type we have the bare form or gro\ind
without any possibility of representing our meaning. "2
But in accepting Bowne's claim that such transcendental
empiricism is alone cocipetent to transform the opaque data of
experience into the transparent order of reason"^ we meet the
objection that explanation by intelligence is open to all the
objections that have been urged against mechanism. Personality
is itself a mystery and we have offered a solution of our lesser
mysteries by merging them into a greater one so that confusion
I has been worse confounded. The reply to all this is not that of
1. Bowne, B. P., MetaTohvsics . rev. ed., p. 428.
2. Bowne, B. P., Theory of ThouRht and Knowledge , p. 97.
3. ibid., p, 234.
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dismay tut it must "be pointed out that in the nature of the
case volitional causality thou^ unpicturable to the senses
nevertheless finds its analogue in our experience. In fact,
it is the only notion of causal agency concerning which we have
any direct experience or insight which is much more than can
"be said of mechanical metaphysical forces which have "been urged
as the ontological ground of all reality. In the nature of the
case, then, any ultimate fact must be mysterious insofar as it
cannot be deduced from anything else or reduced to anything else.
In the case of personality we have a rock-bottom fact revealed
to thOTaght beyond which we cannot go. We can only admit the
fact that mind is deeper than its categories and explains them.
It exists but it exists as a deep mystery. At this point Bowne's
philosophy reaches one of Its siablimest insights. But there is
a choice between mysteries.
"Some mysteries make other things clear, and some leave
things as dark and impenetrable as ever. The former is the
case with the mystery of intelligence. It makes possible
the comprehension of everything but itself. In the
mechanical scheme we are compelled to use the formal
categories of possibility, potentiality, necessity, and
causation, of which the concrete significance absolutely
eludes all conception. . ... In truth, we can find
concrete illustration of these categories only in our
inner ex3>erience. They remain illusive abstractions until
they are interpreted in forms of the inner life."
Bowne*3 analysis of the relation between freedom and
speculation laci^s nothing oi clearness and the substantial con-
1. Bowne, B. P., Theory of Thouscht and Knowledge ,
pp. 234-235.
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clusions of his philosophy are available in no field to a
greater extent than for a stiady of the metaphysics of religion.
The philosophical "basis of religion, or the theological aspects
of philosophy depending "upon one's method and interest, brings
us face to face with freedom and theology, or the religious
problem. Here, too, freedom is necessary to explain the religious
cosmos just as we have siiown it to be involved in the problems of
a general metaphysical character. The approach to Bowne's
doctrine of freedom in relation to religion hinges upon the
problem of personality or the principle of individuality both
human and divine, ihere are four aspects of the problem of freedom
and religion to viiich attention is given. These are (1), just
as freedom was the only solution of the persistent problem of
error to save reason from collapse, so freedom is necessary in
religion as the only solution of the equally persistent problem
of evil. The persistent problems of error and evil are un-
deniable facts of human experience and they are the treacherous
problems over which scores of philosophies and theologies have
been dashed to pieces. Evil is to theology what the problem
of error is to philosophy. (2) , The divine foreknowledge is no
barrier to finite freedom. (3), The category of possibility as
the meaning of omniscience is not equivalent to chance. (4),
Freedom is the only solution of the divine omnipotence.
It was Bowne's contention that free creation is the
only solution of the problem of religion. Prom this point of
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departure we first examine the problem of evil on the basis of
the pantheistic hypothesis which on examination is revealed to
be a form of absolutism and is therefore the denial of free
creation. The essence of pantheism is the affirmation that the
Divine Nature implies the system and all that belongs to it.
Thorough-going pantheism affirms "one xincreated substance, and
nothing else. This substance asstunes various modes, but remains
1
all and in all," More descriptively defined, Bo^vne says it is
"The view that the world is a part of God is the common
factor in all theories of emanation, ancient and modern.
As the waves are a part of the ocean, or, better still,
as each finite space or tim.e is a part of the one infinite
space or time, so each finite thing is a part or phase of
the one infinite existence. In each of these views God is
regarded as world- substance rather than first cause; and this
substance is conceived as a kind of plastic stuff or raw
material which, like clay, can be variously fashioned, and
which is at least partly exhausted in its products."^
The two main types of pantheism are, first, the view that the
world is a part of God or a mode of God and, secondly, the view
that the world is a necesr.ary consequence of the divine nature.
With respect to the first,
"We cannot, without annihilating self-contradiction, speak
of the one as dividing itself into the many, for thereby we
deny that it is the one. It is still worse when vre speak
of it as remaining the one after the division, for thereby
we deny the division. Most pantheistic systems break down
at this point. "3
The second type divides into tv/o forms described as static smd
dynamic pantheism. Logical or static pantheism views the world
1. Bowne, B. P., Studies in Thei^sm, p, 261.
2. Bowne, B, P., Theism, pp. 19¥-200.
3. Bowne, B. P., Studies in Theism, p, 279,
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as the implied conclusion of God the a11-conditioning premise
while dynamic pantheism describes God as the all-conditioning
causality necessarily manifesting itself in the world of things.
Of these two forms, dynamic pantheism is the least objectionable.
Static pantheism is about equivalent to Eleaticism and was
largely basic to Spinoza's system.. It ends in an unprogressive
and changeless conception of the \miverse and therefore every-
1
thing which exists is necessary and eternal. On the other
hand a dynamic pantheism is eqmlly revealed to be a necessi-
tarian doctrine which denies self-determination and affirms a
universal metaphysical determinism into whose nature we have no
insight whatsoever. On the view of pantheian in any form, the
relation of God to the world is conceived to be such that finite
individuality is denied all independence, substantiality and
activity becom.es merely a modal majiife station of the universal
activity of the absolute. Thus persons and things are but
products of the absolute energizing under fixed and immutable
laws. It is perfectly obvious what the status of the problem
of evil and error in this necessitarian scheme of things must
2
be. In any event they become necessary and eternal for, even
on the view of dynamic pantheism, the dynamism rem.ains
unintelligible except on the plane of free rational activity.
Then, too, self-determinism being denied, the unity of the absolute
is gone for only through the free and conscious self is real unity
1, Bowne, B. P,, Theism, p, 210,
2, Bo^vne, B, P,, Theism
, pp. 212,265, Pantheism is
intrinsically related to determinism, fatalism, pessimism and
the denial of free creation vdiile theism is intrinsically related
to purpose, plan, freedom, optimism and a free creation.
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possible. Finally, metaphysical necessity of the mechanical
type is an unclear and opaque notion "which dethrones reason and,
' tmtil freedom is restored as an implication of rationality, thought
is impossible and then the universe becomes contingent rather than
necessary. The bearing of pantheism upon the impersonal world of
things is not so inhospitable to reason even though little can be
made of the doctrine even here. But its bearing on the personal
world, or the consequences of the pantheistic doctrine of man, is
intolerable to reason. This is largely due to the fact that pan-
theistic theory is unable to escape mechanism and necessity.
"For self-determination being denied, vre must find some
ground for the changing activity of the infinite, and this
can be found only in some metaphysical mechanism in the
infinite vrhereby its states interact and determine outcome
and directions. By this tine the tinity of the infinite
has disappeared altogether; at all events, however much
•we might speak of its unity we should be quite \anable to
tell in what the \inity consists. Finally the universal
determinism involved in the theory would make the problem
of evil and error unmanageable. This problem is not over
transparent on the theistic theory; but theism does succeed
in keeping evil and error out of God, Pantheism on the other
hand, must carry them bodily into God, They are not the out-
come of finite folly and frailty, but have their source and
justification in the divine. Thus along with reason emd
righteousness in the infinite we have to posit unreason and
unrighteousness, both alike necessary, said, for all w© can
see, both alike eternal, "Whatever is foolish, irrational,
base, and infamous in hxaman thought and conduct, is rooted
in the divine; and all the unsavory characters who have
disgraced humanity are to be looked upon as setting forth
and expressing the divine nature. Thus reason and conscience
both perish as authoritative, and remain only as psychological
facts along with other psychological facts, any one of T/?hich
is as necessary as any other. The collapse is hopeless, , ,
Perhaps no philosophy is possible on any basis; it certainly
is not possible on a pantheistic one,"l
1, Bowne, B. P., "Notes on Philosophy, (VI l) Pantheism,"
The Independent , 42 (1890), 1019.
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Bowne*s personalisrr. thus had a two-fold motive. It was directed
equally against pantheism and materialism. His thorough-going
stress upon the free, self-deternining activity of persons, the
sacred and inviolable individuality of finite personality as over
against the absolute in one direction and over against other
finite persons in the other direction, made it forever impossible
for the all-engulfing maw of the absolute to turn creation into
"a vast dead sea occupied by God alone." He rejected pantheism
as untenable in every form on the ground that its doctrines both
of God and of man are incoherent and that the vrfiole notion of re-
ducing God to necessity means the utter collapse of reason on the
problems of truth and error v/hile man is but a mere appearance
but no reality apart from his identity as a cosmic function.
On the theistic hypothesis of the relation of God to
the world, the matter is fundamentally different, \7hile for
pantheism the world is either a part of God or a necessary
consequence of the divine nature "Theism holds that the world
1
is a free act and creation by God." It is the affirmation that
a conscious and free intelligence better explains the facts than
a blind automotic power. Instead of the world *s being God or a
part of God in outright identification, the world is posited or
2
created by God and depends upon the divine will. At least four
tj-pes of theism may be distinguished. Deism conceives the world
1. Bowne, B, P., Theism
,
p, 199.
2, ibid,, p. 218.
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as created "by God and thereafter existing independently of God
for the most part. Theistic Idealism, or Personalism, holds
"that the world is essentially a going forth of the divine
causality under the forms of space and time, and in accordance
with a rational plan."^ The phenomenal world is spatially
neither outside nor inside of God but in a non-presentahle
fashion depends upon the divine will just as our thoughts are
neither spatially in or outside our minds "but depend on the
mind as their cause and subject. With respect to finite persons
they have, just as the world, a measure both of dependence and
independence with respect to the divine will but in any case
they have substantial reality. Theistic Realism posits God
as creator and in addition holds to a divine activity of conser-
vation distinct from the creative act. Both persons and the
world are objectively real. Absolute Theistic Idealism is a
vergence on Pantheism denying all substantiality to the world
and persons in the sense that they are a perpetual recreation.
The theistic doctrine of free creation points out a
distinction between God and his creation which is of great importance
in rendering our experience intelligible. On the one hand, finite
persons experience a measure of self-control, volition and independeit
thought. On the other hand, this is only a relative dependence and
1. Bowne, B.P. , Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 342.
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our life is not self-sufficient. This is demanded by the facts
and to deny either independence or dependence does not stress the
entire truth, "it is no doubt fine, and in some sense it is
correct to say that God is in all things; but vrhen it comes to
saying that God is all things and that all forms of thought and
1
feeling and conduct are his, then reason simply commits suicide,"
The only harmonization of the two enduring facts of experience
cited above is on the view of a free creation through which God
provides a measure of finite freedom as well as a measure of
finite dependence ir. personality. For it appears that freedom
and reason are no less divorced in the solution of the problem
of knowledge as such where it is shown clearly that both finite
and infinite freedom must be maintained in order to make clear
what is involved in knowing as well as iji what is known. And it
is only when religion is linked up with a satisfactory theory
of knowledge that free reason can do anything at all with the
problems of error and evil for which pantheism has only the
merest verbal solution,
".Ye are compelled to recognize a necessary and
ineradicable dualism in our finite knowing. The problem
created by this necessary dualism is to show how our ideas
refer to their objects and to make clear if possible whether
objective reference in thought inheres in any or a part or all
of otar ideas. In the knowing process it appears that minds and
and their objects are numerically and qualitatively distinct
1. Bowne, B. P., Theism.
^ p. 216,
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and separate and that our ideas therefore mean to refer to some-
thing other than themselves . How this is possible constitutes
a problem. The monistic epistemologies -which have attempted a
solution of this problem by affirming the numerical and
qualitative identity of minds and their objects in the moment
of knovring have usually proved to be empty verbalisms rather
than real solutions of the problems involved in vrhat it means
to know. These luiproductive attempts may be rou[';hly classed as
materialistic and idealistic with monisms ranging between these
extremes partaking of one or the other points of view in indefinite
degree. It is to be kept in mind that these monisms have usually
gone down in their attempts to solve the problem of error. For
whether minds be reduced to matter or matter be reduced to spirit
in Tiiich case we have pan-objectivism or pan-subjectivism
respectively, there is no way of explaining the problem of
error for both true and false ideas are equally real and the
mind is not free to exercise itself in the use of a criterion
to differentiate betvreen them. In the case of a materialistic
epistemological monism, matter is made the true cause of
personality or thinking substance which correctly grasps the
extra-mental world. But materialism is a necessitarian system
on which basis, as we have pointed out already, there is no ground
for solving the problem of error for both truth and error are
caused alike as effects. The nev^est advocates of material mind.
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1
the neo-realists, at least in part, facing the implications
of an epistenological monism, have 'boldly advocated the theory
of the objectivity of error, Yfhere perceiver and perception or
idea and object are identical, both truth and error become
objective which is equivalent to denying error for our ideas
of errors cannot be erroneous. But an explanation of error
which cancels reason by directing its powers against itself in
explaining the facts of experience is hardly adequate. Nor is
the case improved with the monism of pragmatic epistemology
vrfierein the whole epistemological problem is solved by virtually
ignoring it. On the other hand the monism of absolute idealistic
epistemology is, like neo-realism, \jnable to solve the problem of
error, for like it, error receives an objective status except that
in this case it belongs to the experience of the Absolute. Further-
more, absolutism encounters the problem of evil for all experience
belongs to the Infinite thus reading back into the character of God
both reason end tinreason and righteousness and tmrighteousness
2
alike. How truth and error and good and evil are to be reconciled
coherently in the same experience constitutes a problem before
which the human reason is impotent. The vulnerable point of every
3
monistic epistemology is to be found in the problems of error and
evil, A spiritual necessitarianism is in consequences identical
1. Holt, E.B,, The New Realism
, pp. 303-373. (For him,
error has subsistential but not existential reality.) Pitkin, ''•T.B,,
Alexander, S,, Spaulding, E.G., Russell, B,, all interpret error as
objective and not as subsistential. Cf , Evans, D, Luther, Hew Realism
and Old Reality, pp. 127-129.
2. Spinoza, Hegel, Royce, Bradley and Bosanquet present
systems in which the problems of evil and error reveal the
difficulty encountered by absolute idealism.
3. Flewelling, R. T., Creative Personality
,
p. 131.
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1
•with a materialistic one.
The productive solution of the dualism in finite
knovdng Bovme discovered in positing a theistic monism -which
calls for an application of his doctrine of free creation, "The
dualism of the human subject and the cosmic object is at once
2
transcended and explained in the tinity of the absolute subject."
Vifhile we are corar.itted to hold this conclusion vdth clear insight
and conviction, Bo-wne admits that a great depth of mystery
surrounds personality at this point. It has the advantage,
however, of not ruling personality out of the universe as pan-
objectivism does. Free creation is the only solution iwhich
harmonizes thought and thing. Knor.'ledge is impossible v/here
the cosmic object and the absolute subject are separated by
distinctions of independent being. This is admitted. But if
they are united to render knov^ledge possible it is then impossible
to separate them again. Free creation cuts the Gordian knot.
Since the absolute subject produces the cosmic object and the
cosmic object is so related to the human subject that each in a
sense exists for the other, the problem of knowledge at least
becomes intelligible. How free creation is possible is not the
philosopher's problem because it lies beyond his ken. It is
rather his duty to evaluate and interpret experience as far as
possible. Nevertheless in the notion of free creation there is
1, Flewelling, R.T., Creative Personality
,
pp. 132-133.
2, Bowne, B.P,, Theory of Thought and Knowledge
,
p, 315,
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involved no contradiction. The answer to the questions
Hov;- is creation possible? How can the fundamental reality create
its ovm objects or become its ovm subjects? or. What is the
structure of the infinite reason implying the possibility of
the finite system? can only be found on the view that the
category of possibility is conditioned by a free rational
nature guided by rational purpose of sufficient dignity to
justify itself. Since, therefore, all verbal monisms shatter
themselves on the problem of error, "Every theory of knowledge
1
must reach the theistic conclusion or suffer collapse."
Free creation not only transcends the dualism of finite
knowing thereby maintaining the integrity of knowledge, but it also
preserves finite as well as infinite freedom. This is necessary in
order to prevent the co!" lapse of reason since, as we have seen, it is
2
the most reasonable solution of the problem of error, and free
creation is equally necessary in order to prevent ethical or moral
collapse because it affords the most reasonable solution of the
problem of evil. Finite freedom acooxints for much that is
fallible in experience for it is possible that reason makes errors
in judging and it also places certain aspects of the problem of
evil upon individual persons who are responsible for it. Unless
freedom is a fact we cannot keep either error or evil from becoming
entirely coanic on which ground we must reconcile all contradictions
1, Bowne, B,P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge
,
p. 316.
2, Flewelling, R.T., Creative Personality, p. 133,
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in the nature and character of God. At this point reason as we
have seen suffers collapse.
Our discussion of freedom and creation up to this point
has been largely in connection with the ultimate reality and its
activities. We now consider the possibility of freedom and
creativity in finite persons. One of the purest illustrations
of freedom we have discovered to be revealed in the operation of
pure thought as a self-directing activity which proceeds according
to laws inherent in itself and to ideals generated by itself. We
can only tinderstand creative activity from the analogy of our own
experience according to which we first form conceptions and then
realize them. The creativity of the human mind does not always
imply freedom. The creative activity of thought requires that
our knowledge of nature result from the operation of the forms
1
and categories and the laws of thought. Thus the mind is active
and creative only in the sense that it furnishes the laws or
fixities according to which experience is possible. Freedom is
not involved in such mechanisms and uniformities as these. Nor
must we regard the will as the creator of ideals always generated
by itself. External authority in various forms presents ideas
which we may, true enough, freely reject or appropriate but which
in no sense have been freely created by us. The question of whether
or not we must be free in order to realize these ideals is a question
1. Bowne, B. P., Theism, p, 130.
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vrhich we shall later show involves fundamentally the notion of
freedom. If the finite person has any free creative activity it
is extremely limited since our choices in respect to creation
are "but the conditions of the operation of universal creation.
The nature of our difficulty at this point lies in the
insoluble character of the structure of the divine reason which
makes creation possible. Vfe are under the necessity of positing
a rational nature upon which all possibility depends including
that of creation but the necessity of freedom in such a rational
creation is evident in order to escape the fatalism of the purely
logical reason. Also in order to escape the abyss of chance and
arbitrariness we must seek the tmion of the uuiiformities of the
mind with the freedom of volition in the notion of purpose, which
itself is determined by the notion of the good, . V/hile this
constitutes our idea of free creation, it is far from insight into
1
what the purpose is or its relations to the supreme good. The
mystery which surroxmds this theory of speculation commends itself
on its freedom from contradictions. 'Ye require that ultimate
reality be constituted of free, purposive, ethical and rational
intelligence even though the inter-relations of these are not
absolutely known. This, then, is the only view which renders
knowledge possible. To what extent freedom and creativity are
needed from the infinite point of view is relatively clear in view
of the demands of speculative reason. How far such a notion is
1. Bowne, B.P., Theism
,
p. 230. Theory of Thought and
Knowledge, p, 316,

-219-
applicable to the finite subject requires cautious procedure to
determine. At any rate where the choices of finite -vrills account
for moral evil, the problem is greatly lessened even though the
question of natural evil remains very difficult on any point of
1
view even that of theism. The creative activity of -which
finite persons are capable insofar as freedom is concerned is
largely limited to that of choice. This notion is not uncommon
in contemporary thought.
"That the htunan mind, in its highest flights, creates new
things, thinks in ways that have never been thought before,
seem \mdeniable in face of any of the great works of genius. •
• , T/hy should we doubt that organic evolution is a creative
process and that Mind is the creative agenqy?"^
Again, "the self is the cause of its own actions; and each action,
although connected with the past, is yet a true choice determined
3
by itself, a new creation," The notions of purpose, freedom and
creativity are brought together in such a way that the possibility
of creative choice is involved in free intelligence. On the part
of finite beings therefore we do not postulate creation other than
in an ideal sense remotely analogous to that of the infinite
creativity. Here freedom of choice is accompanied by a power to
act which is \iniquely different from anything ydiich we know, yet
is a fact which in terms of personality we can only partially
appreciate. But the creative activity for -which freedom is thought
to call by many recent -writers must be scrutinized -with the utmost
r.^rig'h'tman, E, S., A Philosophy of Ideals
, pp, 92,99-100,
2, McDougall, William, Outline "of Psychology
,
p. 447,
3, Sorley, W. R,, Moral Values and the Idea of God
,
2nd, ed,, p. 442.
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care.
"The freedom is not the freedom of s\ich outright
creative power as some of the pl\iralists have clamored for.
It is the freedom to choose among and use the forces of the
world. ... Men cannot indeed create, in the outright sense,
but they can produce, and production is but slightly inferior
to outright creation,"
Thus the scientist creates no chemical or physical pov/ers but he
can take the relations existing between things in space and time
and employ them in such a way that changes are produced not only
in the subject matter of the special sciences but also in that of
the humanitarian sciences. Now, finite freedom, continually playing
into this order of law, may produce changes through the manipulation
of relations and laws in two directions. By taking advantage of
known laws, finite choices oan produce changes and results little
less than outright creation and, on the other hand, finite choices
may put energies to such use that the changes resulting are
virtually equivalent to outright destruction. Although finite
freedom continually plays into an order of law and does not in
this sense violate the doctrine of the conservation of energy
but produces effects iriiich are equivalent to production or
destruction, creation or annihilation, man is not in any complete
2
and absolute sense of the word either a creator or a destroyer.
In reviewing the effects produced by man in both his physical and
spiritml heredity and environment, it appears that human freedom
iV McCorme ri7~Bi shop F. J,, Is God Limited? p, 116.
2, Bowne, B. P., Theism, p, 232. ^"Cosmogonies . , ,
relate only to the transforming and combining of given material,
and say nothing concerning its origination."
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however limited constitutes a possibility of such magnitude in
a world like ours that no adequate comprehension of the idea can
be formed. Freedom thus becomes the locus of a possibility with
infinite consequences both physical and spiritual even though the
actual amo\mt of freedom be very little. Yet, despite our cautious
discrimination between free creation in God and free creation in
man, no less a thirJcer than Professor "^T. E. Hocking, stating the
significance of the active mind, says,
"It is the locus of freedom; for it is the self*s determination
of its own degree of being,
"in the free action of mind there is a genuine addition
to being. If the world of the possible were that alleged eternal
and infinite reservoir of essences, there could be no genuine
creation or novelty: action would be limited to marking out
certain preexi stent ideas as candidates for being. But
when we see that the genuinely possible is only what is
conceived possible, every hitherto unthought-of possibility
appears as an absolute creation. The mind adds to the
actual by first adding to the possible. In this view of
things, art acquires a new importance for the constitution
of the future world; — it is one of the major avenues of
metaphysical birth.
At this point, much water has flowed xmder the bridge since Bowne*s
day but the notion of freedom and creativity is obviously an
extension of Bowne*s system Trtiich is perfectly legitimate and
which does not do violence to the substructure of his thought. Care
to differentiate betv;een htunan and divine volition is the one thing
needful to save an otherwise valuable concept from shipwreck.
The extension of Bowne's doctrine of freedom and
creativity is especially stressed in the works of two of his
1. '^Mind and KesLr-Mind, " Proceedings of the Sixth
International Congress of Philosophy, 1926. Editor, E. S, Brightman,
p. 213.
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students, R. T. Flevrelling and G, A. ^rilson. Professor Vfilson
finds the intimacy bet-ween these t^wo notions so pronounced that
where we find the one we are practically certain to find the
other. This is true "because a truly free act is just what is
meant by the creative in that what was before ideal is now made
to exist. "Practically, then, if not also logically, freedom
3
means creativity and creativity means freedom." It is important
to note that the dependence of the finite person upon the supreme
person does not invalidate this claim. Finite creativity is not
merely a refashioning of a preexisting raw material nor is it the
creation of the forms of existence out of pure emptiness, but the
new creation, whatever it is, results as a free cooperation between
finite persons and the Supreme Person. In a sense all experience
n
involves such a cooperation and one of the most signifioemt forms
of creative activity by the self consists in the apprehension of
other selves, T^e may distinguish between the creativity of finite
selves and the creative activity of God but the distinction affords
no insight into how any sort of creation in an ultimate sense is
possible. It is nevertheless vuideniable, it seems, that contingency
is the sole condition of the production of the novel and vmique.
The problem of finite freedom and the divine fore-
knowledge constitutes one of the oldest and most difficult of the
1. Creative Personality .
2 . The Self and Its ^Torld .
3. ibid,, p. 346.
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speculative problems of philosophy and theology. That the last
word has not been said on the subject of freedom is nowhere more
apparent than at this point although there may be other places
•where wise words spoken on the subject of freedom are of greater
practical value. The problem involved is, briefly. How is fore-
knowledge of a free act possible? Is it possible that the divine
knowledge of those independent forms of finite experience not
ascribed to the infinite is a fact and, if so, does this not
cancel human freedom? Respecting the solution of this problem,
Bowne felt that "To press this difficulty would make an impassable
gulf between the finite and the Infinite; and to solve it is beyond
1
us, except in a formal way." Further, he argued that " A fore-
knowledge of freedom cannot be proved to be a contradiction; and
2
on the other hand it cannot be construed in its possibility,"
At best we can only understand what the question means as it is
felt by the reason as a problem requiring a solution. This, like
many others of the persistent problems of philosophy, merely shows
that the solution of the problem of freedom in certain of its
aspects at least consists mainly in getting the problem properly
stated and understood. Tlhile foreknowledge of a free act has
never been proved a contradiction and it has likewise never been
proved that the inability to foresee a free choice would
seriously impede the divine economy, the problem of freedom and
1. Bowne, B.'?.', Theism
, p, 188.
2. ibid,, p, 190. Personalism, p. 210.
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foreknowledge is not to be lightly dismissed.
"The problem here is not lightly to be pushed to one
side. It profotmdly disturbs multitudes of earnest
believers, anxious to provide for the dignity of man on
the one hand and for the sovereignty of God on the other.
We are here largely in a realm where our personal preferences
will decide our choices. If any sacrifice has to be made, I
personally should prefer the sacrifice of the divine omniscience
rather thctn human freedom."^
Perhaps the strongest argument for the divine nescience of future
finite free acts of the last generation was presented by Lorenzo
2
Dow McCabe irtiose position was that freedom and foreknowledge are
incompatible. But there is freedom. Hence, a foreknowledge of
free acts is impossible.
Foreknowledge of a free act must at the outset be
distinguished from the cognate themes, fore -ordination and pre-
destination. It was the confusion of these problems with that of
foreknowledge to which Bowne objected on the ground that the problem
3
is cancelled thereby and that its data are destroyed. Historically,
three theories of the solution of freedom and the divine fore-
knowledge have been developed. Foreknowledge has been asserted
while freedom has been denied. Freedom has been asserted while
foreknowledge has been denied. And, finally, both freedom and
4
foreknowledge have been affirmed. Bowne 's contention was that
the problem can be intelligently discussed only in connection with
1. McConnell, Bishop F . J
.
, I s God Limited
?
p. 124,
2. The Knowledge of God and Cognate' Themes, Cincinnati:
Hitchcock and Y.^alden, 1878.
3. Bowne, B.P,, "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zion»s
Herald
,
56 (1879), p.. 73.
4. Bowne, B.P., Philosophy of Theism
, p. 158. Theism,
p. 189.
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the category of time, itself a most difficult and intricate problem
on any philosophical point of view which deals seriously with the
problem, ?Te first consider the doctrine of foreknowledge as
applied to freedom where tLne is considered as objective and real.
The untenable and contradictory character of foreknowledge of a
truly free act becomes apparent on the realistic view of time when
we recall our definition of freedom,
"By definition a free act is an absolute beginning, and as such is
not represented by anything before its occurrence. Tie trace it to
a specific volition, and beyond that it has neither existence nor
1
representation,
"
Now by omniscience is meant "a knowledge of all things and of all
2
events, past, present, and future, necessary and free alike,"
But how can a free act as an absolute beginning be known as a
future event where there are no present grounds for knowing? The
knowledge of a future event alTmys supposes present grounds for
knowing. But in the case of a free act there are no such grounds
which means that foreknowledge of free acts would have to be
possible without any grounds of knoTring so far as we can tell.
The only possible solution of this problem on the realistic view
of time would be to assiime that God*s modes of knowing are incom-
prehensible to us. On the realistic view of time for God as well
as for man, foreknowledge of a free act appears to be a contra-
1, Bowne, B, P,, Theism
,
p. 189.
2, ibid,, p. 187.
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diction \anless we say that God's ways of knowing fHiture events are
not conditioned by existing grounds while otirs are which is tantamount
to saying that we give up the problem as insoluble. If we say that
the future is present with God we say what is not true if time is
real and such a knowledge could only be an hallucination. In fact,
a true act of free will rarely occurs in daily life, and when it
does, we have no grounds of certainty but only a varying degree of
probability in foretelling what persons will do. No one knows
better than the good man himself whose character appears so de-
pendable from without, that is, to be determined by the good, how
easy it is for hin to choose something else. To say that our fore-
knowledge is conditioned by present grounds of knowing while God's
is of another sort is merely to admit the inconceivability of
foreknowledge of freedom. On the realistic conception of time,
the future cannot be present with Gfod, hence to say that the future
is present to God violates the point of view. Two alternatives
of the argument are open at this point of the discussion. One may
conclude that foreknowledge of free acts is incomprehensible but
nevertheless accept it. Or, one may accept the point of view that
because foreknowledge of free acts is incomprehensible, it must
1
therefore be denied,
Yfe must next examine the category of possibility as the
meaning of the divine foreknowledge. No one has ever thought of
excluding from this question more than the possible exception of
1, Bowne, I3,F,, "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zion'
s
Herald
,
56 (1879), jj". .73,
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the free choices and acts of finite persons. This exception
granted, the divine knowledge would still be virtually omniscient.
The question grows, not out of our inability to conceive the past
and the present as open to omniscience, but out of our inability
to picture the possible as fully known as the equivalent of fore-
knowledge of freedom. Or, as Bowne tersely puts it, "The difficulty
with foreknowledge of free acts, is, therefore, not that it destroys
1
freedom, but that the notion is essentially absurd and contradictory."
The objection to limiting the divine omniscience to the category
of possibility Bowne indicates as resting upon two errors, first,
the habit of substituting etymology for logic T)?hich, in the case
of omniscience, consists in affirming essentially absurd and
contradictory interpretations of it based on dictionary definitions
instead of interpreting it as a logical philosophical concept;
secondly, the imaginary demand for reverence which too is based
upon sheer thoughtlessness and which, instead of receiving
philosophical correction and instruction, falls back upon the
imaginary demands of reverence. According to the demands of
logic, foreknowledge of all the acts of free beings are possible
but not certain since by definition these acts are contingent and
hence unknowable imtil enacted,
"The possible, therefore, cannot become the certain in the
divine mind tmtil the free will has transferred it from
the realm of the possible to the realm of fact. Apart from
this view, the doctrine of divine guidance in the affairs
of men is without meaning."
1. Bowne, B. P., "The Divine Forelcnowledge, " Zionjs
Herald, 56 (1879), p. 73.
2. ibid., p, 73,
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On this point of view, ormiscience is a conception of knowledge
•srtiich embraces all reality in all its aspects and possibilities
including not only what is but what is implied in what is and
all which can ever develop from what is. Thus from the beginning
all the possible acts and their consequences of free creatures
will be known as possible but they cajinot be knovm as certain
because by definition free acts are contingent. Thus they are
truly known only -when they become real and, prior to that, they
are in fact only possibilities and can only be knowledge in that
sense. Bornie contended that the interpretation of foreknowledge
in terms of the category of possibility is a limitation more
apparent than real due to our habit of reasoning prejudicially
rather than logically.
It novy remains to consider the objections urged against
the limitation of God's foreknowledge to the category of pos-
sibility. It is said that such a conception requires us to
postulate God's knowledge as growing and changing. Here again
the difficulty in our thought can be removed by learning to
unthink some old v/ays of thinking in the interest of accommo-
dating our theories to the facts of experience. If time and
change are true categories, a corresponding change in the divine
knowledge is inescapable. To the argument that God's purpose is
from everlasting and that the notion of God's eternal thought
denies change and time may be replied that such knowledge re-
veals only the end of creation emd denies the changing process
whereby thought is realized. Remaining true to viiat is meant
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by the free as foreknown, we must insist that the free be known
as free and contingent and that it is only when the overt act
appears that contingency disappears. Free acts flow into sai
order of law and can never cease to be so that God's experience
of those acts as possible and contingent is not the same as his
knowledge of them as facts. The divine foreknowledge consists
in knowing the possibilities of the created will so that every-
thing which happens God has foreseen as possible but vfhich he
has never before seen as actual. The passage from the possible
to the actual is by means of the free will of the finite person.
Therefore a free act on account of its contingent nature is not
proper knowledge as certain before it becomes a fact and is to
be described as a possibility if we hold true to what we mean
by knowledge and if we hold true to what the facts demand. That
God*s forelcnowledge of freedom must be knovm as free and contingent
as we have defined the category of possibility as opposed to fact
8uid reality and, as such, is derogatory to the divine character
is no essential part of the conclusion to which we have come.
There remains a point of criticism with respect to
Bovme's stmnary dismissal of the problem of the divine foreknowledge
in cormection with the category of time,
"All this on the supposition of a single, all-
conditioning time. On our own view of the ideality and
relativity of time the problem vanishes in its traditional
form, and nothing remains but the general mystery which
shrouds for us the epistemology of the Infinite and the
existence of the finite,"
1, Bowne, B.P., Theism, p. 190,
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fflhile BoT,7ne accepted the doctrine of the ideality of time, he
considerably modified its conventional form. This appears in
his OTvn argument for it has been noted how, on the reality of
time, he abandons the problem and yet his own doctrine of tiiae
provides for real change and for real time under Tirfiich change
becomes intelligible. He argues that free choices involve
changes of the sort in which all cemnot be foreseen. This, he
contends, extends to the divine foreknowledge which requires
that, however this be construed in terms of the divine knowing,
it is a lack of foreknowledge on the part of God to the extent
already stated. Just how to harmonize his contention that fore-
1
knowledge of free acts cannot be proven contradictory but on
the other hand cannot be construed in its possibility with what
he wrote eight years previously to the effect that foreknowledge
of free acts does not destroy freedom but that the notion is
2
essentially absurd and contradictory is not clear except that
his own thought had changed in the meantime. His suggestion that
God's ways of knowing must be inscrutable to us on the theory that
time is real is modified to mean on his conception of the ideality
of time to retain a sufficiently realistic view of time to make
time and change facts which condition in some sense the knowledge
of God even though Bowne admitted that the nature of the divine
volition or the psychology of the absolute remains somewhat obscur
1, Bowne, B, P. Theism
, p, 190,
2, Bowne, B. P., "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zion* s
Herald, 56 (1879), p, 73.
3, McConnell, Bishop F.J,, Is God Limited? pp, 124-125,
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One aspect of the category of possibility remains to
be examined, that is that the meaning -which vre have attached to
omniscience is not equivalent to that of chance. The identifi-
cation of the category of possibility with chance is an outcome
of confusing the abstract notion of freedom with real freedom.
Here as elsewhere, in his characteristic fashion, Bowne calls
1
attention to the extremely narrov/ limits of freedom. Bowne
points out that the order of o\ir own thoughts is largely beyond
our control as well as are the existence and order of our
feelings which are still more mechanical. The laws of our
own nature are determined as well as are the laws of external
nature. Therefore, since we can originate no new and unforeseen
possibilities, to limit divine foreknowledge does not reduce the
universe to chaos. "It is, then, sheer cant or thoughtlessness,
2
to claim that to limit foreknowledge is to endanger the universe."
Nor does God's foreknowledge of the possible only as possible
mean that God has no foreknowledge of any kind. Here, as else-
where, real or concrete freedom and uniformity tmite in rational-
ity, and, therefore, chance is not implied in freedom as we have
expounded it in relation to free acts ydiich are foreknovra. And
our conclusion is that some modified form of the ideality of time
is the only condition of the tenability of the doctrine of fore-
knowledge as related to the problem of freedom.
Freedom and the divine omnipotence constitute a
1. McConnell, Bishop F. J., Is God Limited? p, 115.
Bowne, B. P., "The Divine ForeknowledgeT" Zion's Herald, 56
(1879), p. 73.
2. Bowne, B. P., "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zion*s
Herald, 56 (1879), p. 73.
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problem about "svhich the changed temper of our own age has
required extensive reconstruction. One of tlie strongest
arguments for the illusory character of freedom is to be
found in the defense of a certain type of belief about the
divine omnipotence on the ground that freedom constitutes a
finite power vrtiich would endanger the divine sovereignty and
1
upset the plans of the \uiiverse. In view of this it is
necessary to state in '/»hat a fully philosophically instructed
definition of omnipotence is to consist. On the one hand
common sense has tended, throxigh dictionary appeal, to inflate
omnipotence to the point of including the power to do not only
the possible and the impossible but the consistent and the
2
absurd with equal facility. On the other hand vre find the
notion that God has the power to do what can be done but
that he cannot transcend the limitation of certain necessities
which are likely self-existent and eternal. Dissatisfied
with what is here thought to be an untenable subordination of
God, the tendency to swing back to the opposite view whereby
God transcends all limitations enabling him to do anything and
everything. But this view means the utter annihilation of
reason itself, yfe have already pointed out that the category
1. uif'igen reached the opposite conclusion and
"Through the conception of free-will .... reconciled the
two antithetical principles of Christian metaphysics: faith
in divine omnipotence and consciousness of sin." Cushman, H.E.,
A Beginner's History of Philosophy
,
7rol, 1, pp. 316-317.
2. Bowne, B.P., "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zion' s
Herald, 56 (1879), p. 73.
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of possibility and the category of necessity constitute not
only doubtful categories but become unclear and unmanageable
theses excepting -when conceived as based upon the self-
determination of a free agent and -when the necessity is
conceived as rational in character. If limitation is imposed
upon the divine power, its meaning can consist only in the
necessities of reason described as eternal truths. By these
God is conditioned and these impose a limitation on all
power, hvinan or divine. This is the meaning of omnipotence
which we now examine in conjunction with freedom. Our con-
clusion that the world ground is a imity excludes pluralism
in fundamental being which furnishes the basis for the further
conclusion that rational necessity and eternal truth are
united in the tinitary nature of fundamental being in such
a way that rational principles or fundamental laws of the
divine activity constitute the fixed modes of its procedure.
A rational nature conceived \mder the fom of a fixed law of
activity or mode of manifestation involves no limitation of
God.
"But a nature in the sense of a fixed law of
activity or mode of manifestation involves no such
limitation. This is best seen in a concrete case.
Thinking, we say, is governed by the laws of thought.
But these laws are not anything either out of the
mind or in the mind. Yfe feel them neither as an
external yoke nor as an internal limitation. The
reason is that they are essentially only modes of
thought activity, and are reached as formal laws by
abstraction from the process of thinking. The basal
fact is a thought activity, and reflection shows
that this has certain forms. These are next erected
into laws and imposed on the mind; and then the fancy
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arises that they are limitations and hindrances to
knowledge. In fact, however, they do not rule intellect,
but only express what intellect is. Nor is the mind
ever so conscious of itself as self-guiding and self-
controlled as when conducting a clear process of thought.
It would "be a strange proposition to free the mind and
enlarge knowledge by annulling the laws of thought,
The laws of intelligence are therefore only expressions of its
nature, not hindrances to knowledge and the laws of thought
are no barrier to thought which is conscious of itself as
self-guided and self-controlled,
Yle can do nothing with the notion of divine omnipo-
tence on the basis of the abstract manipulation of the cate-
gories of possibility and necessity. And, vixen the problem
is made concrete according to the way in which we build up
our finite experience of power, just as was seen in the case
of our notion of omniscience, we discover that ihe principles
of freedom and necessity must unite in the rationality of the
divine omnipotence. The notion of divine omnipotence independent
of uniformity reduces to pure arbitrariness and the virtual
2
destruction of reason itself. On the other hand, when we try
to think this notion independently of freedom, the \miverse
reduces to pure necessity which is equally the destruction of
reason. Freedom and necessity appear to be contradictory and
mutually exclusive as determinations of being only when con-
sidered as abstractions or as etymological deductions and in
1. Bowne, B,P,, Theism
, pp. 195-196.
2. Bo7/ne, B.P,, Metaphysics, rev. ed, p. 412,
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both these cases these have nothing to do necessarily with
their logical implications. Finite experience reveals the
only ideas of necessity and self-determination that we know.
The personal as real reveals, therefore, these formally
opposite ideas xrnited in actual experience. Buttressing
spontaneous thought there follows reflective thought T/*iich
confirms the testimony of experience that rational existence
1
is conditioned by both ideas, "We are not, howevei; to conclude
because reason is shown to be possible only through the union
of fixity and freedom, that these ideas are preexistent factors
out of which the rational life is constituted. The fundamental
reality is the rational life itself and freedom and necessity
are aspects of it which, when viewed as emtithetical, are only
apparently so to uncritical thought "hut are in reality united
and transparent to the order of reason.
"Here, as elsewhere, we must avoid abstractions and
must fall back on experience for the concrete meeming of
our terms. If we consult the dictionary only, we may
easily persuade ourselves that fixity and freedom are
incompatible; but if we consult experience, we shall
find that we cannot dispense with either. To give freedom
any significance it must be based on uniformity or fixity;
and to give this fixity any value it must be allied with
freedom. Pure necessity cancels reason. Pure arbitrar-
iness cancels reason. It is only in the union of fixity
and freedom that the rational life is possible; or
rather it is only as the rational life has these opposite
aspects that it exists. They are not preexistent factors
out of which the rational life is made; they are only
antithetical aspects of the rational life; and this is
1. Turner, J.S,, The Philosophic Basis of Moral
Obligation, p. 95. Bosanquet, B,, Implication andTinear
Inference, p. 129.
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1
the essential and only reality in the case,"
Bowne concludes that what is true for finite persons
2
in a limited sense is absolutely true for God. This requires
us to summarize briefly the result to which we have come in
regard to the rational finite person in whom the meaning of
the union of freedom and necessity has been made clear.
Volition cannot overthrow or reverse the fixed, secure,
absolute, inviolable laws of thought in the nature of reason.
Notwithstanding this fact, these laws do not ftanction automatical-
ly in the attainment of truth. Therefore, in addition to the
laws of reason, a ratifying act of corresponding self-determin-
ation by the free spirit is required to make a rational soul.
We do not in the least weaken this conclusion by admitting
that the possibility of the union of freedom and necessity
in finite rational life, by means of which act the free spirit
constitutes himself a rational soul, is inconstruable. This
mystery is nevertheless a fact of experience which is always
the last court of appeal in the sense that the data of the
problem are always to be discovered here whether that
experience be referred to in its ordinary connotation or as
transcendental empiricism.
If we now carry this conclusion into our conception
of the rational Infinite or Supreme Person, we conclude that
1* BoTOie, B.P., Theism
, pp, 196-197.
2, ibid
, ,
p. 198. This is one of the most \inequivocal
of Bowne' s statements that the personal is the truly real, "What
is tirue for ourselves in a limited degree, we may regard as
absolutely true for God."

-237-
the presence of the free absolute will of God is likewise
necessary in order to validate and to reify the otherwise
powerless necessities of the divine being, God is thus
absolute will, self-caused, absolute agent forever self-
determining according to the necessities of rational and
eternal principles, the perfect tinion of freedom and neces-
sity. This is our idea of personality in its perfection.
Two criticisms may be brought against Bowne '
s
teaching about freedom and the divine power, VIq call at-
tention to the too inclusive character of the argtment that
what is true for finite persons in a limited degree is
absolutely true for God, In the first place, tmless the
vsrtiole of Bowne 's system is critically brought before the
mind in its entirety at this point, it might appear that the
argument ceuicels theism and again returns to pantheism. That
is, if "what" (note the universal form of the proposition as
Bowne stated it) is true of finite beings in a limited degree
may be regarded as absolutely true for God, it is equivalent
to saying just the opposite of what Bowne 's entire philosophy
was designed to achieve. But BoTivne would not have us infect
the divine character with all our finite limitations. In
the second place such a notion violates our ideal of the
divine etiquette. We may correct the matter by calling
attention to Bowne 's distinction between the use of crass
and spiritual anthropomorphism and also between human and
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divine volition. If we keep ethics and reason closely linked
together, there is no objection to the study of personality
h-uman and divine as herein set forth. We finally call attention
to the question of the cogency of an analogical argument of the
sort here employed. Aristotle used analogy (^^ltpfl^&^y^f as a
form of inference and discovery and since his day it has iDecome
almost universal in the realm of htcnan inquiry. "It has always
1
played an especially significant r6le In theology." While
this method of reasoning may commit the fallacies of false
analogy and of falling into hasty generalization, it cannot "be
gainsaid that it nevertheless lies at the very basis of deduc-
tive and inductive procedure and is one of the most fruitful
methods of inquiry for suggesting hypotheses in science and
philosophy and religion. The cogency of the hypothesis here
set forth which requires the union of freedom and necessity in
ethical personality rests upon its ability not to explain all
problems for which it is proposed as an explanation, much less
does it aim to be an explanation of the explanation, but it
is advanced as the most coherent interpretation of most of the
difficult problems of philosophy. If the divine omnipotence
is under the control of an absolutely ethical and rational will,
freedom is the one condition under which we can think the world
as creative and in the higiaest sense of the word purposive.
1. Hobinson, D. S., The Principles of Reasoning
.
p. 298.
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In order to laiify the career of reason in connection
with freedom as its analytically necessary precondition and
apart from vrhich it must collapse, we call attention directly
to the relation between freedom and rational ideals. The
argument thus far shows conclusively how rational ideals are
fundamentally conditioned by the truth of reason. Free
activity is the condition of the formation of any rational
1
ideal. This must be so because freedom has been shown to
be the sole condition of the possibility of discovering any
distinction betvfeen truth and error. In the face of the
nattire of the evidence which has been educed in favor of this
point, we can no longer argue with one who refuses to recognize
the grotmds of both life and reason as having any imperative
claims worthy of consideration. Any rational ideal requires
that the distinction between truth and error be made apparent,
otherwise the ideal loses its significance entirely. Then,
too, freedom not only conditions the power to form rational
ideals but is the condition of the appropriation of any
rational ideal. To refuse to think annuls the entire problem
for the rational ideal is a product of choosing to think and
the assumption of the responsibility for consistent thinking.
But thinking becomes enigmatic and puerile apart from freedom.
The ideal is not possessed by persons apart from a free act of
1. Brightman, E.S., A Philosophy of Ideals
, p. 84.
Bowne, B. P., Metaphysics , rev. ed, pp. 406, 408'. Personalism ,
pp, 199-200, Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles, p. 169.
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ratification and acknowledgement of it as belonging to them.
The individual finds that he must be free to accept the ideal
as his and to recognize it as such before responsibility can
be attached. Then, finally, freedom enters as the condition
1
of the realization of ideals. The execution of the ideal
requires the selection of that action "which conforms to the
adopted pattern. This means that an ideal, in order to be
realized, implies a freely chosen purpose vdiich is freely sus-
tained and this in tiirn requires the free choice of the means
necessary to its achievement. Unless the will is free to ac-
cept and reject in every stage of the attainm.ent of the ideal
that -which does or does not conform respectively to the purpose
in the light of the chosen ideal, there can be no such thing as
knowledge of any sort whether our ideal be that of scientific
knowledge or of moral knowledge or of philosophical knov/ledge
or of religious knowledge. We have therefore shown that freedom
is basic to the ideals of reason and that the career of reason
in science, morality, philosophy and religion respectively and,
in fact, in all rational ideals is involved in the fact of
freedom.
Reconstruction of the Problem of Freedom
In the Light of Present Insight,
The fundamental conclusions reached concerning the
1. Bov/ne, B,P,, Metaphysics, rev, ed, p, 405.
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deep speculative significance of freedom may be summarized as
follows. We call attention first to four significant con-
clusions which show its deep speculative significance for
epistemology. First, the essential trustworthiness of reason
presupposes that thought is a free activity based on rational
insight and on no other condition can the reason be considered
trustworthy. Secondly, the necessary epistemological dualism
involved in our finite knowing finds its only possible solution
in the metaphysical notion of a free creator. Thirdly, the
primacy of the moral or practical reason requires freedom to
prevent life from falling into collapse due to inner contra-
diction. Fourthly, the creative activity of thought is con-
ditioned by both freedom and necessity but the active mind as
free is the condition of the production, emergence, novelty
and change in the world which is little less than outright
creation. We secondly call attention to the deep speculative
significance of freedom for metaphysics. First, freedom is the
condition of any real explanation. Secondly, in personality we
find the only union of the categories of change and identity.
That is, free creative intelligence, through self-consciousness,
can maintain its identity through change. Thirdly, the rational
demand for unity is conditioned upon freedom for free conscious
self-hood is the only real tmity which we know and reason reveals
it to be the only individual and concrete reality capable of a
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true unity. Here we find in free intelligence the sotiroe of
both ixnity and plurality and capable, through self-consciousness,
of maintaining its unity as over against plurality. Fourthly,
the notion of causation ends in infinite regress and self-
contradiction iinless elevated to the personal and volitional
plane. Fifthly, the highest type of purpose, that of rational
intelligence, involves freedom. Sixthly, creation implies
freedom in the structtire of the divine reason v^hich makes
creation possible. Seventhly, the doubtful categories of
possibility and necessity are meaningless and unmanageable
theses and find no clear meaning except when based upon the
self-determination of a free agent and rational necessity.
Free personality is the key to reality, or free
self-activity is a basic postulate of Bowne's metaphysical
system. He made freedom equal in importance with self-
consciousness. Further, he made freedom the fundamental pre-
supposition of epistemology. He also made freedom the fundamental
presupposition of metaphysics for only the free is the truly real.
These three conclusions following as a result of the nature of
personality are sufficient to constitute personalism a unique
doctrine in connection with its bearing upon the postulate of
freedom.
Freedom as a principle for extending any rational
knowledge is indispensable. The permanent significance of any
rational science is conditioned by a free rational ideal apart
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from irtiich the mind loses its integrity not only for science
but for any field of knowledge whatsoever. And this leads to
the insight that freedom has a permanent significance for all
philosophy. Nor is this the -whole truth for freedom as a
Gedankenmethode is not capable of adequate appreciation. "The
factor introduced by htunan freedom, then, is one of -whose pos-
1
sibilities vre can form no adequate ideal," It is not un-
reasonable to say that freedom is the condition of indefinite
progress or the extension of rational knov;-ledge in any and all
directions and apart from yfhich the career of reason is
terminated. Mental evolution especially must be grotinded in
freedom and can continue only so long as it is so conditioned.
Instead of freedom being 1* enfant terrible of science, it is
finally revealed to be the Siamese twin of its soul. All valid
science is a product of thought and it is in thinking that we
discover the purest illustration of freedom, "We direct and
maintain attention, we criticize the successive steps of the
argument, we look before and after, we think twice and reserve
our decisions. The process goes on within reason itself,
2
reason strpplying the motive, the norm, and the driving force,"
1. McConiiell, Bishop F.J,, Is God Limited? p, 118.
Bowne, B.P,, Introduction to PsychologTcal Theory,~p, 229,
"Since, then, the very natxxre of explanation refers us to
facts and processes outside of itself as its own foundation, we
need not be concerned at finding in freedom a fact which admits
of no deduction or comprehension, — a fact to be recognized and
admitted, not deduced or comprehended," Metaphysics, rev, ed.,
pp. 416-417,
2, Bowne, B, P,, Metaphysics
,
rev, ed,, p. 406,
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It is only as the free and active mind is able to posit a
rational ideal and then control the condition of its realization
that knovrledge is extended.
With these conclusions before us the case for freedom
can be more adequately formulated than Boivne^s conclusion which
argues that the contradictory of freedom can lead at best to
no more than a drawn battle. It is true enough that freedom
1
and necessity are both improved hypotheses or ideals of
explanation neither of which in the nature of the case can
be absolutely proven. But if there be no better argiinent for
freedom than to say that its contradictory is unable to
demonstrate the falsity of freedom the ground for freedom
itself is in danger. For the disproof of mechanism does not
necessarily prove the truth of freedom, nor does the truth of
mechanism within limits disprove the fact of freedom. On the
other hand, freedom if considered to be proved need not disprove
the truth of mechanism. If freedom is true it must be true for
good reasons eund this is equally binding upon the argument for
necessity. Even though it is an assumption that reality is
rational and even though this is an ideal which can only be
partially achieved, the relative coherence of freedom as an
hypothesis can be shown to explain the relevant facts far
more satisfactorily than on any other view,
"With the scope and content of Bowne ' s doctrine
!• Royce, Josiah, Studies of Good and Evil
,
pp. 128, 136-137.
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before tis we may now direct our study to the question of the
superiority of Bowne^s doctrine of freedom when compared with
leading contemporary theories. Despite the fact that the last
word, even today, remains \insaid concerning the problem of
1
freedom and ftirther that it is frankly recognized that we
lack an actual test by which a problem such as this can be
2
solved, we at the same time recognize that "The problem of
freedom, both in its narrow sphere of personal free-will and
in its larger social significance, is one which has merited
3
the attention of all peoples in history." The attitude of
modern philosophy toward the problem of freedom is well stated
by A. Fouillle: "The problem which we are going to discuss is
not only a philosophical problem; it is, par excellence the
problem for philosophy. All the other questions are bound up
4
with this," The manner in which Fouillie here speaks char-
acterizes not only modern French philosophy in which freedom
is the central problem but also to a very large extent German,
English and American philosophy diiring the same period. Two
factors contributed to the re-opening of the problem of freedom
in modern and contemporary philosophical thought. First, the
scientific dogmatism which affirmed determinism, in such a way
that personality as respects man's actions, beliefs and morals
1. Brightiran, E,S,, A Philosophy of Ideals
,
p. 199.
2, Carr, H.W.
,
Changing Backgrotinds in Religion and
Ethics, p. 100.
3, Gtmn, J,A,, Modern French Philosophy
,
p, 136.
4. Fouillee, A,, Libert^ et Determinism'e, Preface.
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became intolerable, inevitably led to a restudy of the problem
1
of freedom. Secondly, the unsatisfactory solution of the
2
problem as philosophers inherited it from Kant required the
attempt at a more satisfactory solution of the problem of
freedom. The extent to which the problem of freedom has
become the central problem in modern philosophy may be seen
in the folloYring list of defenders of the doctrine in one form
or another. Practically all the great modern thinkers in France
have made freedom the central problem in their philosophy:
Cournot, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Lachelier, Fouillee, Boutroux,
Blondel, Brochard and Henri Bergson have produced powerful
dialectic in its defense. In Germany, Hans Driesoh, Muller-
Preienfels, Jung, Lotze, Nicolai Hartmann and N, Lossky defend
in their writings some form of freedom. In England, W. R. Boyce
Gibson, J, S. Mackenzie, Louis Arnand Reid, Martineau, C. A.
Richardson, James Seth, IT, E. Johnson, William Brown, and
IT, R, Sorley defend in their vrritings the doctrine of freedom.
In America, James, Royce, M, V/, Calkins, Bowne, and the personal-
iatic school, Peirce, E. G. Spa\ilding, William McDougall and
1Y, E. Hocking have all defended freedom in their writings. From
this im.posing array of modern and contemporary scholarship, it
will serve our purpose to select only a few whose positions
serve by way of comparison and contrast with that of Bov/ne to
1, Bri'ghtman, E.S,, Religious Values, p, 206,
2, Tsanoff, Radoslav Andrea, "Freedom as an Ethical
Postulate: Kant," Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edvfin
Creighton, pp. ei-TT.
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evaluate the letter's teaching about freedom.
In the writings of M. Bergson, we find an outstanding
contemporary statement of the problem of freedom as it has
developed through the work of many of his colleagues yet
modified in several important respects by his own point of
view. Freedom is described largely in terms of spontaneity,
hazard, chance and an ambiguous future in its cosmic implicationf,
"The portals of the f\iture stand wide open, the future is being
1
made." This means that there is a place for creative evolution,
development, novelty and real beginnings. But at this point M,
Bergson breaks with a doctrine of freedom like that of Renouvier
and prefers to follow Guyau in the denial of the doctrine of
Providence and prevision, holding that his tychism implies only
nouveaute in the universe. He denies outright the position of
determinism and affirms a doctrine of contingency in both nature
and personality. But in his supreme stress upon the reality of
freedom, unlike Boutrotix, M. Bergson completely excludes all
question of teleology. He argues that freedom is not a dattim
of experience either directly or indirectly since it is a power
anterior to acts. The view of freedom vrhich he expounds is
largely independent of all religious implications. The solution
of the problem cannot be understood apart from his view of the
notion of change, or la^ duroe . The liberating objective of M,
Bergson* s freedom is the atteir^t to provide a place for the
1. Gum\, J.A., Modem French Philosophy
,
p, 168.
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freedom of the hxurian will as a creative activity in the universe
which delivers us from the physical determinism of the natural
sciences and consequently necessity and fatalism and from the
psychological determinism of associationalistic or atomistic
1
psychology. We are indeterminate creative spirits with great
power of creation hut M. Bergson is careful to deny in free
creativity all finalism and teleology which he regards as
merely a reversed mechanism, M, Bergson teaches absolute
contingency in his evolution of the world, but, nevertheless,
his anti-teleological conception of the world has opened his
system to the charge of pessimism however freedom and the notion
of progress, possibility and development also make for optimism.
There is little to add to James' doctrine of freedom
after that of M, Bergson has been understood except to point
out that James did not accept such a thorough-going doctrine
of indeterminism or absolute contingency as that expounded by
M, Bergson who so greatly influenced him. Nevertheless James'
doctrine of freedom is characterized by placing determinism and
freedom in antithesis "whereas the true antithesis is between
2
determinism and indeterminism."
Bowne's historical connection with M. Bergson and
James was stated in the section on his relation to modern
philosophy, ""ue reserved for this section of the study a
1, Bergson, Henri, Les Pennies immediate s de la
Conscience
,
lte,ti§re et Memoire
, L* Evolution Creatrice.
2. Johnson, W.E., Logic
,
Part 3, Introduction xxxiii.
Professor Johnson believes Dr. G, Ward first advanced this notion
which Pearse and 'T. James more explicitly followed. The author
evidently means Peirce and la:. James Ward in this reference.
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critical comparison of their ideas atout freedom. M. Bergson
and James represent largely anti-intellect-ualistic revolts
against natiaralism on the one hand and absolute idealism on
the other. Bowne, in his attempt to -unite rationalism and
empiricism counteracted these voluntaristic doctrines of
freedom "by introducing reason into the problem of freedom and
determinism. He further recognized that the true antithesis
lies not between freedom and determinism but rather between
1
determinism and indeterminism. Bowne never meant to affiiin
by freedom the doctrine of •uncaused events which absolute
2
contingency or the -unconditioned will wo-uld seem to imply.
His great discovery was the -union of freedom and -uniformity in
Z
rationality as the only solution of the problem of freedom.
Then, too, Bowne showed how the category of teleology or
p-urpose is involved in the nature of free intelligence. Final
causality is p-urposive and must be interpreted as will informed
4
by an intelligent p-urpose. It therefore appears that,while
freedom is the central problem in M. Bergson' s philosophy, he
does not use the term in the sense of the power of contrary
choice between alternatives inasm-och as it conflicts with nis
metaphysical notion of change and time. Further, his extra-
ordinary definition of freedom as expressed in terms of
absolute contingency, while it provides for novelty, progress
and development, leaves much to be desired. The vital -urge or
1. Turner, J.E. , The Philosophic Basis of Moral
Obligation
, p. 102.
2. Cf. Brown, William, Mind and Personality
, pp.86-87.
3. Cf
. James, William, Principles of Psychology
.
Vol.2,
p. 572. "My belief is tioat the question of free-will is insol-uble
on strictly psychologic grounds."
4. Bowne, B.P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge
, p. 106.
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indeterminism in the cosmos is equivalent to saying that nature
realizes undesigned results. This evolutionary hypothesis of
M. Bergson is the embodiment of an IIan vital which, while a
psychical entity, appears capricious and independable. This
leaves the world of both nature and personality without
rational autonomy, "Believing that personal autonomy, a
power of deliberative choice between alternatives, is indis-
pensable to a worthy conception of freedom, we can award only a
1
limited appreciation-to Bergsori*s treatment of the subject,"
Moreover, Bowne's view of freedom has, among other interests, a
strongly religious presupposition. The extent to which M, Bergson
has affirmed the power of creativity to finite spirits which is
a characteristic of many recent pluralisms is a demand with
which Bo\7ne*s notion of freedom does not fully accord. Free
creative activity is for Bowne entailed in God's activity but,
in human life, activity is only remotely analogous to it. At
this point Bowne's doctrine has, I think, been legitimately
2
' extended by conservative thinkers. The charge of pessimism
brought against M, Bergson' s conception of an ant i-teleological
\iniverse is supplemented by Bowne's notion of freedom as related
to ptirposive intelligence and this provides for optimism and
progress in the light of a rational goal of history. Finally,
neither James nor M, Bergson discuss freedom in any other than
1. She Idon, H.C,, Pantheistic Dilemmas and Other Essays
in Philosophy and Religion
,
p, 103.
2, Hocking, W.E,, "Mind and Near-Mind," Proceedings of
the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy
, pp. 203-215,
McDougall, Yailiam, Outline of Psychology
,
p. 44T,
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its ethical and metaphysical implications, including the notion
of progress and creative evolution, Bov/ne, on the other hand,
recognized the ethical, historical and metaphysical implications
of freedom but he stressed as these men did not freedom as the
foimdation of epistemology, that is, its relation to reason.
From the point of view of personal freedom, M, Bergson affirmed
his objective to consist in the discovery of a theory of freedom
intermediate between ethical ajid psychological freedom, not equi-
1
distant from both but slightly nearer the notion of free will.
In the main, M, Bergson* s theory and solution of the problem of
2
freedom are ambiguous. Y^ith respect to clearness and intelligi-
bility and to inclusivenoss, the use which Bowne makes of freedom
affords a fundamental satisfaction of the demands of rational
explanation in a way in which M. Bergson' s does not.
The doctrine of freedom defended by Josiah Royce
represents the attempt to harmonize freedom with personal
absolutism. His interest in freedom was primarily ethical and
metaphysical although he also affirmed psychological freedom,
Royce himself recognized that
"No accusation is more freq\ient than that an Idealism
which has once learned to view the world as a rational
whole, present in its actuality to the unity of a single
consciousness, has then no room either for finite individ-
uality, or for freedom of ethical action, "3
1. LeRoy, Edouard, The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson,
p. 193,
2. Carr, H,TV,, Changing Backgrounds in Religion and
Ethics
, pp. 98-100,
3. Royce, J,, The 'Yorld and the Individual, Vol. 1,
p, 433.
(
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It was this charge -which Royce felt that he cotild satisfactorily
meet by removing the objection that absolute idealism is but a
form of spiritual determinism. He undertook to show that both
God's will emd our finite will get consciously expressed in the
world without any contradiction on the hypothesis of absolutism.
Can finite lives retain any individuality and freedom in the
face of the unity of the whole divine life? Royce argued that
"you are in God; but you are not lost in God."^ The finite
will is an expression of the divine will by virtue of which it
is an expression of its own will so far as it acts with definite
intent,
"Therefore are you in action Free and Individual, just
because the unity of the divine life, when taken
together with the uniqueness of this life, implies
in every finite being just such essential originality
of meaning as that of which you are conscious. "2
Nevertheless Royce denied the self all independent being
although the self is a life and not an abstract law. It does
however have individuality through its relation to God in whom
it dwells as an individual and of whose purpose it is the xinique
expression. "This world that Tre live in is, in its wholeness,
the expression of one determinate and absolute purpose, the
3
fulfilment of the divine will." Finite freedom is extremely
limited due to heredity and environment but, insofar as it
attempts to uniquely express the divine will, it is free. Man,
Royce, Josiah, The Wor Id and the Individual
,
Vol. 1,
p. 465,
2. ibid.. Vol. 1, p. 470.
3. ibid.. Vol. 2, p. 292.
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as an object of the world of description, is determined, but, as
an object of the world of apprehension or meaning, he is free.
And yet how we can affirm the will and individuality of the self
as free while at the same tine affirming the unity of the world
and of the divine plan upon which the vriiole depends is still
problematic. For where there are no independent beings, how
can there be any free beings? Freedom lies in my reciprocity
with all else in the universe. My choices effect the whole
world of Being just as a change in Being changes me. Royce
here affirmed a universal teleology v^hich is the opposite ex-
1
treme of M. Bergson's denial of teleology. He admitted the
legitimacy of novelty and progress as resulting from freedom
and agrees that "One now has to talk (although such speech is,
by hypothesis, but illusory) of progress, which means novel good
entering a world that has thus far lacked its presence. One has
2
to treat nature as if she could be made better." Yfe have pre-
viously shown how the pluralistic personal ism of Leibnitz was
essentially deterministic but how the h\imn self can be free to
choose where the universe is conceived as an organic whole of
interrelated and active selves is a point where the absolutist
usually becomes strained in his argument. The absolutist argues
that each self is in reality but a mode or phase or on© way of
the Absolute *s experiencing, hence every self is but the expres-
1. Royce, Josiah, The Yiforld and the Individual, Vol. 2,
p. 328.
2. Royce, Josiah, Studies of Good and Evil, p. 135.
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8ion of the purpose of the absolute and can express no free
purpose of its own. The possibility therefore of a finite
will's choosing any purpose opposed to the divine will is
a contradiction in Being since every self foras an identical
part of the absolute self. To say that the Absolute wills
the finite individual's choices or volitions but in a dif-
ferent way from that in which the finite self wills them
constitutes the method by which the absolutist attempts to
cut the Sordian knot. In this sense Royce argued that God
wills our finite volitions even when they are sinful in a way
that they are already "atoned for" by the universe.
"Thus, the rebellious purpose of the finite self,
though indeed experienced and even willed by the
Absolute, differs from the Absolute's purpose by
the essential difference between part and whole;
and the Absolute's will differs from the human
self's will merely, but significantly, by trans-
cending it."
Hoyce has insisted that the self has individuality in the
Absolute but no independence, nevertheless he argued for the
freedom of choice in finite selves.
From Bowne's point of view, Royce 's conception of
freedom is more apparent than real, that is, his solution of
the problem of freedom is largely a verbal solution. Both
would affirm the doctrines of creation and teleology but
the freedom affirmed by Bowne demands that finite persons
1. Calkins, M.W., The Persistent Problems of
Philosophy
, pp. 478-479.
(I
I )
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are created not only with individiaality "but with a degree of
1
independence and impenetrability which Hoyce would not allow,
Bowne of course affirmed that ontologically everything depends
on God "but that free creation gives man a measiore both of
independence and dependence upon God. Both Soyce and Bowne
were interested in freedom because of its ethical and religious
implications but here again Hoyce, like James and Bergson, did
not, as Bowne did, find in freedom the foundation of epistemo-
logy and the condition of any and all rationality whatsoever.
Then, too, as we showed in Bowne 's application of freedom to
the problem of religion, the problem of evil becomes all but
insoluble on any pantheistic absolutistic scheme. In the
same way, the problem of error becomes equally difficult, for
absolute idealism, try as it will, can scarcely avoid every-
thing's becoming enveloped by the maw of the Absolute.
"Undermine finite personality, as personalism
conceives it, and you open the dyice that lets
in the pantheistic flood that turns creation
into 'a vast dead sea occupied by God alone.'
Here it is that Bowne 's form of personalism diverges
sharply from the numerically monistic personalism,
or absolute idealism, of so many of his eminent
contemporaries, that of the late Professor Royce,
for example."^
In the last analysis, absolute idealism constitutes a spiritual
determinism which, at least as Royce expo\mded it, sacrifices
1. Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth, The Idea of God in
the Light of Recent Philosophy
, pp. 263, 266-268, 289-290.
2. Duncan, G. M., "Bowne vs. Determinism and
Pantheism," Methodist Review
.
105 (1922), p. 385.
I
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1
the individual finite person to the absolute person. It
is correct to say that there are some problems that neither
the hypothesis of personal absolutism nor personal idealism
can solve "but, in view of the facts of experience as we
know then, we seem to have "both a measure of self-control
and a measure of determinism in personality in view of which
it would appear that Bowne's doctrine of freedom does "better
justice "by the greater number of facts involved than does that
of Royce.
We now turn to the consideration of some contemporary
doctrines of freedom more nearly in accord with the fundamental
burden of Bowne's teaching about freedom* It has been pointed
out that the doctrines of freedom as set forth by M. Bergson,
James and Royce made no use of freedom as an epistemological
foundation. The relation between freedom and reason was
shown in Bowne's teaching about freedom to reveal not only
the clearest illustration of freedom which we possess but
it revealed in addition the fact that the career of reason
must end in disillusionment and collapse where freedom is
denied. We saw how both Ulrici and Renouvier have in recent
philosophy stressed this teaching with which Bowne was certainly
acquainted. At the present time there are, in the philosophical
writings of W. E. Johnson, Louis Arnaud Reid, E. G. Spaulding
1, Royce 's most distinguished disciple in America,
Miss M.W. Calkins, insists that a distinction should be made
between those absolute idealists who do not and those who do
sacrifice the individuality and independence of finite persons
to the absolute person.
II
I
(
I
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and E. S. Brightman, to "be found, interpretations of the
relation between freedom and reason identical in character
with the point of view set forth "by Bowne. Professor Reid
1
shows that reason "may even "be the real condition of freedom."
For him, "Seasonable choice, ; ... iB in some sense free choice.
He rejects, as did Bowne, freedom in the sense of indetennin-
ism which means unmotivated choice and hence leaves the
nature of choice a mystery. It is only when reflective
thinking is achieved that man becanes to some extent free.
It is in the process of reflection that we are capable of
facing a choice between two or more alternatives and are
free to rise above the mechanisms of consciousness in order
to contemplate other courses of action. The element of delay
characteristic of reflection helps us to discover the locus
of freedom in experience. In this pause is to be found the
real explanation of all voluntary conduct. "The development,
then, of the power of reasoning reflection makes possible the
revelation to our mental eye of an ever increasingly wide
range of both quantity and quality of choices from which rwe
4
may select." If we deny the freedom of theoretical
thinking, all science and theory become a farce including
1. Reid, L.A», "Reason and Freedom," The Monist,
34 (1924), p. 528.
2. ibid . , p. 530.
3. Reid, L.A. , "Reason and Freedom," The Monist
.
34 (1924), p. 531. Cf. Bowne, B.P., Theory of Thow^t and
Knowledge
. pp. 17-18.
4. ibid ., p. 534.
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the theory that judges them to be farcical. Freedom alone
saves reason from Protagorean relativity. In considering
the relation of reflection to choice it is well to point
out that the mental life is both free and determined,
"Evolution, heredity, environment, education, etc.,
have elevated us to a condition in which we are able
to reflect; reflection, though conditioned by
instinctive propensities, such as curiosity, is
yet free from our own impulses in the sense that
we are able to step back as it were, to contemplate
them and the ends they subserve, and, further, to
value various alternatives by a reference to some
wider and more ultimate end."^
It is not in choice that we are free but in the process of
choosing; it is while we pause that we are mentally free
for there is before us perhaps a series of alternatives from
which reflection may undertake to choose action which in-
volves more or less worthy ends. The overt act or choice
once made, we are then determined according to the laws
governing the consequences of our action. "Choosing is
freedom from impulse and the revelation of a wide range of
possibilities; and when we freely choose, we freely choose
2
to be determined by one end or another." Both Professor
Eeid and Bowne find freedom in reflective choosing rather
than in choice which is always determined and at this point
offer a criticism of Professor James' problem of will:
1. Reid, L.A. , "Reason and Freedom," The Monist
,
34 (1924), p. 535. Cf. Bowne, B.P., Metaphysics , rev. ed. p. 406.
Hocking, W.E. , The Self Its Bod.v and Freedom, p. 149.
2. ibid.
,
p. 536.
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"Ideal imptilse plus X> instinctive propensity.
"As a matter of fact, James desires this formula
to appear paradoxical because he himself finds the
problem of freedom insoluble, and thinks of that which
determines the will as some kind of magic entity. His
whole view, like that of many other defenders of freedom,
seems to be invalidated by a desire to discover freedom
in the wrong place, i.e., in choice itself. But choice
is always determined, as we saw. Choosing, on the other
hand, is free, and is the only thing free."
In the doctrine of freedom set forth by Professor
W. E. Hocking, the relation between freedom and reason is
also clearly brought out when he says that " causes are not
2
reasons
, and reasons are not causes." In this way it is
shown that mental process is in part rational and therefore
the causes discovered by physical-psychology are not equivalent
3
to mind. Here we have a recognition of two types of events,
one purely causal and the other partially rational and which
are neither parallel nor congruent with each other. The
meaning of saying that reasons are not causes lies in point-
ing out that causes are identifiable with forces but reason
represents another type of causation. In this sense it is
not affirmed that events are uncaused but that the conditions
of their appearance as found in freedom are different from
those which are grounded in physical causality. It is a merit
of Bowne's work that he discussed the whole problem of freedom
in connection with the category of causality. Again, Professor
1. Eeid, L.A. , "Reason and Freedom," The Monist, 34
(1924), p. 537.
2. Hocking, W.E. , "Miud and Near-Mind," Proceedings
of the Sixth International Cong:resa of Philosophy
, p. 205.
3. Hocking, W.E. , The Self Its Body and Freedom ,
pp. 168-169.
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Hocking's stress on freedcan to the effect that "The degrees of
OTir freedcan are the degrees of o-ur own reality. . . • We may
say, if we like, that we are free In proportion as we are
1
rational and reflective;" Bowne made this distinction the
very heart of his teaching about freedom. The free only is
2
the truly real for him. Another interesting parallel "between
Bowne and Professor Hocking as regards their notions of freedom
lies in the relation of free personality to immortality.
Professor Hocking well sums up their positions when he says
that
"Unless in the use of freedom a self has freely
resigned freedom and made itself 'a part of nature
and not something in contrast to nature' there is
no presumption, scientific or otherwise, that this
nature must circ-umscribe its destiny."
Then, too, their doctrines are alike in affirming a literally
indeterminate future in order to provide for the kind of
freedom which they assert. This does not mean that freedom
and necessity are antithetical hut that there is, if freedom
"be true, a not altogether unambiguous fut-ure. The contingency
of the laws of nature mfikes it possible for freedom, defined
as a limited indetermlnlsm, to be true without abrogation of
4
and interference with physical laws.
A similar position to that Just stated is to be
1. Hocking, W.E. , The Self Its Body and Freedom , p. 170.
2. Knudson, A.C., The Philoso-phy of Personalism , p. 433.
3. Hocking, W.E. , The Self Its Body and Freedom , p. 177.
4. ibid .
, pp. 157-165. Cf. Bowne, B.P., Personalism .
pp. 206-210.
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fotmd in the writings of Professor W, E. Johnson who also
discusses freedom in its connections with reason and causality*
"By direct introspection, I feel assured that I can
assign the cause of any one of my acts of will; hut
it is only with considerable doubt that I would
venture to formulate rules in accordance with which
I invariably act. In virtue of this assurance I
maintain that, in willing, I am both free and
determined: determined , because my volition is not
uncaused; free , because the immediate causal
determinants of my volition are within my own
consciousness,"^
Causal determination of the will is not deducible from
observed "uniformity of behavior in oneself, other persons
or the race, or in animals. It is further pointed out that
this introspected freedom which furnishes a somewhat direct
knowledge of the immediate causes of volition should not
lead us to reject determinism in this sense as being material-
istic nor should we with J. S. Kill assume that freedom makes
the claim that the effects of volition are knowable apriori
without recourse to experience. I do experience desire and
cognition upon introspection and these factors appear as
causes of volition. But I am far more intimately acquainted
with these psychical processes than with the physiological
processes which reveal the physical effects of any act of
will. Then, too, Professor Johnson strikes a decidedly
Bownean strain when he points out that to recognize determinism
1. Johnson, W.E., Logic
. Part 3, Introduction,
xxzii-xxxiii, p. 123*
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within consciousness does not mean that the will has "been
assigned a kind, of causality borrowed from and like unto the
mechanical type of causation obtaining in physical phenomena.
Quite the contrary is true, for, as history reveals the truth,
it is causation of the type experienced in human volitions
that science has borrowed and falsely applied to physical
phenomena. Causal volition constitutes a problem for inves-
ti^tion concerning which science, here as in other psycholog-
ical branches, is supreinely ignorant. The postulate of
freedom is, then, as we have shown, the central problem in
modern and contemporary philosophy, but nowhere have we found
it more clearly and systematically expounded in connection
with the career of reason than in the philosophy of Borden
P. Bowne. ^^owhere do we find its epistemological significance
worked out in connection with reason as such or in the fields
of h\iman enterprize, science, philosophy, religion and
morality in more thorough-going and painstaking manner.
Conclusions
Ihe conclusions, then, to which this research in
Bowne 's doctrine of the deep spec\ilative significance of
freedom leads may be stated as follows:
1, Freedom and vmiformity must unite in rationality
and neither can dispense with the other. That is, absolute
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freedoia and absolute determinism are "both incoherent concepts.
2. Freedom has a deep speculative significance for
epistemology in that it constitutes the source of our discovery
of truth and error,
3. The speculative significance of ITeedom for meta-
physics is revealed in the fact that "without assuming a free
cause as the source of the outer world the mind is unable to
satisfy its own rational nature or to bring any line of thought
to an end." (jsowne, B.P., Metaphysics , rev. ed.
, p. 408)
Explanation, the rational deoiand for unity, the solution of the
antinomies supplied by the categories of monism and plioralism
and change and identity all demand freedom.
4. freedom is required in order to solve the pro-
blem of religion as one of the most valuable attributes of
personality human or divine. The problems of creation, evil,
omniscience and omnipotence all require freedom for their
solution.
5. All rational ideals, e.g., those of science,
philosophy and religion, demand freedom as the condition of
their formation, appropriation and realization.
6. The status of freeaom is that of an improved
hypothesis, basic to mental life apart from which reason
cannot function significantly, which, although incapable of
perfect deduction, is shown to be the most reasonable
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explanation of all the relevant facts.
7. The deep speculative significance of freedom
constitutes a factor in experience whose possibilities are
infinite.
Summary
The integrity of the study of the deep speculative
significance of freedom lies in having shown that freedom is
a problem in the proper sense and that its solution, while not
admitting of a perfect deduction, is nevertheless a necessary
postulate or idea of reason. Freedom has at times been regarded
as a significant speculative postulate of thought, at others as
an incoherent hypothesis, and finally it has even been regarded
as an -ELberwundener Standpunkt . IThile Bowne recogpized the value
of the history of philosophy to prevent needless repetition of
the errors of thought, he also recognized a positive contritution
to his doctrine made especially by modern philosophies. From
the determinism of Leibnitz, the concept of noumenal freedan as
expounded by Kant, the absolutist doctrine of Hegelian freedom
and the determinism of Herbart, he found little more than nega-
tive instruction. From Berkeley, Lotze and, more in particular
from Ulrici and Renouvier, he found much in accordance with
a sound doctrine of freedom in general, and a direct contribu-
tion to his own doctrine of the deep speculative significance
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of freedom. Neither of tiiem made the doctrine f-undamental to
their systems in the way in which Bowne stressed it.
The imture of freedom lies in a new "beginning, hence
a free act is not represented prior to its occtirrence hy any-
thing tl-iat must lead to it. This prohlem is inductively inves-
tigated with no purpose of demonstrating a theorem hut rather
of solving a problem which requires as its solution no explana-
tion of how freedom is made or is possible but only to show
that it is a necessary postulate of the rational life apart
from which the career of reason collapses. This conclusion
is not the result of immediate insight or intuition but it is
a deduced necessity. Freedom is approached in connection
with the category of causality and the self in such a way
that personality as dynamic or volitional causality is the
constitutive notion of the truly real.
Hence it is shown that freedom is the condition of
any and all science and philosophy since every necessitarian
scheme destroys reason, the distinction between truth and
error. For all rational ideals, including those of science,
morality, philosophy and religion, freedom has a deep specula-
tive significance in that it conditions their formation,
appropriation and realization. The question of freedom enters
intimately into the very struxjture of reason and proves to be
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the source of the discovery of "both truth and error in knowledge.
The relation of freedom to science reveals the latter to be one
of the great achievements of human freedom. While the clearest
illustration of freedom is to "be found in reason, the most signi-
ficant field of freedom is to he found in the moral realm.
The relation of freedom to philosophy shows that freedom is
necessary not only for the solution of the problem of error
but is required at the very foundation of the cosmos inasmuch
as freedom is the only condition of any real explanation, the
only possible solution of the problem involved in thinking the
categories of change and identity, the only ground for the
achieving of the rational demand for \mity and at the same
time providing for the pluralistic aspect of experience, and
finally the condition of the unification of a system of things
with a common source into a plan or purposeful activity. When
we turn to the ideal of religion, free creation offers the only
solution of the problems of good and evil, foreknowledge, omni-
science and omnipotence. We find the notions of freedom and
creativity implying each other. It is the notion of freedom
and not that of necessity of which we can forui any clear idea.
Without freedom, the categories of thought and being are
plunged into insoluble antinomies before which the reason is
impotent.
A study of this rational epistemic significance of
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freedom in recent contemporary thought shows that Bbwne's
doctrine exhibits superior insight in formulating the prohlem
of freedom in such a way that the antithesis is presented "be-
tween determinism and indeterminism rather than "between deter-
minism and freedom. It is also revealed in its superior insight
that the clearest illustration of freedom lies in the process
of thought itself where freedom and intelligence prove to be
insepara"ble and therefore stand or fall together. Freedom and
uniformity are united in rationality likewise and one cannot
exist without the other. The epistemological significance of
freedom is not developed in the works of James, Royce and M.
Bergson. In those present yyriters such as W.E.Hocking, Louis
Arnaud Reid, E. G. Spaulding and 7i. E. Johnson, excepting
Bowne's disciples where the doctrine has "been taken largely
for granted, we do not find the relation "between freedom and
reason recognized by philosophers in general to the extent it
deserves in view of its significance as a philosophical princi-
ple of investigation. Nevertheless, freedom as such has become
the central problem of philosophy.
Finally, the root notion of Bowne's doctrine of
freedom consists in showing that it is the condition of the
essential trustworthiness of reason, that it is a necessary
postulate, basic to mental life, apart from ?aiich reason cannot
function significantly but with which, groiand is provided for
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the unlimited extension of human knowledge. In short, freedom
is one of the most valmhle attributes of personality human
or divine.
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